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hyprland-headless-stream-pl…/docs/TODO/mcp-tokens-do-not-scope-resources.md
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HermenixandClaude Opus 5 10176356b6 docs(mcp)!: mcp-v4, a second transport, and what its token is not
The contract said "stdio, and only stdio" and now describes two
transports, so it gets a version -- **v4**, because v3 (the live stream)
was published to main while this branch was in review.  Nothing here
breaks: no tool renamed, no argument reshaped, no resource moved, so a
client written against v2 over stdio still works unchanged.  v2 is the
only bump that took something away, and it took away five tools; v3 and
v4 are additive.

§1 is rewritten around the asymmetry rather than around the feature,
because the asymmetry is the part that is easy to get wrong later: stdio
is unauthenticated **on purpose** and that is now written down with its
argument, so the next reader does not "fix" it.  A stdio client spawns
the server, so it has already passed a filesystem permission check and
holds the broker's 0660 control socket either way -- unix permissions are
the gate, exactly as `mcp.enable`'s own option text has always said.  A
port is the first time the caller passed neither, which is the entire
reason the token exists.

§2 gains `HHSTREAM_MCP_STATE_DIR` (and why it is NOT `sessions.stateDir`:
that directory is 0700 owned by the broker's user and holds the audit
trail), the `serve --http` flags, and the `token` verbs with the three
decisions behind them -- digests not tokens, wall-clock expiry where
every broker deadline is BOOTTIME, and a flock because two processes
write the table.  §3 records that a token's toolsets intersect the
server's and cannot widen them.

§10 is new and is the part worth having: **what this is not.**  Not OAuth
2.1, not RFC 9728, no metadata discovery -- so a client that can only
*discover* an authorization server will not connect, and one that lets
you set a header will.  And a token narrows tools but not resources, so a
`frames` token can still read `hhstream://sessions`.  Both are now TODO
files with their own evidence and recommended routes, beside the two
limits the SDK imposes:

* `mcp-http-auth-is-not-oauth.md` -- medium, and the severity is about
  interoperability rather than exposure.  Nothing is weaker than it
  claims; what is missing is the part that lets a client somebody else
  configured connect without a human pasting a header.  It records that
  `ssh host hhstream-mcp` is genuinely the better answer for one operator
  with one machine, because that is what this competes with.
* `mcp-tokens-do-not-scope-resources.md` -- medium, and nothing at all
  until a second token is minted for someone else, at which point the
  restriction is narrower than it reads.

README gains the HTTP section with the three things to know before
enabling it (the unit's refusal and self-heal, no TLS, not OAuth);
README.dev gains the token commands in the dev-shell walkthrough and the
new check's row; ARCHITECTURE gains the two transports in its diagram and
the reason the shim has a state directory while owning no state about the
desktop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KchcvnbfhhZhUHy83YL3Ya
2026-10-12 18:00:05 +00:00

4.3 KiB

A token narrows the tools it may call, and none of the state it may read

The issue

hhstream-mcp token mint --toolsets frames makes a token that is offered three tools — shot, record, run — and is refused session_start, session_kill, every pointer verb and every keyboard verb. It is also offered all five resources and all three templates, unchanged. So a token scoped to "look at the screen" can read hhstream://sessions and learn every running session's id, application, pid, log path and home directory; it can read hhstream://sessions/<id>/logs and get an application's own output; and it can read hhstream://pointer and see who holds the lease.

tests/unit/test_mcp_http.py::test_resources_are_not_narrowed_by_a_token asserts this, deliberately, so the behaviour is pinned rather than incidental.

The reasoning that produced it is sound for the server's own flag and does not survive being reused for a token. docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md §2 keeps resources out of --toolsets because a tool listing is a budget and a resource is not: tools compete for a model's attention, resources are the host's to put in context, and making hhstream://sessions conditional on the session tools being enabled would couple two decisions that are not the same decision. All true.

But --toolsets is set by whoever starts the process, and a token is handed to somebody else. A budget and an authorization are different things, and hhstream_mcp.http.offered_for applies the budget's rule to the authorization — which is the bug in one sentence.

How much this matters depends entirely on a fact the code cannot see: whether the operator hands out more than one token. With one token it is nothing. With two of different trust, it is a confused deputy — the narrow token's holder was told it could only look at the screen, and it can enumerate the desktop.

Ideas

  1. A separate --resources list on the token. (recommended) Mint takes --resources naming families (status, sessions, pointer, containers, screen), defaulting to all of them, and hhstream_mcp.resources.read refuses a URI outside the grant with the same ReadRefused a bad URI already raises. Two fields because they are two decisions — a token that may drive the pointer does not automatically need to read session logs — and keeping them separate means the server's --toolsets can go on meaning only what it means now.
  2. Derive the resource grant from the toolsets. frames implies hhstream://status, screen and outputs/{name}; sessions implies the session resources; pointer implies hhstream://pointer. One field, no new vocabulary, and it maps the way a reader would guess. Rejected as the recommendation because the mapping is a guess: hhstream://containers is a session resource that a pointer-only token genuinely needs, since the pointer aims at a session's output, and a derived rule would have to special case it.
  3. A single --read-only-everything / --no-read switch. The cheap version: a token either reads all state or none. Honest and tiny, and strictly better than today. But "none" breaks the pointer tools for the reason above, so it would be a switch nobody could use with a narrow token.
  4. Leave it and document it. What ships. Defensible while this machine has one operator and the tokens all belong to them, which is why this is medium rather than high — but it is the option that gets less defensible the moment a second token is minted for someone else.

Why it matters

Medium. The surface it exposes is read-only and this is a single-operator machine today, so nothing is currently reachable through it that the token holder could not also learn by taking a screenshot and reading the window titles — which frames lets it do.

It becomes real with the second token. --toolsets on a token is advertised as the way to hand out a restricted credential, and the restriction is narrower than it reads: an operator who mints a frames token for a screen-watching agent has not stopped that agent from enumerating sessions, and nothing in the surface or the mint output says so. Until this is fixed, that sentence belongs in the answer to "can I give out a limited token" — which is what this file is for.