fixing test failures
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@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ let
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anyUsb = pt.usb != [ ];
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earlyIds = lib.filter (i: i != null) (map (d: d.id) pt.pci);
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# Netfilter mark tagging guest-originated traffic in bridged mode. The
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# guest's only way in is the tap interface, so marking at the bridge
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# prerouting hook is as specific as an address match - and it is the only
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# way to identify the guest at the ip-family layer, where its DHCP-issued
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# LAN address is not statically known. 18501 == 0x4845 ("HE"), for hermenix.
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bridgeMark = 18501;
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# Graceful ACPI power button via QMP, then wait for QEMU to exit.
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stopScript = pkgs.writeShellScript "hermes-vm-stop" ''
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set -eu
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@@ -330,6 +337,26 @@ in
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type = types.int;
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default = 24;
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};
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bridged = mkOption {
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type = types.bool;
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default = false;
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description = ''
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Put the guest directly on your LAN instead of behind the host's
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NAT. The bridge absorbs `externalInterface`, and the guest takes
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an address from your LAN's DHCP, so any device on the LAN can
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reach any port the guest exposes.
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Inbound is no longer limited to `publish` (which is ignored in
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this mode): the LAN may reach every guest port. Outbound is still
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governed by `lanAccess` / `allowLan`, and `hostAccess` plus the
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host cache still work over the host-guest service net
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(`hostAddress` stays configured on the bridge).
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Requires a working DHCP server on the LAN, and a guest that runs
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a DHCP client on its NIC (see guest/common.nix - this repo's
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guest does).
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'';
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};
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externalInterface = mkOption {
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type = types.nullOr types.str;
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default = null;
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@@ -734,11 +761,15 @@ in
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systemd.network.networks."10-${net.bridge}" = {
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matchConfig.Name = net.bridge;
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# hostAddress stays on the bridge in both modes: it is the guest's
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# service net (host cache, hostAccess). In bridged mode the LAN DHCP
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# lease is added on top of it.
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address = [ "${net.hostAddress}/${toString net.prefixLength}" ];
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networkConfig = {
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ConfigureWithoutCarrier = true;
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IPv4Forwarding = true;
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};
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}
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// lib.optionalAttrs net.bridged { DHCP = "ipv4"; };
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};
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systemd.network.networks."11-${net.tapId}" = {
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@@ -746,6 +777,17 @@ in
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networkConfig.Bridge = net.bridge;
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};
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# Bridged mode: the physical uplink becomes a bridge port so the LAN
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# shares an L2 domain with the guest and the guest's DHCP is answered
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# by the LAN itself. The port must not carry its own address config -
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# the bridge owns the LAN address now. Note the bridge takes a fresh
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# DHCP lease, and because its MAC can differ from the uplink's, the
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# host's LAN IP may change after the first switch to bridged mode.
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systemd.network.networks."12-${net.externalInterface}" = lib.mkIf net.bridged {
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matchConfig.Name = net.externalInterface;
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networkConfig.Bridge = net.bridge;
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};
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# ip_forward: use the same sysctl keys networking.nat used (mkOverride 99
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# so they win over any lower-priority defaults elsewhere in the config).
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boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding" = lib.mkOverride 99 true;
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@@ -764,19 +806,86 @@ in
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# while covering every legitimate external path.
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networking.nftables.tables.hermenix-nat = lib.mkIf (net.externalInterface != null) {
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family = "ip";
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content =
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if net.bridged then
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# Bridged mode: no DNAT (the guest is directly reachable on the
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# LAN) and no primary masquerade. Keep one scoped masquerade as a
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# fallback: if the guest's DHCP lease lapses it falls back to its
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# static default route via the host, and this keeps that path
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# working instead of blackholing at the uplink. With a healthy
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# lease the guest's traffic is L2-bridged and never reaches this
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# chain. Only traffic handed up from the bridge (i.e. the guest's
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# service-net traffic) is matched, never the LAN itself.
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''
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chain postrouting {
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type nat hook postrouting priority srcnat;
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iifname "${net.bridge}" oifname "${net.externalInterface}" masquerade
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}
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''
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else
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''
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chain prerouting {
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type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat;
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''
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+ lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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iifname != "${net.bridge}" ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.hostPort} dnat to ${net.guestAddress}:${toString s.guestPort}
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'') cfg.publish
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+ ''
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}
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chain postrouting {
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type nat hook postrouting priority srcnat;
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iifname "${net.bridge}" oifname "${net.externalInterface}" masquerade
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}
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'';
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};
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# =====================================================================
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# Bridged mode: bridge-family enforcement.
