# hermenix Hermes Agent in a NixOS VM that owns its own bootloader and its own `/nix/store`, on two btrfs-backed disks, under an unprivileged hardened QEMU. The agent can rebuild its own system and update itself, durably. It shares no filesystem with the host, and reaches nothing on your network unless you say so. --- ## Installation ### Guided The `hermenix` CLI (`nu/hermenix.nu`) is a flake package — no checkout needed anywhere. Run it straight from its Gitea URL: ```bash nix run git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermenix -- setup ``` (Or `nix profile install git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermenix` once, then just `hermenix setup` from here on — or get it declaratively via the nixos-setup overlay, same as any other package. Any of these work from any directory, on any host with SSH access to Gitea.) Walks the host-side steps: checks prerequisites, creates the disks, generates the cache signing key, writes `/etc/hermenix/local.nix` from your SSH keys, builds the bootstrap image and writes it to the disk. It prints the module snippet to paste into your own configuration at the end, with your uplink interface already filled in. Safe to re-run — every step detects what's already done and offers to skip, and nothing destructive happens without an explicit confirmation. It deliberately stops short of `nixos-rebuild`, since that's your config. The rest of this section is what the command does, for when you'd rather do it by hand or something goes sideways. ### 1. Create the disks Two of them, and the split is the whole design: | | Holds | Size | Snapshotted | Backed up | |---|---|---|---|---| | **system** | NixOS, `/nix/store` | 80G | No | No | | **state** | identity, memories, workspace, `/etc/nixos` | 20G | Yes | Yes | The system disk is large, takes all the write churn, and is entirely rebuildable from this flake — so there's no point protecting it. The state disk holds the only things that can't be reproduced, which makes snapshots cheap and backups quick. ```bash sudo btrfs subvolume create /var/lib/hermes-vm/system sudo btrfs subvolume create /var/lib/hermes-vm/state sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/hermes-vm/snapshots # BEFORE creating any file inside them sudo chattr +C /var/lib/hermes-vm/system /var/lib/hermes-vm/state sudo btrfs property set /var/lib/hermes-vm/system state compression none sudo truncate -s 80G /var/lib/hermes-vm/system/system.raw sudo truncate -s 20G /var/lib/hermes-vm/state/state.raw sudo mkfs.ext4 -L hermes-state /var/lib/hermes-vm/state/state.raw ``` **The `chattr +C` ordering matters.** Btrfs is copy-on-write and so is a VM writing to a disk image; stacked, every guest write forks an extent and the image fragments badly. `+C` turns that off — but only for files created afterwards. Set it on empty subvolumes and confirm with `lsattr` before writing anything. If you get it backwards, recreate the subvolume and copy the image in fresh. Separate subvolumes because a btrfs snapshot covers a whole subvolume. Keeping the system image out of the state subvolume is what makes snapshots small. ### 2. Generate the cache signing key The host serves its store to the guest as a read-only binary cache, so the guest doesn't re-download from the internet what you already have. ```bash sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets sudo nix-store --generate-binary-cache-key hermes-cache-1 \ /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.secret /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.pub sudo chown nix-serve /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.secret sudo chmod 0400 /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.secret cat /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.pub ``` ### 3. Write `/etc/hermenix/local.nix` Host-specific settings live here, not in this repo — see `guest/local.nix.example` for the reference shape: ```nix { cachePublicKey = "hermes-cache-1:AbCd..."; # the key you just printed; leave # empty and the guest just skips # the host cache authorizedKeys = [ "ssh-ed25519 AAAA... you@laptop" ]; } ``` `sudo mkdir -p /etc/hermenix` first if it doesn't exist. ### 4. Build the image and write it to the system disk The two extra substituter options stop you compiling Determinate Nix from source. `--impure` is needed because `guest/common.nix` reads `/etc/hermenix/local.nix` from outside this flake's own source tree — deliberately, so the flake itself stays generic and shareable while your settings stay on your host. ```bash nix build --impure git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermes-guest-image \ --option extra-substituters https://install.determinate.systems \ --option extra-trusted-public-keys cache.flakehub.com-3:hJuILl5sVK4iKm86JzgdXW12Y2Hwd5G07qKtHTOcDCM= # notrunc keeps the disk at its full size; the image is smaller sudo dd if=result/nixos.img of=/var/lib/hermes-vm/system/system.raw \ bs=4M conv=notrunc,fsync status=progress ``` (Building from a local checkout instead — e.g. while developing this flake — works the same way with `.