# Hermenix Hermes Agent in a NixOS VM that owns its own bootloader and its own `/nix/store`, on two btrfs-backed disks, under an unprivileged hardened QEMU. **THE ULTIMATE WAY TO RUN HERMES**! The agent can rebuild its own system and update itself, durably. It shares no filesystem with the host, and reaches **nothing** on your network unless **you say so**. One CLI, `hermenix`, with five subcommands: | | For | | -------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | | `hermenix setup` | one-off host provisioning — disks, cache key, image build | | `hermenix migrate ` | carry an existing flat `HERMES_HOME` into the guest | | `hermenix remote ""` | run `setup`/`migrate` on a remote host over SSH | | `hermenix vm ` | control the VM itself — start/stop/console/snapshots/backups | | `hermenix ctl ` | drive the agent inside the VM — identity/config/secrets/gateway | --- ## Installation ### Guided The `hermenix` CLI (`nu/hermenix.nu`) is a flake package — no checkout needed anywhere. Run it straight from its Gitea URL: ```bash nix run git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermenix -- setup ``` (Or `nix profile install git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermenix` once, then just `hermenix setup` from here on — or get it declaratively via the nixos-setup overlay, same as any other package. Any of these work from any directory, on any host with SSH access to Gitea.) Walks the host-side steps: checks prerequisites, creates the disks, generates the cache signing key, writes `/etc/hermenix/local.nix` from your SSH keys, builds the bootstrap image and writes it to the disk. It prints the module snippet to paste into your own configuration at the end, with your uplink interface already filled in. Safe to re-run — every step detects what's already done and offers to skip, and nothing destructive happens without an explicit confirmation. It deliberately stops short of `nixos-rebuild`, since that's your config. The rest of this section is what the command does, for when you'd rather do it by hand or something goes sideways. ### 1. Create the disks Two of them, and the split is the whole design: | | Holds | Size | Snapshotted | Backed up | | ---------- | ------------------------------------------- | ---- | ----------- | --------- | | **system** | NixOS, `/nix/store` | 80G | No | No | | **state** | identity, memories, workspace, `/etc/nixos` | 20G | Yes | Yes | The system disk is large, takes all the write churn, and is entirely rebuildable from this flake — so there's no point protecting it. The state disk holds the only things that can't be reproduced, which makes snapshots cheap and backups quick. ```bash sudo btrfs subvolume create /var/lib/hermes-vm/system sudo btrfs subvolume create /var/lib/hermes-vm/state sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/hermes-vm/snapshots # BEFORE creating any file inside them sudo chattr +C /var/lib/hermes-vm/system /var/lib/hermes-vm/state sudo btrfs property set /var/lib/hermes-vm/system compression none sudo btrfs property set /var/lib/hermes-vm/state compression none sudo truncate -s 80G /var/lib/hermes-vm/system/system.raw sudo truncate -s 20G /var/lib/hermes-vm/state/state.raw sudo mkfs.ext4 -L hermes-state /var/lib/hermes-vm/state/state.raw ``` **The `chattr +C` ordering matters.** Btrfs is copy-on-write and so is a VM writing to a disk image; stacked, every guest write forks an extent and the image fragments badly. `+C` turns that off — but only for files created afterwards. Set it on empty subvolumes and confirm with `lsattr` before writing anything. If you get it backwards, recreate the subvolume and copy the image in fresh. Separate subvolumes because a btrfs snapshot covers a whole subvolume. Keeping the system image out of the state subvolume is what makes snapshots small. ### 2. Generate the cache signing key The host serves its store to the guest as a read-only binary cache, so the guest doesn't re-download from the internet what you already have. ```bash sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets sudo nix-store --generate-binary-cache-key hermes-cache-1 \ /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.secret /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.pub sudo chown nix-serve /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.secret sudo chmod 0400 /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.secret cat /var/lib/secrets/hermes-cache.pub ``` ### 3. Write `/etc/hermenix/local.nix` Host-specific settings live here, not in this repo — see `guest/local.nix.example` for the reference shape: ```nix { cachePublicKey = "hermes-cache-1:AbCd..."; # the key you just printed; leave # empty and the guest just skips # the host cache authorizedKeys = [ "ssh-ed25519 AAAA... you@laptop" ]; } ``` `sudo mkdir -p /etc/hermenix` first if it doesn't exist. ### 4. Build the image and write it to the system disk The two extra substituter options stop you compiling Determinate Nix from