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6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
HermenixandClaude Opus 5 1fab00f2bf docs(mcp)!: mcp-v2.1, a second transport, and what its token is not
The contract said "stdio, and only stdio" and now describes two
transports, so it gets a version -- but **v2.1 and not v3, because
nothing breaks**.  No tool renamed, no argument reshaped, no resource
moved; a client written against v2 over stdio still works unchanged.  v2
was a major bump because it *removed* five tools.  A point release is
what an additive change is.

§1 is rewritten around the asymmetry rather than around the feature,
because the asymmetry is the part that is easy to get wrong later: stdio
is unauthenticated **on purpose** and that is now written down with its
argument, so the next reader does not "fix" it.  A stdio client spawns
the server, so it has already passed a filesystem permission check and
holds the broker's 0660 control socket either way -- unix permissions are
the gate, exactly as `mcp.enable`'s own option text has always said.  A
port is the first time the caller passed neither, which is the entire
reason the token exists.

§2 gains `HHSTREAM_MCP_STATE_DIR` (and why it is NOT `sessions.stateDir`:
that directory is 0700 owned by the broker's user and holds the audit
trail), the `serve --http` flags, and the `token` verbs with the three
decisions behind them -- digests not tokens, wall-clock expiry where
every broker deadline is BOOTTIME, and a flock because two processes
write the table.  §3 records that a token's toolsets intersect the
server's and cannot widen them.

§10 is new and is the part worth having: **what this is not.**  Not OAuth
2.1, not RFC 9728, no metadata discovery -- so a client that can only
*discover* an authorization server will not connect, and one that lets
you set a header will.  And a token narrows tools but not resources, so a
`frames` token can still read `hhstream://sessions`.  Both are now TODO
files with their own evidence and recommended routes, beside the two
limits the SDK imposes:

* `mcp-http-auth-is-not-oauth.md` -- medium, and the severity is about
  interoperability rather than exposure.  Nothing is weaker than it
  claims; what is missing is the part that lets a client somebody else
  configured connect without a human pasting a header.  It records that
  `ssh host hhstream-mcp` is genuinely the better answer for one operator
  with one machine, because that is what this competes with.
* `mcp-tokens-do-not-scope-resources.md` -- medium, and nothing at all
  until a second token is minted for someone else, at which point the
  restriction is narrower than it reads.

README gains the HTTP section with the three things to know before
enabling it (the unit's refusal and self-heal, no TLS, not OAuth);
README.dev gains the token commands in the dev-shell walkthrough and the
new check's row; ARCHITECTURE gains the two transports in its diagram and
the reason the shim has a state directory while owning no state about the
desktop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KchcvnbfhhZhUHy83YL3Ya
2026-10-11 22:41:20 +00:00
HermenixandClaude Opus 5 e636472106 docs(mcp)!: mcp-v2, and the two limits the SDK imposes on it
`docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md` goes to mcp-v2 with a change table at the top, because
v1 lasted a day and an agent that learned it deserves to be told what moved
rather than to discover it. The new §4 freezes the resource surface: the eight
URIs, their bodies, their query parameters, and the five rules the layer keeps
(a read never writes; only declared parameters; a literal route beats a
template; a frame's media type comes from its bytes; no subscriptions). §6
gains the other half of the error mapping -- for a resource read every exit
code arrives as `-32602` with the remedy in `message` and the structured object
in `data`, because `ReadResourceResult` has no `isError` to use instead.

§2 records what `--toolsets` is and is not: there is no grouping primitive in
MCP, the `Tool` object has nowhere to put a family, and tools are a flat list
in the specification too -- so the only lever is which tools the server lists,
decided by whoever spawns it.

README.md leads with the split rather than with a tool count, since that is the
thing a reader has to understand before any of the names make sense, and shows
the `--toolsets` form for a client with a tight budget. ARCHITECTURE.md's sixth
box grows its second half and says why `shot` is on both sides.