` in place of the git URL.) ### 5. Add the module to your system flake ```nix { inputs.hermenix.url = "git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git"; outputs = { nixpkgs, hermenix, ... }: { nixosConfigurations.myserver = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem { system = "x86_64-linux"; modules = [ hermenix.nixosModules.default ./configuration.nix ]; }; }; } ``` ```nix services.hermenix = { enable = true; disk.baseDir = "/var/lib/hermes-vm"; network.externalInterface = "eno1"; # your uplink vcpu = 4; mem = 8192; }; ``` `sudo nixos-rebuild switch`, then `hermes-vm console` to watch it boot. ### 6. First boot, inside the guest ```bash hermes-vm ssh # Confirm the disk labels match guest/hardware.nix BEFORE any rebuild lsblk -f # FlakeHub Cache login. Device-code flow: it prints a URL you approve in a # browser anywhere, so the headless guest never needs one. determinate-nixd login # Pin the seeded flake sudo nix flake lock /etc/nixos ``` The Hermes CLI installs itself automatically on first boot (`systemd.services.hermes-install` in `common.nix`) — it runs unattended, so there's nothing to run for that part. Give it a few minutes (it's compiling native Node modules); watch it with `journalctl --user -u hermes-install -f` if you want to see it happen. Once it's done: ```bash hermes setup hermes gateway install ``` These two need real input (model provider, API keys, messaging platform tokens), so they stay manual. The identity seed is already in place — `SOUL.md`, a starter `config.yaml`, a `USER.md` and a skill covering safe self-rebuilds. Back on the host, check the gateway came up and that the unit name matches the default: ```bash hermes-ctl units hermes-ctl status hermes-ctl soul ``` > **Check the labels in step 6 before the first rebuild.** > `guest/hardware.nix` assumes the root partition is labelled `nixos` and the > ESP `ESP`. If the image generator used different ones, fix that file first. > Otherwise the agent's first `nixos-rebuild switch` produces a system that > won't boot and you're restoring a snapshot on day one. From here `hermes update` self-updates in place and `sudo nixos-rebuild switch --flake /etc/nixos#hermes` is a durable change to the machine. Neither needs anything from you. --- ## Running it on a remote host `setup` and `migrate` both act on whatever machine they run on — local disks, local sudo, vsock into the local guest. There's no way around SSHing into the target host first. `hermenix remote` does that SSH step for you: ```bash hermenix remote fwdesk.lab.internal setup hermenix remote fwdesk.lab.internal "setup --clean" hermenix remote fwdesk.lab.internal "migrate /var/lib/hermes" ``` Quote the subcommand and its own flags/args as **one string** whenever there's more than just the bare subcommand name — nu's own argument parser treats any bare `--flag`-shaped word as an attempt to match a flag on `remote` itself, so `hermenix remote host setup --clean` (unquoted) fails before it ever reaches the SSH step. It runs `nix run #hermenix -- ` directly on the remote host — no checkout involved, on either end. The remote host does need its own SSH access to Gitea (the same access a `git clone` would need). Override the flake URL with `--flake` if you're pointing at a fork or a branch. It connects with `ssh -t`, which allocates a real pty — required for the interactive prompts in `setup`/`migrate` to work at all over the connection. --- ## SSH into the guest ```bash hermes-vm ssh # interactive shell hermes-vm ssh systemctl status # run a command and exit hermes-vm console # serial console, for when SSH is down ``` This goes over **vsock**, not the network. There is no listening SSH port exposed anywhere, and the guest needs no inbound network path for you to reach it. If the guest has broken its own networking entirely, `hermes-vm