source. `--impure` is needed because `guest/common.nix` reads `/etc/hermenix/local.nix` from outside this flake's own source tree — deliberately, so the flake itself stays generic and shareable while your settings stay on your host. ```bash nix build --impure git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermes-guest-image \ --option extra-substituters https://install.determinate.systems \ --option extra-trusted-public-keys cache.flakehub.com-3:hJuILl5sVK4iKm86JzgdXW12Y2Hwd5G07qKtHTOcDCM= # notrunc keeps the disk at its full size; the image is smaller sudo dd if=result/nixos.img of=/var/lib/hermes-vm/system/system.raw \ bs=4M conv=notrunc,fsync status=progress ``` (Building from a local checkout instead — e.g. while developing this flake — works the same way with `.` in place of the git URL.) ### 5. Add the module to your system flake ```nix { inputs.hermenix.url = "git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git"; outputs = { nixpkgs, hermenix, ... }: { nixosConfigurations.myserver = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem { system = "x86_64-linux"; modules = [ hermenix.nixosModules.default ./configuration.nix ]; }; }; } ``` ```nix services.hermenix = { enable = true; disk.baseDir = "/var/lib/hermes-vm"; network.externalInterface = "eno1"; # your uplink # network.bridged = true; # guest takes its own LAN IP via DHCP; # # every port it opens is then LAN-reachable vcpu = 4; mem = 8192; }; ``` `sudo nixos-rebuild switch`, then `hermenix vm console` to watch it boot. ### 6. First boot, inside the guest ```bash hermenix vm ssh # Confirm the disk labels match guest/hardware.nix BEFORE any rebuild lsblk -f # FlakeHub Cache login. Device-code flow: it prints a URL you approve in a # browser anywhere, so the headless guest never needs one. determinate-nixd login # Pin the seeded flake sudo nix flake lock /etc/nixos ``` The Hermes CLI installs itself automatically on first boot (`systemd.services.hermes-install` in `common.nix`) — it runs unattended, so there's nothing to run for that part. Give it a few minutes (it's compiling native Node modules); watch it with `journalctl --user -u hermes-install -f` if you want to see it happen. Once it's done: ```bash hermes setup hermes gateway install ``` These two need real input (model provider, API keys, messaging platform tokens), so they stay manual. The identity seed is already in place — `SOUL.md`, a starter `config.yaml`, a `USER.md` and a skill covering safe self-rebuilds. Back on the host, check the gateway came up and that the unit name matches the default: ```bash hermenix ctl units hermenix ctl status hermenix ctl soul ``` > **Check the labels in step 6 before the first rebuild.** > `guest/hardware.nix` assumes the root partition is labelled `nixos` and the > ESP `ESP`. If the image generator used different ones, fix that file first. > Otherwise the agent's first `nixos-rebuild switch` produces a system that > won't boot and you're restoring a snapshot on day one. From here `hermes update` self-updates in place and `sudo nixos-rebuild switch --flake /etc/nixos#hermes` is a durable change to the machine. Neither needs anything from you. --- ## Running it on a remote host `setup` and `migrate` both act on whatever machine they run on — local disks, local sudo, vsock into the local guest. There's no way around SSHing into the target host first. `hermenix remote` does that SSH step for you: ```bash hermenix remote fwdesk.lab.internal setup hermenix remote fwdesk.lab.internal "setup --clean" hermenix remote fwdesk.lab.internal "migrate /var/lib/hermes" ``` Quote the subcommand and its own flags/args as **one string** whenever there's more than just the bare subcommand name — nu's own argument parser treats any bare `--flag`-shaped word as an attempt to match a flag on `remote` itself, so `hermenix remote host setup --clean` (unquoted) fails before it ever reaches the SSH step. It runs `nix run #hermenix -- ` directly on the remote host — no checkout involved, on either end. The remote host does need its own SSH access to Gitea (the same access a `git clone` would need). Override the flake URL with `--flake` if you're pointing at a fork or a branch. It connects with `ssh -t`, which allocates a real pty — required for the interactive prompts in `setup`/`migrate` to work at all over the connection. --- ## SSH into the guest ```bash hermenix vm ssh # interactive shell hermenix vm ssh "systemctl status" # run a command and exit hermenix vm console # follow the VM's boot/journal output ``` `ssh` takes its remote command as a single string, not separate words — quote anything past a single bare word (nu's own parser otherwise tries to match `--flag`-shaped tokens against `vm ssh`'s own flags, and errors on extra positional words either way). This goes over **vsock**, not the network. There is no listening SSH port exposed anywhere, and the guest needs no inbound network path for you to reach it. `console` is just `journalctl -u