A session could move a cursor and press it, but not scroll. The protocol already had the request -- zwlr_virtual_pointer_v1.axis(time, axis, value) -- it had simply never been implemented, in the driver or the broker. hhstream session pointer scroll <id> --axis vertical --amount 3 Positive is down (vertical) or right (horizontal): the protocol's direction, not a choice of ours, which is why direction travels in the sign and there is deliberately no up/down vocabulary layered over it. The output is whatever the last warp aimed at, exactly like a button, so scrolling somewhere else is a warp first -- and the lease is what keeps the whole gesture atomic. Bounded at 100 wheel clicks per request on both sides, because a decimal-point slip should be a refusal rather than a session scrolled somewhere unrecoverable. The resume point is re-stamped, not moved: the cursor did not go anywhere, so the coordinates are re-affirmed and only the stamp advances. Recorded in the contract as an amendment to the frozen op set, because adding an op to a frozen interface should be visible rather than implied. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Containers are built, tested, and switched off
The issue
A session can be given its own container — its own headless output and a numbered workspace — but no window can be assigned to it.
The broker stamps an identity on each session's app and matches a windowrule on
match:initial_class, on the assumption that an allowlisted app will carry that
stamp. None of them does: chromium reaches the compositor through a wrapper
script whose flags do not set a per-session class, and foot has no such
option. Every allowlisted app therefore lands in the base class set, the
broker judges it foreign to every container, and quarantines it.
The consequence is that enabling containers makes sessions unusable — which is
how this was found: not in tests, but live, immediately after the first switch
that enabled them. Containers are now off
(containers_enabled = false), and every session reports
container: {state: "degraded", output: null}, deliberately, so a disabled
machine cannot be mistaken for one whose compositor is down.
Ideas
- Adopt windows by the pid the compositor already reports. (recommended)
hyprctl clients -jgives each client's pid, and the broker already knows each session's pid — so the join is a lookup, and no app has to take part. No stamp, no per-app flags, and it works for programs that will never co-operate. It must use(pid, starttime)rather than pid alone, because the wrapper replaces its own argv and that is exactly the pid-reuse confusion already fixed once inprocmon. - Per-app identity argument, where one exists. chromium accepts
--class=hh-<id>, so the wrapper could pass the session's value. Cheap for chromium, and dead weight for every other app: it makes the allowlist a list of apps that cooperate. - Keep the stamp, set it in each wrapper. Same shape as (2), more moving parts, same ceiling.
- Hybrid: pid first, stamp as a fallback. Only worth it if some app reports
no pid at all; the compositor's
-1sentinel for "absent pid" already covers the reporting side.
Why it matters
The isolation milestone does not deliver while this is open. Sessions still
share one output and tile over each other on the same screen — two concurrent
sessions are both ready and both visible at once. Per-session ownership today
is bookkeeping only: a runtime directory, an idle clock, captured output, an
audit trail.
So the difference between what the design claims ("a session owns a workspace") and what the machine does ("a session is an app on a shared screen") is entirely this one join. And note which failure mode to expect on the way: the first half of the feature — creating outputs and workspaces — worked on the first attempt and looked fine right up until an app was put in one. A green container test proves the compositor accepted the commands, not that anything arrived.