ssh` still works — `console` is the fallback for when it's broken its SSH too. Under the hood it's `ssh -o ProxyCommand='socat - VSOCK-CONNECT:77:22'`, if you'd rather drive it by hand. --- ## Bootstrapping Hermes's identity The seed lives in `guest/hermes/`: ``` guest/hermes/ home/ SOUL.md -> ~/.hermes/SOUL.md config.yaml -> ~/.hermes/config.yaml memories/USER.md -> ~/.hermes/memories/USER.md skills/nixos-self-config/SKILL.md -> ~/.hermes/skills/... workspace/ AGENTS.md -> ~/workspace/AGENTS.md ``` Edit these before building the image and the agent wakes up already knowing who it is, how you like to be spoken to, and how to rebuild its own system without bricking itself. **Seeding happens on first boot only, and this is deliberate.** Hermes rewrites `SOUL.md` and its memories as it learns — that's the product. If the seed were re-applied on every rebuild it would silently delete everything the agent had worked out about you. So the copy is guarded by a marker file and never repeats. Two consequences: - Editing `guest/hermes/` after first boot changes nothing by itself. Use `hermes-ctl reseed` when you actually want to overwrite. - The seed is the *starting* identity, not the current one. To see what Hermes has made of itself, `hermes-ctl soul`. ### Machine facts vs identity `/etc/hermes/ENVIRONMENT.md` is generated from `guest/common.nix` on every rebuild and describes the machine: what's reachable, where the store is, what persists. It's always accurate and there's no point editing it. `SOUL.md` is identity and belongs to the agent. The seeded version points at `ENVIRONMENT.md` rather than repeating it, so the two can't drift. ### Folding what it learned back into the seed ```bash hermes-ctl pull ./hermes-home # excludes .env, sessions, state.db diff -ru guest/hermes/home ./hermes-home ``` Worth doing occasionally. If the agent has written something genuinely good into its own SOUL.md, you want that in the seed before you ever rebuild from scratch. --- ## Managing Hermes from the host `hermes-vm` drives the virtual machine. `hermes-ctl` drives the agent inside it. Rename the latter with `services.hermenix.cliName = "hermes";` if you'd rather it felt local. ```bash hermes-ctl soul # current identity hermes-ctl soul edit # pull, $EDITOR, push, offer to restart hermes-ctl memory edit # memories/USER.md hermes-ctl conf edit # config.yaml hermes-ctl secrets # keys, values masked hermes-ctl secrets edit # edit ~/.hermes/.env, written 0600 hermes-ctl secrets show # values, when you really mean it hermes-ctl status # gateway service hermes-ctl logs # follow it hermes-ctl restart hermes-ctl units # find the unit name if the default is wrong hermes-ctl reseed # overwrite identity from the seed hermes-ctl pull [dir] # copy live identity to the host ``` Anything unrecognised is passed straight through to the `hermes` CLI in the guest, with a TTY attached: ```bash hermes-ctl chat hermes-ctl update hermes-ctl sessions list hermes-ctl doctor ``` The `edit` variants pull the file out over vsock, open your `$EDITOR` locally, write it back, and offer to restart the gateway. Secrets go in at mode 0600 and never pass through the Nix store — which is the whole reason there's no declarative option for them. If `status` and `logs` come back empty, the gateway unit is probably named something other than `hermes-agent`. Run `hermes-ctl units` and set `services.hermenix.gatewayUnit` to match; upstream has used more than one name for it. ## Seeing what the guest is running ```bash hermes-vm config ``` Prints the current system store path, the last ten generations, the git log of `/etc/nixos`, and anything uncommitted. That last one matters: the agent editing files without committing is the usual reason the config on disk and the running system disagree. To read or diff the config locally: ```bash hermes-vm config-pull ./guest-live diff -ru guest/ guest-live/ ``` Expect that diff to grow. The `guest/` directory in this repo is the seed that was written on first boot; it is deliberately not kept in sync. Once the agent edits its config, this repo and the guest diverge permanently, and a host rebuild will not fix a guest config problem. --- ## Letting the guest reach a service on your network By default the guest can reach the public internet and nothing private. To open a single endpoint — say Ollama on another machine: ```nix services.hermenix.lanAccess = [ { address = "192.168.1.50"; port = 11434; } # ollama { address = "192.168.1.50"; port = 9000; proto = "udp"; } ]; ``` Each entry punches one destination and port through the RFC1918 drop. The guest reaches it as `192.168.1.50:11434` directly. Traffic is masqueraded, so the other machine sees it arriving from your host's address, not the guest's. There's also `allowLan = true`, which opens all private address space at once. It exists, but reach for `lanAccess` instead — the whole point of this design is that an agent which goes wrong can't go wandering. ### A service on the host itself Different chain, different option. ComfyUI on the host, port 8188: ```nix services.hermenix.hostAccess = [ { port = 8188; } ]; ``` **The service must be bound somewhere the guest can see.** If it listens on `127.0.0.1` the rule won't help, because the guest arrives on the bridge address. Bind it to `10.77.0.1` (bridge only, invisible to your LAN) or `0.0.0.0`: ```nix services.comfyui.listenAddress = "10.77.0.1"; # or whatever your service calls it ``` From the guest that's then `http://10.77.0.1:8188`. --- ## Exposing a service the guest is running Say the agent has built a web app on guest port 8080. Two halves. **Guest side.** The agent opens its own firewall, in `/etc/nixos`: ```nix networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 22 8080 ]; ``` **Host side.** Nothing at all, if you only want to reach it from the host — host-to-guest is outbound traffic and already permitted: ```bash curl http://10.77.0.2:8080 ``` To publish it to the wider network: ```nix services.hermenix.publish = [ { hostPort = 8080; guestPort = 8080; } ]; ``` That DNATs the port on your uplink to the guest and opens the matching forward rule. `hostPort` and `guestPort` don't have to match, so you can park an awkward guest port somewhere sensible. A note on this one: publishing a port is the one change here that lets the outside world start conversations with the agent's machine. Everything else in this design is the guest reaching out. Put a reverse proxy with TLS and auth in front of anything that isn't a toy, and keep the list short. --- ## Passing hardware to the guest ### Before reaching for this If what you want is "the agent can use the GPU", passthrough is often the wrong answer. It is exclusive — the host loses the card completely while the VM runs — and it is the single largest reduction in isolation available in this setup. The alternative: keep Ollama or ComfyUI on the host where the GPU already works, and open the port with `hostAccess`. The agent gets the capability over HTTP and the device stays on your side of the boundary. That is usually both easier and better. Pass the hardware through when the guest genuinely needs the device itself — CUDA in-process, a capture card, a radio, a display output. ### What passthrough costs you A PCI device does DMA. The IOMMU is the only thing standing between a passed-through device and host memory, which is why `passthrough.iommu` is a hard requirement and the module refuses to build without it. Two further constraints follow from how IOMMUs work: - **Whole groups only.** Every device in an IOMMU group goes together. Check yours before planning anything: ```bash for d in /sys/kernel/iommu_groups/*/devices/*; do echo "group $(basename "$(dirname "$(dirname "$d")")"): $(lspci -nns "$(basename "$d")")" done | sort -V ``` If your GPU shares a group with a controller you need, you cannot pass it cleanly. ACS override patches exist; they work by lying about isolation, and they have no place in a setup built to contain an autonomous agent. - **Every function.** A GPU is at least two entries — graphics and its HDMI audio function. ### GPU ```bash lspci -Dnn | grep -i vga # addresses and vendor:device IDs ``` ```nix services.hermenix.passthrough = { iommu = "amd"; # or "intel" pci = [ { address = "0000:01:00.0"; id = "10de:2204"; } # graphics { address = "0000:01:00.1"; id = "10de:1aef"; } # HDMI audio ]; }; ``` Setting `id` makes vfio-pci claim the card in the initrd, before `nvidia` or `amdgpu` can. Do this for GPUs — unbinding a live graphics driver afterwards is unreliable, and the failure mode is a host with no display. Devices given only an `address` are bound at boot by a oneshot service instead, which is fine for things you swap around. Rebuild and **reboot** — early binding happens in the initrd. Then check: ```bash lspci -nnk -d 10de:2204 | grep "Kernel driver" # want: vfio-pci ``` On the guest side, the agent installs the drivers