hermes-vm -f` on the host — a read-only follow of the VM unit's journal, useful for watching it boot or diagnosing why SSH won't come up, but it can't take input. There's currently no interactive fallback for when the guest itself is unresponsive. Under the hood `ssh` is `ssh -o ProxyCommand='socat - VSOCK-CONNECT::22'` (cid defaults to 77, `services.hermenix.vsockCid`), if you'd rather drive it by hand. The VM itself is a systemd unit: `hermenix vm start`/`stop`/`restart` control it directly, same as `systemctl {start,stop,restart} hermes-vm` on the host. --- ## Bootstrapping Hermes's identity The seed lives in `guest/hermes/`: ``` guest/hermes/ home/ SOUL.md -> ~/.hermes/SOUL.md config.yaml -> ~/.hermes/config.yaml memories/USER.md -> ~/.hermes/memories/USER.md skills/nixos-self-config/SKILL.md -> ~/.hermes/skills/... workspace/ AGENTS.md -> ~/workspace/AGENTS.md ``` Edit these before building the image and the agent wakes up already knowing who it is, how you like to be spoken to, and how to rebuild its own system without bricking itself. **Seeding happens on first boot only, and this is deliberate.** Hermes rewrites `SOUL.md` and its memories as it learns — that's the product. If the seed were re-applied on every rebuild it would silently delete everything the agent had worked out about you. So the copy is guarded by a marker file and never repeats. Two consequences: - Editing `guest/hermes/` after first boot changes nothing by itself. Use `hermenix ctl reseed` when you actually want to overwrite. - The seed is the _starting_ identity, not the current one. To see what Hermes has made of itself, `hermenix ctl soul`. ### Machine facts vs identity `/etc/hermes/ENVIRONMENT.md` is generated from `guest/common.nix` on every rebuild and describes the machine: what's reachable, where the store is, what persists. It's always accurate and there's no point editing it. `SOUL.md` is identity and belongs to the agent. The seeded version points at `ENVIRONMENT.md` rather than repeating it, so the two can't drift. ### Folding what it learned back into the seed ```bash hermenix ctl pull ./hermes-home # excludes .env, sessions, state.db diff -ru guest/hermes/home ./hermes-home ``` Worth doing occasionally. If the agent has written something genuinely good into its own SOUL.md, you want that in the seed before you ever rebuild from scratch. --- ## Managing Hermes from the host `hermenix vm` drives the virtual machine. `hermenix ctl` drives the agent inside it. ```bash hermenix ctl soul # current identity hermenix ctl soul edit # pull, $EDITOR, push, offer to restart hermenix ctl memory edit # memories/USER.md hermenix ctl conf edit # config.yaml hermenix ctl secrets # keys, values masked hermenix ctl secrets edit # edit hermesHome's .env, written 0600 hermenix ctl secrets show # values, when you really mean it hermenix ctl status # gateway service hermenix ctl logs # follow it hermenix ctl restart hermenix ctl units # find the unit name if the default is wrong hermenix ctl reseed # overwrite identity from the seed hermenix ctl pull [dir] # copy live identity to the host ``` Anything unrecognised is passed straight through to the `hermes` CLI in the guest, with a TTY attached — quote it as one string if it's more than a single word (same rule as `vm ssh` above): ```bash hermenix ctl chat hermenix ctl update hermenix ctl "sessions list" hermenix ctl doctor ``` The `edit` variants pull the file out over vsock, open your `$EDITOR` locally, write it back, and offer to restart the gateway. Secrets go in at mode 0600 and never pass through the Nix store — which is the whole reason there's no declarative option for them. If `status` and `logs` come back empty, the gateway unit is probably named something other than `hermes-agent`. Run `hermenix ctl units` and set `services.hermenix.gatewayUnit` to match; upstream has used more than one name for it. ## Seeing what the guest is running ```bash hermenix vm config ``` Prints the current system store path, the last ten generations, the git log of `/etc/nixos`, and anything uncommitted. That last one matters: the agent editing files without committing is the usual reason the config on disk and the running system disagree. To read or diff the config locally: ```bash hermenix vm config-pull ./guest-live diff -ru guest/ guest-live/ ``` Expect that diff to grow. The `guest/` directory in this repo is the seed that was written on first boot; it is deliberately not kept in sync. Once the agent edits its config, this repo and the guest diverge permanently, and a host rebuild will not fix a guest config problem. --- ## Letting the guest reach a service on your network By default the guest can reach the public internet and nothing private. To open a single endpoint — say Ollama on another machine: ```nix services.hermenix.lanAccess = [ { address = "192.168.1.50"; port = 11434; } # ollama { address = "192.168.1.50"; port = 9000; proto = "udp"; } ]; ``` Each entry punches one destination and port through the RFC1918 drop. The guest reaches it as `192.168.1.50:11434` directly. Traffic is masqueraded, so the other machine sees it arriving from your host's address, not the guest's. There's also `allowLan = true`, which opens all private address space at once. It exists, but reach for `lanAccess` instead — the whole point of this design is that an agent which goes wrong can't go wandering. ### A service on the host itself Different chain, different option. ComfyUI on the host, port 8188: ```nix services.hermenix.hostAccess = [ { port = 8188; } ]; ``` **The service must be bound somewhere the guest can see.