A second TODO, `mcp-resources-cannot-be-subscribed-to.md`, records the limit
that cost the most: `Server.get_capabilities` hardcodes
`ResourcesCapability(subscribe=False, …)`, so registering a
`subscribe_resource` handler changes nothing and a client is correctly told not
to try. Subscriptions would have been the principled answer to the missing
`logs --follow` -- it is the one place this design wanted a capability the SDK
will not advertise -- so the file names the one-line local override, says what
it risks, and recommends upstreaming the real fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE
2026-10-11 11:50:12 +00:00
HermenixandClaude Opus 5 6a40c7e2e4 docs(mcp): freeze the tool surface, and record what the in-process seam costs
`docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md` (mcp-v1) is the new interface, written the way this
repository writes interfaces: the tool names, the arguments each takes, the
flag form, what is deliberately absent and why, and a row per exit code saying
what it arrives as and what an agent should do about it. An agent that has
learned these names is a consumer like any other, so renaming one needs a
version bump.

README.md gains the section an operator reads: the `mcp.enable` option, the
`mcpServers` block to register it with, why both environment variables are
shown at their defaults, and what to do when `shot` cannot read the frame
socket. README.dev.md gains the `nix build .#hhstream-mcp` half of the build
section, the `vm-mcp` row, the new files in the layout, and the reason `mcp` is
in the unit check's environment. ARCHITECTURE.md gains the sixth box, drawn
above the CLI rather than beside the broker, because that is where it sits.

`docs/TODO/mcp-in-process-has-no-call-deadline.md` records the two things the
in-process seam costs, rather than leaving them to be rediscovered. A thread
cannot be interrupted, so there is no per-call deadline and a wedged call
queues every later one behind it; and `cli.main`'s `sg` re-exec is an `exec`
this server cannot perform, so a frame verb that cannot read the socket fails
where the CLI would have recovered. The second is the one an operator meets
first -- the CLI works from their shell and the tool does not -- which is why
the failure says what the CLI would have done and how to not need it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE
2026-10-11 06:33:07 +00:00
HermenixandClaude Opus 5 de408e4b7f the surface: CLI verbs, the module's options, and three checks the compositor votes in
Everything below the CLI was merged and green against fakes; none of it was
reachable and none of it had ever met a compositor. This wires it up and then
puts the compositor in a position to disagree.

CLI (src/hhstream/cli.py, src/hhstream_session/**)

  session container [ID], session reconcile [ID], and the seven pointer verbs
  from PLAN §9. `start` still prints the bare session id and nothing else.
  `list` gains WS / OUTPUT / POINTER, with the gap marker where a value is
  genuinely unknown rather than a blank that reads as zero -- the POINTER
  column needs a second, read-only `pointer.state` call because the `list`
  reply carries no lease state.

  The lease id is cached in `hhstream_session.lease` (under
  $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), because PLAN §9's gesture verbs take no --lease and the
  wire requires a lease_id on every one of them; --lease and $HHSTREAM_LEASE
  override it, and a `no_lease` refusal drops the stale entry.

  Exit codes are the contract's: a gesture with no lease is 9 and never
  reaches the broker, and a compositor failure is 10 with a message that says
  the session is still running. `kill` now warns about
  `session.container_survivors` -- windows the compositor still shows -- and
  distinguishes `null` ("could not ask") from `[]`.

  `shot`/`record --output NAME` capture one container through `grim -o`; the
  frame socket publishes the main output only, so it cannot do it.

Module (nix/module.nix)

  sessions.containers.{enable,max,mode,workspaceBase},
  sessions.pointer.{enable,leaseTtl,leaseMax}, rendered into the generated
  TOML with §10's key names. hhstream-pointer.service: the operator's account,
  supplementary group hhstream, After=/BindsTo= the compositor,
  Restart=on-failure, KillMode=process, and the command line §3.4 freezes.
  tmpfiles for /run/hhstream plus RuntimeDirectoryPreserve on the broker,
  without which restarting the broker deletes the driver's socket out from
  under it. The runtime-directory length assertion is untouched.