itself. It owns `/etc/nixos`, so `hardware.nvidia` and `nvidia-container-toolkit` are its problem, not yours — which is rather the point of the arrangement. ### HDMI output A display hanging off a passed-through GPU works once the guest drives the card; nothing extra is needed here. A capture card or HDMI grabber is just another PCI or USB device — find it with `lspci -Dnn` or `lsusb` and use the matching section. ### USB devices and Bluetooth Matched by vendor and product ID: ```bash lsusb # e.g. "Bus 001 Device 004: ID 8087:0026 Intel ..." ``` ```nix services.hermenix.passthrough.usb = [ { vendorId = "8087"; productId = "0026"; } # bluetooth radio { vendorId = "0403"; productId = "6001"; } # serial adapter ]; ``` This adds an xHCI controller to the guest and forwards the matching devices. No IOMMU requirement, no VFIO, and much milder than PCI passthrough — QEMU mediates rather than handing over raw hardware. Two things that catch people: - **The host must not be using it.** For an integrated Bluetooth radio, keep `btusb` off it: `boot.blacklistedKernelModules = [ "btusb" ];`, and don't enable `hardware.bluetooth` on the host. - **No hotplug.** QEMU resolves these at start, so a device that's unplugged when the VM boots won't appear when you plug it in. `hermes-vm restart` after plugging. Passing a whole USB *controller* through as a PCI device gets you real hotplug for anything in its ports, at the cost of that controller being exclusive to the guest. ### When it doesn't start `hermes-vm console` first. Then, in rough order of likelihood: the device didn't bind to vfio-pci (`lspci -nnk`), the IOMMU isn't on (`dmesg | grep -i iommu`), or something in the group is still held by the host. The module lifts `LimitMEMLOCK` for you when PCI passthrough is configured, since VFIO pins the whole guest RAM allocation and the default limit otherwise produces a memorably unhelpful error. ## Recovery Four layers, cheapest first. The first two live inside the guest and cover almost every real mistake. ```bash # The agent's own config history hermes-ctl soul # what it thinks it is now hermes-vm ssh git -C /etc/nixos log --oneline # Previous NixOS generations, also in the guest's boot menu hermes-vm ssh sudo nixos-rebuild switch --rollback # Snapshot of the state disk hermes-vm snapshots hermes-vm rollback state-20260914-1400 # Restore from backup hermes-vm backups ``` ### Snapshots Hourly by default, keeping 48. Only the state disk — the system disk isn't snapshotted because `hermenix setup` rebuilds it from the flake in minutes. The host fsfreezes the guest through qemu-guest-agent around each one, so the snapshot captures a consistent filesystem rather than the equivalent of pulling the power. Takes milliseconds; the VM keeps running. `hermes-vm rollback` stops the VM, moves the current state subvolume aside as `state.old-`, and restores the snapshot in its place. Nothing is deleted, so a mistaken rollback is itself reversible. Clean the `state.old-*` directories up yourself once you're happy. **Keep retention tighter than you would on ZFS.** The state image is nodatacow, and every live snapshot reintroduces copy-on-write for the blocks it still references. Performance sags while snapshots exist and recovers as they're pruned. ### Backups ```nix services.hermenix.backup = { enable = true; repository = "sftp:backup@nas:/hermes"; passwordFile = "/var/lib/secrets/hermes-restic"; }; ``` This backs up the guest's *state*, not its disk. Files are pulled over the SSH channel that already exists and streamed into restic. Two reasons it works that way. The backup stays portable — it restores onto any filesystem, or a different machine entirely, and doesn't care that you're on btrfs today. And it avoids loop-mounting a guest-written filesystem on the host, which would mean the host kernel parsing data the agent controls. That would undo a fair bit of what the rest of this design is for. If the repository is on your LAN rather than the internet, note this runs on the *host*, so it needs no `lanAccess` entry — the guest never touches it. ### When the guest won't boot at all The system disk is disposable by design. Re-run `hermenix setup`, write a fresh image to the system disk, and leave the state disk alone — Hermes comes back with its identity, memories, workspace and NixOS config intact. That is the intended repair, not a last resort. ### Starting completely fresh `hermenix setup --clean` stops the VM, deletes