** If it listens on `127.0.0.1` the rule won't help, because the guest arrives on the bridge address. Bind it to `10.77.0.1` (bridge only, invisible to your LAN) or `0.0.0.0`: ```nix services.comfyui.listenAddress = "10.77.0.1"; # or whatever your service calls it ``` From the guest that's then `http://10.77.0.1:8188`. --- ## Exposing a service the guest is running Say the agent has built a web app on guest port 8080. Two halves. **Guest side.** The agent opens its own firewall, in `/etc/nixos`: ```nix networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 22 8080 ]; ``` **Host side.** Nothing at all, if you only want to reach it from the host — host-to-guest is outbound traffic and already permitted: ```bash curl http://10.77.0.2:8080 ``` To publish it to the wider network: ```nix services.hermenix.publish = [ { hostPort = 8080; guestPort = 8080; } ]; ``` That DNATs the port on your uplink to the guest and opens the matching forward rule. `hostPort` and `guestPort` don't have to match, so you can park an awkward guest port somewhere sensible. A note on this one: publishing a port is the one change here that lets the outside world start conversations with the agent's machine. Everything else in this design is the guest reaching out. Put a reverse proxy with TLS and auth in front of anything that isn't a toy, and keep the list short. --- ## Putting the guest directly on your LAN The default setup keeps the guest on an isolated bridge behind the host's NAT, reachable from outside only through `publish`. This section is for when you want the VM to be a first-class device on your LAN instead: its own fixed address on the network, reachable on any port from any device, while keeping everything it can see outbound locked down. Enable it and tell it your LAN's numbers: ```nix services.hermenix.network = { bridged = true; externalInterface = "enp191s0"; # your uplink (required) # Static LAN addressing: bridged mode does not use your LAN's DHCP. lanAddress = "10.0.12.50"; # the guest's fixed LAN address hostLanAddress = "10.0.12.10"; # this host's own LAN address lanGateway = "10.0.12.1"; # your router lanPrefixLength = 24; # default 24 # lanDns = [ "1.1.1.1" ]; # optional; defaults to lanGateway }; ``` What that gives you: the bridge absorbs the uplink, the host and the guest share the LAN, and each side has a fixed address. The guest never needs to know its own address - the module runs a small DHCP server on the bridge that reserves `lanAddress` for the guest's MAC, so the VM stays a plain DHCP client and just receives its address. This host keeps its LAN identity too: the bridge clones your uplink's MAC, so the LAN sees this host under its usual MAC (no duplicate-address surprises), and the guest's DHCP broadcast never leaves the bridge, so nothing on your LAN can race the reservation. ### What is and isn't reachable - **Inbound to the guest, from anywhere on the LAN: every port** is open. The guest's own firewall decides what answers - by default it only opens port 22, so the agent opens whatever it wants LAN-reachable. - **Guest egress is still gated**, exactly as in NAT mode: `lanAccess` entries and `allowLan` are unchanged. The VM sees the LAN, but only the parts you have allowed. - **Guest to host still works**: `hostAccess` and the host Nix cache are reachable over the service net at `10.77.0.1` in both modes. - **`publish` is ignored** in this mode - every inbound port is already reachable. Drop the entries if you come back to NAT mode. ### Switching over 1. Pick three free addresses: the guest (`lanAddress`), this host (`hostLanAddress` - use the address it already has on that interface, e.g. a router reservation, so nothing else on the LAN breaks), and the router itself (`lanGateway`). Keep `hostLanAddress` and `lanAddress` outside any DHCP pool, or reserve them in the router first. 