  And ExecStartPost on the compositor, opening its IPC directory to its own
  group: Hyprland creates <runtime>/hypr with S_IRWXU, so the broker -- a
  different account by design -- could not reach the request or event socket
  at all, and degraded silently exactly as it is built to.

Checks (checks/**)

  vm-ipc: both sockets at their frozen names, measured against sun_path's 108
  bytes, and a socket2 subscriber that receives an openwindow for a window the
  test creates. The subscriber is the shipped HyprlandIPC, not a second
  implementation: this check exists to prove that this client hears this
  compositor.

  vm-containers: one hh-* output per session at the container mode, the window
  on it, a second window of the same application beside it, an unmatched
  window quarantined, grim -o isolating one container, teardown removing the
  output and freeing the slot. PLAN experiment 3 is answered: `hyprctl output
  create headless` works.

  vm-pointer: a version-2 virtual pointer, a warp and a click whose
  coordinates the *application* reports, BUSY naming the holder, an expired
  lease swept with its held button lifted, and a broker restart that leaves
  the lock free, the bookmark intact and the driver reachable.

  checks/lib gains the guest the three share, their test-script helpers (no
  assertions live there), an event-socket subscriber and a Wayland client that
  says where it was clicked -- nothing in nixpkgs both honours
  $HHSTREAM_APP_ID and reports pointer events.

Reported, not worked around: the broker reads none of the container or
pointer config (policy.py takes [defaults] and [apps] only), `start` has no
no_container field so --no-container is refused rather than silently ignored,
and nix/hyprland-conf.nix sets input:follow_mouse = 0, which sends pointer
events to the focused window only -- measured, with the cursor at the aimed
pixel and no client told. README.dev.md has the evidence for each.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQy29x9AfHWyzNd1f7XPGK
2026-10-03 06:58:44 +00:00
Hermenix 30f456c07e integrate the session broker: one CLI, a module unit, and a VM check
M0 of the sessions design, wired into the flake and gated by a real check.

What is here now:

- `src/hhstreamd/` — the broker: session registry, lifecycle verbs, process-group
  teardown, app allowlist, audit log, idle reaper on CLOCK_BOOTTIME.
- `src/hhstream_session/` — the CLI handlers, registered into the one front door.
- `src/hhstream/cli.py` — `hhstream status|shot|run|record|session …`, so the
  frame verbs and the session namespace are one binary.
- `nix/module.nix` — `sessions.*` options and the `hhstream-sessions.service`
  unit: the operator's own account (never a service account, because launched
  applications should see that account's home), the compositor's group as a
  supplementary group (without it a launched GUI client cannot open the Wayland
  socket), the generated app allowlist, and `--compositor-runtime-dir` so
  applications are handed the compositor's session rather than the broker's.
- `checks/vm-sessions.nix` — 18 subtests on a real compositor in a VM.

Two bugs found by driving it, both fixed:

- BUG-01: launched applications could not reach the compositor at all — the
  broker spawned them with its own inherited environment, which names the login
  session. `hhstreamd/compositor.py` discovers the socket and builds the child
  environment; a directory with no usable socket is a startup refusal, not a
  warning.
- BUG-02: `kill` refused to signal a live application and said nothing was
  wrong. The identity gate hashed `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, which every `execve`
  replaces — and on NixOS applications are reached through wrapper scripts that
  do exactly that. The gate now rests on `starttime` (+ boot id, + session id
  where it is immutable) and records command-line drift as evidence of nothing.

KillMode=process is set on the unit on purpose: the default control-group kill
would take the applications down with the broker, which would make adoption and
a broker restart pointless.
2026-10-01 12:23:16 +00:00
Hermenix db886faa38 docs: pin the server command line in the contract; add ARCHITECTURE.md 2026-09-28 11:53:19 +00:00