the existing `system.raw`/`state.raw`/UEFI vars, and drops the stale `known_hosts` entry for the guest (a fresh state disk means a fresh SSH host key on next boot, so the old entry would otherwise fail with a host-key-mismatch on your next connect) — then walks through setup again for a genuinely clean first boot, rather than the disk-exists, skip-ahead path. It leaves the btrfs subvolumes and any snapshots alone (only the files inside them), and asks you to type `clean` to confirm before touching anything. --- ## Nix flavour The guest runs **Determinate Nix**, nixpkgs pinned to FlakeHub (`f/NixOS/nixpkgs/0.1`, rolling; use `0` for current stable). - `/etc/nix/nix.conf` belongs to Determinate and must not be edited. Custom settings go in `/etc/nix/nix.custom.conf`, written from `guest/common.nix`. There is deliberately no `nix.settings` block. - No `nix.gc` either — `determinate-nixd` runs the collector. - Lazy trees are on by default, which makes the agent's flake evaluations much cheaper. That matters more than it sounds when something re-evaluates nixpkgs on a schedule. - Neither flake uses `inputs.nixpkgs.follows` for `determinate`. Determinate warn it causes FlakeHub Cache misses. Substituter order in the guest: FlakeHub Cache, your host cache, `cache.nixos.org`. If FlakeHub Cache goes quiet, the login has expired — run `determinate-nixd login` again. The host stays on stock Nix. Nothing here requires changing that. --- ## What the guest can and cannot reach | | Default | |---|---| | Public internet | Yes — it needs this for model APIs and messaging | | Host Nix cache | Yes, one port, `hostCache.enable = false` closes it | | Anything else on the host | No, unless in `hostAccess` | | Your LAN and other VMs | No, unless in `lanAccess` | | Inbound from the network | No, unless in `publish` | | Host hardware | None, unless in `passthrough` | The guest owns its kernel and its config, so nothing inside it is a security boundary. The nftables rules in `modules/host.nix` are. QEMU runs as an unprivileged `hermes-vm` user with its own seccomp sandbox and systemd hardening, with a thin device model: virtio-blk, virtio-net, vsock, RNG, serial. No virtiofs. `vhost-net` is off deliberately — it would move packet handling into the host kernel in exchange for throughput one agent doesn't need. The host cache does let the guest read every store path on the host. Store paths are world-readable anyway, so this isn't new exposure, but don't bake secrets into your host's store. --- ## Known rough edges - The Determinate NixOS module's option names for custom Nix settings aren't published — only the nix-darwin `determinateNix.customSettings` equivalent is. So `guest/common.nix` writes `/etc/nix/nix.custom.conf` via `environment.etc`. If a future module version claims that file, you'll get a conflict; switch to its option then. - `determinate-nixd login` is manual. There's no way to bake the credential into the image without parking a token somewhere it shouldn't be. - `MemoryDenyWriteExecute = true` is correct under KVM but is the first thing to flip if QEMU refuses to start. - `pkgs.OVMF.firmware` / `pkgs.OVMF.variables` are current attribute names; older nixpkgs put these under `pkgs.OVMF.fd` in an `FV/` subdirectory. - PCI passthrough needs a reboot to take effect, because early vfio binding happens in the initrd. - Snapshots need btrfs. Everything else works on any filesystem; without it you rely on backups alone for recovery. - `state.old-*` directories left by `hermes-vm rollback` are not cleaned up automatically, on purpose. Delete them yourself once you're sure. - First boot builds a lot. Give it time. --- ## Migrating an existing (e.g. Docker-based) Hermes deployment If you already have a running Hermes with real data (`HERMES_HOME` pointing at some directory full of `SOUL.md`, `memories/`, `sessions/`, `state.db`, etc.): ```bash nix run git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermenix -- migrate /path/to/existing/HERMES_HOME ``` Run `... -- migrate --help` for the full set of options (vsock CID, guest user, destination path, hostname rewrites). It copies — never moves or deletes — the source data, so the original stays a safe fallback until you've verified the new VM. The module's `services.hermenix.hermesHome` option lets `hermes-ctl` (and your own `HERMES_HOME` export inside the guest) point at wherever that existing flat layout lands, instead of the default seeded `~/.hermes`.