2. Set `network.bridged = true` with the options above, then `sudo nixos-rebuild switch`. The network drops briefly while the host reconfigures - plan for it. 3. Verify from the host: `hermenix vm ssh`; inside the guest, `ip -4 addr` shows the service net (`10.77.0.2`) **and** its fixed LAN address. From any other device on the LAN: ```bash ssh hermes@ # and any other port the guest opens ``` ### Switching back Set `bridged = false` (the `lan*` options are ignored) and rebuild the host. The guest's DHCP client finds no server on the isolated bridge and settles onto its static route via the host again; no guest-side change needed. ### Gotchas - `hostLanAddress` is a static claim on the LAN - pick one your router won't hand out, or reserve it. - Any network config you had for the uplink interface is replaced by its bridge-port role while bridged (this module's networkd unit for it takes priority over most others). - An older guest image that predates the DHCP-on-NIC setup in the current `guest/common.nix` won't take an address in bridged mode; upgrade the image or apply that config inside the VM first. --- ## Passing hardware to the guest ### Before reaching for this If what you want is "the agent can use the GPU", passthrough is often the wrong answer. It is exclusive — the host loses the card completely while the VM runs — and it is the single largest reduction in isolation available in this setup. The alternative: keep Ollama or ComfyUI on the host where the GPU already works, and open the port with `hostAccess`. The agent gets the capability over HTTP and the device stays on your side of the boundary. That is usually both easier and better. Pass the hardware through when the guest genuinely needs the device itself — CUDA in-process, a capture card, a radio, a display output. ### What passthrough costs you A PCI device does DMA. The IOMMU is the only thing standing between a passed-through device and host memory, which is why `passthrough.iommu` is a hard requirement and the module refuses to build without it. Two further constraints follow from how IOMMUs work: - **Whole groups only.** Every device in an IOMMU group goes together. Check yours before planning anything: ```bash for d in /sys/kernel/iommu_groups/*/devices/*; do echo "group $(basename "$(dirname "$(dirname "$d")")"): $(lspci -nns "$(basename "$d")")" done | sort -V ``` If your GPU shares a group with a controller you need, you cannot pass it cleanly. ACS override patches exist; they work by lying about isolation, and they have no place in a setup built to contain an autonomous agent. - **Every function.** A GPU is at least two entries — graphics and its HDMI audio function. ### GPU ```bash lspci -Dnn | grep -i vga # addresses and vendor:device IDs ``` ```nix services.hermenix.passthrough = { iommu = "amd"; # or "intel" pci = [ { address = "0000:01:00.0"; id = "10de:2204"; } # graphics { address = "0000:01:00.1"; id = "10de:1aef"; } # HDMI audio ]; }; ``` Setting `id` makes vfio-pci claim the card in the initrd, before `nvidia` or `amdgpu` can. Do this for GPUs — unbinding a live graphics driver afterwards is unreliable, and the failure mode is a host with no display. Devices given only an `address` are bound at boot by a oneshot service instead, which is fine for things you swap around. Rebuild and **reboot** — early binding happens in the initrd. Then check: ```bash lspci -nnk -d 10de:2204 | grep "Kernel driver" # want: vfio-pci ``` On the guest side, the agent installs the drivers itself. It owns `/etc/nixos`, so `hardware.nvidia` and `nvidia-container-toolkit` are its problem, not yours — which is rather the point of the arrangement. ### HDMI output A display hanging off a passed-through GPU works once the guest drives the card; nothing extra is needed here. A capture card or HDMI grabber is just another PCI or USB device — find it with `lspci -Dnn` or `lsusb` and use the matching section. ### USB devices and Bluetooth Matched by vendor and product ID: ```bash lsusb # e.g. "Bus 001 Device 004: ID 8087:0026 Intel ..." ``` ```nix services.hermenix.passthrough.usb = [ { vendorId = "8087"; productId = "0026"; } # bluetooth radio { vendorId = "0403"; productId = "6001"; } # serial adapter ]; ``` This adds an xHCI controller to the guest and forwards the matching devices. No IOMMU requirement, no VFIO, and much milder than PCI passthrough — QEMU mediates rather than handing over raw hardware. Two things that catch people: - **The host must not be using it.** For an integrated Bluetooth radio, keep `btusb` off it: `boot.blacklistedKernelModules = [ "btusb" ];`, and don't enable `hardware.bluetooth` on the host. - **No hotplug.** QEMU resolves these at start, so a device that's unplugged when the VM boots won't appear when you plug it in. `hermenix vm restart` after plugging. Passing a whole USB _controller_ through as a PCI device gets you real hotplug for anything in its ports, at the cost of that controller being exclusive to the guest. ### When it doesn't start `hermenix vm console` first. Then, in rough order of likelihood: the device didn't bind to vfio-pci (`lspci -nnk`), the IOMMU isn't on (`dmesg | grep -i iommu`), or something in the group is still held by the host. The module lifts `LimitMEMLOCK` for you when PCI passthrough is configured, since VFIO pins the whole guest RAM allocation and the default limit otherwise produces a memorably unhelpful error. ## Recovery Four layers, cheapest first. The first two live inside