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#
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# With the uplink bridged, guest <-> LAN traffic is switched at L2 and
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# never traverses the ip-family hooks the NAT-mode rules rely on, so
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# bridged mode gets its own table where the tap port is unambiguous.
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# lanAccess / allowLan still gate what the guest may reach; inbound
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# from the LAN to the guest is open on every port.
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# =====================================================================
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networking.nftables.tables."hermenix-bridge" = lib.mkIf net.bridged {
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family = "bridge";
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content = ''
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chain prerouting {
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type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat;
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type filter hook prerouting priority filter; policy accept;
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# Tag anything entering from the guest. ip-family input rules
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# (host cache, hostAccess) match this mark.
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iifname "${net.tapId}" meta mark set ${toString bridgeMark}
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}
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chain forward {
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type filter hook forward priority filter; policy accept;
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# Inbound from the LAN to the guest: any device, any port.
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oifname "${net.tapId}" accept
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''
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+ lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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iifname != "${net.bridge}" ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.hostPort} dnat to ${net.guestAddress}:${toString s.guestPort}
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'') cfg.publish
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iifname "${net.tapId}" ip daddr ${s.address} ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.port} accept
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'') cfg.lanAccess
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+ (
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if cfg.allowLan then
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''
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iifname "${net.tapId}" accept
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''
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else
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''
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iifname "${net.tapId}" ip daddr {
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10.0.0.0/8,
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172.16.0.0/12,
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192.168.0.0/16,
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169.254.0.0/16,
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127.0.0.0/8,
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100.64.0.0/10
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} drop
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iifname "${net.tapId}" ip6 daddr { fc00::/7, fe80::/10, ::1/128 } drop
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iifname "${net.tapId}" accept
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''
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)
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+ ''
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}
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chain postrouting {
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type nat hook postrouting priority srcnat;
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iifname "${net.bridge}" oifname "${net.externalInterface}" masquerade
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}
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'';
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};
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@@ -792,15 +901,35 @@ in
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# The deliberate guest -> host holes: the Nix cache, plus anything listed
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# in hostAccess.
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#
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# NAT mode: the guest always arrives from its fixed service-net address,
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# so match address + bridge. Bridged mode: the guest's LAN address comes
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# from DHCP and is not known here, so the bridge table above tags guest
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# traffic with a netfilter mark as it enters the tap - the rules match
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# that mark instead. The tap is exclusive to the guest, so the mark is
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# as specific as an address match: LAN devices can never inherit these
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# holes.
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networking.firewall.extraInputRules =
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optionalString cfg.hostCache.enable ''
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iifname "${net.bridge}" ip saddr ${net.guestAddress} tcp dport ${toString cfg.hostCache.port} accept
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''
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+ lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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iifname "${net.bridge}" ip saddr ${net.guestAddress} ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.port} accept
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'') cfg.hostAccess;
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if net.bridged then
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optionalString cfg.hostCache.enable ''
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meta mark ${toString bridgeMark} tcp dport ${toString cfg.hostCache.port} accept
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''
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+ lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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meta mark ${toString bridgeMark} ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.port} accept
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'') cfg.hostAccess
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else
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optionalString cfg.hostCache.enable ''
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iifname "${net.bridge}" ip saddr ${net.guestAddress} tcp dport ${toString cfg.hostCache.port} accept
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''
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+ lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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iifname "${net.bridge}" ip saddr ${net.guestAddress} ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.port} accept
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'') cfg.hostAccess;
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# Order matters here. Allowlists must precede the RFC1918 drop.
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#
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# These ip-family rules only ever see routed traffic. They are the whole
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# story in NAT mode; in bridged mode the guest's LAN traffic is
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# L2-bridged instead and is governed by the hermenix-bridge table.
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networking.firewall.extraForwardRules = ''
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iifname != "${net.bridge}" accept
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ct state established,related accept
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@@ -809,10 +938,13 @@ in
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+ lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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iifname "${net.bridge}" ip daddr ${s.address} ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.port} accept
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'') cfg.lanAccess
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# Inbound to guest services published on the uplink.
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+ lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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oifname "${net.bridge}" ip daddr ${net.guestAddress} ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.guestPort} accept
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'') cfg.publish
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# Inbound to guest services published on the uplink. NAT mode only; in
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# bridged mode the bridge table opens every inbound port instead.
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+ lib.optionalString (!net.bridged) (
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lib.concatMapStrings (s: ''
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oifname "${net.bridge}" ip daddr ${net.guestAddress} ${s.proto} dport ${toString s.guestPort} accept
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'') cfg.publish
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)
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+ (
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if cfg.allowLan then
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''
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