the guest and cover almost every real mistake. ```bash # The agent's own config history hermenix ctl soul # what it thinks it is now hermenix vm ssh "git -C /etc/nixos log --oneline" # Previous NixOS generations, also in the guest's boot menu hermenix vm ssh "sudo nixos-rebuild switch --rollback" # Snapshot of the state disk hermenix vm snapshot # trigger one now, e.g. before a risky change hermenix vm snapshots hermenix vm rollback state-20260914-1400 # asks you to type 'rollback' to confirm # Restore from backup hermenix vm backup # trigger one now hermenix vm backups ``` ### Snapshots Hourly by default, keeping 48. Only the state disk — the system disk isn't snapshotted because `hermenix setup` rebuilds it from the flake in minutes. The host fsfreezes the guest through qemu-guest-agent around each one, so the snapshot captures a consistent filesystem rather than the equivalent of pulling the power. Takes milliseconds; the VM keeps running. `hermenix vm rollback` stops the VM, moves the current state subvolume aside as `state.old-`, and restores the snapshot in its place. Nothing is deleted, so a mistaken rollback is itself reversible. Clean the `state.old-*` directories up yourself once you're happy. **Keep retention tighter than you would on ZFS.** The state image is nodatacow, and every live snapshot reintroduces copy-on-write for the blocks it still references. Performance sags while snapshots exist and recovers as they're pruned. ### Backups ```nix services.hermenix.backup = { enable = true; repository = "sftp:backup@nas:/hermes"; passwordFile = "/var/lib/secrets/hermes-restic"; }; ``` This backs up the guest's _state_, not its disk. Files are pulled over the SSH channel that already exists and streamed into restic. Two reasons it works that way. The backup stays portable — it restores onto any filesystem, or a different machine entirely, and doesn't care that you're on btrfs today. And it avoids loop-mounting a guest-written filesystem on the host, which would mean the host kernel parsing data the agent controls. That would undo a fair bit of what the rest of this design is for. If the repository is on your LAN rather than the internet, note this runs on the _host_, so it needs no `lanAccess` entry — the guest never touches it. ### When the guest won't boot at all The system disk is disposable by design. Re-run `hermenix setup`, write a fresh image to the system disk, and leave the state disk alone — Hermes comes back with its identity, memories, workspace and NixOS config intact. That is the intended repair, not a last resort. ### Starting completely fresh `hermenix setup --clean` stops the VM, deletes the existing `system.raw`/`state.raw`/UEFI vars, and drops the stale `known_hosts` entry for the guest (a fresh state disk means a fresh SSH host key on next boot, so the old entry would otherwise fail with a host-key-mismatch on your next connect) — then walks through setup again for a genuinely clean first boot, rather than the disk-exists, skip-ahead path. It leaves the btrfs subvolumes and any snapshots alone (only the files inside them), and asks you to type `clean` to confirm before touching anything. --- ## Nix flavour The guest runs **Determinate Nix**, nixpkgs pinned to FlakeHub (`f/NixOS/nixpkgs/0.1`, rolling; use `0` for current stable). - `/etc/nix/nix.conf` belongs to Determinate and must not be edited. Custom settings go in `/etc/nix/nix.custom.conf`, written from `guest/common.nix`. There is deliberately no `nix.settings` block. - No `nix.gc` either — `determinate-nixd` runs the collector. - Lazy trees are on by default, which makes the agent's flake evaluations much cheaper. That matters more than it sounds when something re-evaluates nixpkgs on a schedule. - Neither flake uses `inputs.nixpkgs.follows` for `determinate`. Determinate warn it causes FlakeHub Cache misses. Substituter order in the guest: FlakeHub Cache, your host cache, `cache.nixos.org`. If FlakeHub Cache goes quiet, the login has expired — run `determinate-nixd login` again. The host stays on stock Nix. Nothing here requires changing that. --- ## What the guest can and cannot reach | | Default | | ------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- | | Public internet | Yes — it needs this for model APIs and messaging | | Host Nix cache | Yes, one port, `hostCache.enable = false` closes it | | Anything else on the host | No, unless in `hostAccess` | | Your LAN and other VMs | No, unless in `lanAccess` | | Inbound from the network | No, unless in `publish` | | Host hardware | None, unless in `passthrough` | With `network.bridged = true` the "Inbound from the network" row changes: with the guest on the LAN, every port it opens is reachable from the LAN; `publish` stops doing anything. The outbound rows are unchanged - the `lanAccess` / `allowLan` gates still apply. The guest owns its kernel and its config, so nothing inside it is a security boundary. The nftables rules in `modules/host.nix` are. QEMU runs as an unprivileged `hermes-vm` user with its own seccomp sandbox and systemd hardening, with a thin device model: virtio-blk, virtio-net, vsock, RNG, serial. No virtiofs. `vhost-net` is off deliberately — it would move packet handling into the host kernel in exchange for throughput one agent doesn't need. The host cache does let the guest read every store path on the host. Store paths are world-readable anyway, so this isn't new exposure, but don't bake secrets into your host's store. --- ## Known rough edges - The Determinate NixOS module's option names for custom Nix settings aren't published — only the nix-darwin `determinateNix.customSettings` equivalent is. So `guest/common.nix` writes `/etc/nix/nix.custom.conf` via `environment.etc`. If a future module version claims that file, you'll get a conflict; switch to its option then. - `determinate-nixd login` is manual. There's no way to bake the credential into the image without parking a token somewhere it shouldn't be. - `MemoryDenyWriteExecute = true` is correct under KVM but is the first thing to flip if QEMU refuses to start. - `pkgs.OVMF.firmware` / `pkgs.OVMF.variables` are current attribute names; older nixpkgs put these under `pkgs.OVMF.fd` in an `FV/` subdirectory. - PCI passthrough needs a reboot to take effect, because early vfio binding happens in the initrd. - Snapshots need btrfs. Everything else works on any filesystem; without it you rely on backups alone for recovery. - `state.old-*` directories left by `hermenix vm rollback` are not cleaned up automatically, on purpose. Delete them yourself once you're sure. - First boot builds a lot. Give it time. - `services.hermenix.hermesHome` currently defaults to a path that doesn't exist in the guest (it's built from the host's disk-image directory, not the guest's mounted state disk) — set it explicitly on every deployment, migrated or not. See "Migrating an existing deployment" below for the value to use. --- ## Migrating an existing (e.g. Docker-based) Hermes deployment If you already have a running Hermes with real data (`HERMES_HOME` pointing at some directory full of `SOUL.md`, `memories/`, `sessions/`, `state.db`, etc.): ```bash nix run git+ssh://gitea@minipc1.lab.internal:22/ari/hermenix.git#hermenix -- migrate /path/to/existing/HERMES_HOME ``` Run `... -- migrate --help` for the full set of options (vsock CID, guest user, destination path, hostname rewrites). It copies — never moves or deletes — the source data, so the original stays a safe fallback until you've verified the new VM. To run it from a different machine than the one hosting the VM, see `hermenix remote` above — the same `migrate /path/...` argument goes in the quoted command string. The module's `services.hermenix.hermesHome` option lets `hermenix ctl` (and your own `HERMES_HOME` export inside the guest) point at wherever that existing flat layout lands, instead of the default seeded `.hermes` under the state disk. **Set `hermesHome` explicitly, even if you're not migrating.** The option's shipped default doesn't currently resolve to a real path inside the guest — it's built from the host's own disk-image directory rather than the guest's mounted state disk, so `hermenix ctl soul`/`conf`/`secrets`/etc. will fail against it unhelpfully until you override it. For the default seeded layout: ```nix services.hermenix.hermesHome = "/var/lib/hermes/.hermes"; ``` For a migrated flat layout, use whatever `--dest` you passed to `migrate` (default `/var/lib/hermes`). ### Don't run it with `sudo` `migrate` (like `hermenix vm ssh` and `hermenix ctl`) reaches the guest with a plain `ssh` call over vsock, authenticating with whatever key or agent the invoking user already has — the same identity that's in the guest's `authorizedKeys`. Prefixing the command with `sudo` runs that `ssh` as **root** instead, which has no matching key, and you'll hit: ``` hermes@hermes: Permission denied (publickey,keyboard-interactive). ``` If `hermenix vm ssh` works for you as your normal user, `migrate` doesn't need anything more privileged — run it the same way. ### If some of the source can't be read Old flat `HERMES_HOME` directories, especially ones left behind by a rootless-Docker deployment, sometimes contain a stray entry owned by a container-internal uid with no mapping on the host — unreadable by anyone outside the container. `migrate` tars the source with `--ignore-failed-read`, so a warning like this is expected and non-fatal: ``` tar: ./.hermes: Cannot open: Permission denied ``` Everything else still gets copied and the run still completes, including the hostname rewrite step. If you actually need what's in the unreadable entry, grab it separately, as root, before or after the main migration — e.g.: ```bash sudo tar -C /path/to/HERMES_HOME/.hermes -cf - . \ | hermenix vm ssh 'mkdir -p /var/lib/hermes/.hermes-old && tar -C /var/lib/hermes/.hermes-old -xf -' ``` ### `hermes setup` fails with "docker not found on PATH. Cannot route to container" `hermenix migrate` automatically excludes `.local/bin` and `.hermes-installed` from the migration tar, so this should not happen with current versions. If you see it after a migration with an older build, the source's `.local/bin/hermes` (a Docker-routing launcher from the previous environment) was copied into the guest and is shadowing the native install. Fix inside the guest: ```bash # Remove the stale launcher rm -f ~/.local/bin/hermes # Reinstall the native hermes binary curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/main/scripts/install.sh \ | bash -s -- --non-interactive --skip-setup # Verify it's a real binary, not a shell script file ~/.local/bin/hermes # Now proceed with setup hermes setup ``` If `hermes-install.service` never ran because `.hermes-installed` was also migrated from the source, you may instead let systemd do it: ```bash rm -f ~/.local/bin/hermes ~/.hermes-installed sudo systemctl start hermes-install journalctl -fu hermes-install # watch until complete hermes setup ``` ## Hacking on this repo The devshell provides nushell, nufmt, and pre-commit hooks. Enter it once: ```bash direnv allow ``` On first entry devenv installs the pre-commit hooks automatically. Hooks run on every commit, including: - **nufmt** — formats all `*.nu` files in place - **gen-completions** — reruns `nu/gen-completions.nu` and stages `nu/completions.nu` whenever a usage block in the source files changes - **nu-tests** — runs the CLI test suite (see below) whenever anything under `nu/` changes ### Testing Three test suites. None is ever run for you by an agent working in this repo — they're for you (or CI) to run. **CLI tests** (`nu/tests/`), via [nutest](https://github.com/vyadh/nutest): ```bash runtest # everything (bin/ is on PATH inside the devShell) runtest vm_test # just nu/tests/vm_test.nu runtest-debug vm_test # load vm_test.nu into an interactive nu session instead ``` Covers the CLI's pure helper functions (path/env defaults, `shquote`, `normalize-size`, the `gen-completions.nu` parser) and a smoke test that the whole `hermenix`/`vm`/`ctl` subcommand tree parses and dispatches correctly — without ever invoking a subcommand's real body (no ssh, no disk writes, no `nix build`). **Guest VM tests** (`guest/vm-tests/test_unbridge.nix` / `guest/vm-tests/test_bridge.nix`): boot `guest/common.nix` — the same module set `hermes-guest-image` is built from — in ephemeral, throwaway NixOS test VMs. No real disk under `/var/lib/hermes-vm/**` is ever touched: ```bash runvmtest # NAT/isolated-bridge mode (plain pass/fail) runvmtest guest-vm-bridged # bridged mode with a simulated LAN runvmtest-debug # interactive driver REPL (ptpython) for the default suite ``` Both tests boot the guest the same way and share every check that must hold in both modes — first-boot seeding (`~/.hermes`, `~/workspace`, the `/etc/nixos` symlink), that seeding is idempotent across a reboot (the whole point of the `.seeded` marker), the `hermes` user/sudo setup, and SSH. That shared node config and assertion script are defined once in `guest/vm-tests/common.nix` and imported by both, so nothing can drift between the two modes' common checks. Each test then adds the checks that only make sense for its mode: - `guest-vm-unbridged` — the isolated bridge has no DHCP server, so it asserts the guest stands on its static config alone: exactly the one `10.77.0.2/24` address and exactly one default route, via the host. - `guest-vm-bridged` — a second node simulates the LAN (a dnsmasq DHCP server, a throwaway HTTP service, and a plain device). It asserts the guest takes a DHCP lease beside the static service-net address, keeps both default routes (the LAN gateway at metric 100 and the host fallback at metric 200), can reach a service on the LAN, and that a LAN device can connect to a port the guest exposes (the guest's own firewall still decides what answers). The host-side half of bridged mode — the bridge itself, the mark-based rules — is covered statically by the check below. Both deliberately do not cover the real `hermes-install` script (no internet route inside the test VM) or `modules/host.nix`'s own `hermes-vm` QEMU service — those stay manual, operator-run checks. `runvmtest-debug` gives you `start_all()`, `machine.wait_for_unit(...)`, and `machine.shell_interact()` (a live shell inside the guest) to step through a failure by hand instead of just getting pass/fail. **Module evaluation checks** (`tests/network-modes-check.nix`): a static check — no build, no VM boot — that evaluates `modules/host.nix` in both networking modes (NAT and `network.bridged = true`) plus `guest/common.nix`, and asserts on the generated nftables rulesets, the firewall input/forward rules, the networkd units, and the guest's DHCP/route-metric config: ```bash nix build .#checks.x86_64-linux.network-modes ``` Catches regressions in the bridged-mode flag without booting anything. If it fails, the assertion that broke is named in the error.