The contract said "stdio, and only stdio" and now describes two transports, so it gets a version -- but **v2.1 and not v3, because nothing breaks**. No tool renamed, no argument reshaped, no resource moved; a client written against v2 over stdio still works unchanged. v2 was a major bump because it *removed* five tools. A point release is what an additive change is. §1 is rewritten around the asymmetry rather than around the feature, because the asymmetry is the part that is easy to get wrong later: stdio is unauthenticated **on purpose** and that is now written down with its argument, so the next reader does not "fix" it. A stdio client spawns the server, so it has already passed a filesystem permission check and holds the broker's 0660 control socket either way -- unix permissions are the gate, exactly as `mcp.enable`'s own option text has always said. A port is the first time the caller passed neither, which is the entire reason the token exists. §2 gains `HHSTREAM_MCP_STATE_DIR` (and why it is NOT `sessions.stateDir`: that directory is 0700 owned by the broker's user and holds the audit trail), the `serve --http` flags, and the `token` verbs with the three decisions behind them -- digests not tokens, wall-clock expiry where every broker deadline is BOOTTIME, and a flock because two processes write the table. §3 records that a token's toolsets intersect the server's and cannot widen them. §10 is new and is the part worth having: **what this is not.** Not OAuth 2.1, not RFC 9728, no metadata discovery -- so a client that can only *discover* an authorization server will not connect, and one that lets you set a header will. And a token narrows tools but not resources, so a `frames` token can still read `hhstream://sessions`. Both are now TODO files with their own evidence and recommended routes, beside the two limits the SDK imposes: * `mcp-http-auth-is-not-oauth.md` -- medium, and the severity is about interoperability rather than exposure. Nothing is weaker than it claims; what is missing is the part that lets a client somebody else configured connect without a human pasting a header. It records that `ssh host hhstream-mcp` is genuinely the better answer for one operator with one machine, because that is what this competes with. * `mcp-tokens-do-not-scope-resources.md` -- medium, and nothing at all until a second token is minted for someone else, at which point the restriction is narrower than it reads. README gains the HTTP section with the three things to know before enabling it (the unit's refusal and self-heal, no TLS, not OAuth); README.dev gains the token commands in the dev-shell walkthrough and the new check's row; ARCHITECTURE gains the two transports in its diagram and the reason the shim has a state directory while owning no state about the desktop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KchcvnbfhhZhUHy83YL3Ya
5.2 KiB
The HTTP transport's bearer token is not MCP authorization
The issue
hhstream-mcp serve --http requires Authorization: Bearer <token> on every
request, where the token is a static secret an operator minted with
hhstream-mcp token mint and pasted into a client's configuration. That is not
what the Model Context Protocol says authorization is.
The specification's authorization profile is OAuth 2.1 plus RFC 9728
protected-resource metadata. A compliant server answers an unauthenticated
request with a 401 whose WWW-Authenticate carries a resource_metadata
parameter pointing at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource; the client
fetches that, learns which authorization server to talk to, discovers its
metadata, and runs a real flow with scopes, refresh and revocation. The MCP
Python SDK ships the machinery for this — mcp.server.auth, its
TokenVerifier protocol, AuthSettings with an issuer_url and a
resource_server_url, and RequireAuthMiddleware.
What ships here is hhstream_mcp.http.BearerAuth, forty lines of ASGI
middleware that looks the token up in a file. The 401 carries
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="hhstream" and nothing else, because there is
no authorization server to point at and advertising a metadata endpoint that
does not exist would be worse than advertising nothing.
The measured consequences, in order of how soon they are met:
- A client that only knows how to discover an authorization server cannot
connect. It will read the
401, find noresource_metadata, and have nowhere to go. A client that lets a human set a header connects immediately — which is most of them today, and is why this is usable at all. - There is no rotation and no expiry negotiation.
token mint --expires-insets a fixed lifetime at mint time and nothing can extend it; a client that wants to keep working past it needs a human to mint another one. There is no refresh token because there is no token endpoint. - There are no scopes in the protocol's sense. A token carries
toolsets, which is this project's own notion and invisible to a client: nothing in the handshake tells a caller what its token may do, so an agent discovers its own limits by being refused. (AccessToken.scopesis where these would go if the SDK's path were taken, and the SDK's middleware is what would then enforce them.) - Audience is unchecked. RFC 8707 resource indicators exist so a token minted for one server cannot be replayed at another. These tokens name no audience, so a token is as good as the operator's care in handing it out.
Ideas
- Keep it, and say so. (what ships, and the recommended route for now) The threat this transport actually faces is "someone on the LAN finds the port", and a 256-bit token in a header answers it. OAuth would add an authorization server to deploy, a metadata document to serve and a flow to get right, in exchange for no additional protection against that threat on a single-operator machine. The honest version of this option is the one taken: a limit written down, not a capability implied.
- Implement the SDK's
TokenVerifierover the same table. The protocol is one method (async verify_token(token) -> AccessToken | None) and the store already satisfies it in all but name —Store.verifyreturns aGrantand anAccessTokenis aGrantwithclient_idandscopesspelled differently. That alone buys spec-shaped verification and letstoolsetsbecome realscopes, enforced by the SDK's middleware rather than byoffered_for. It does not buy discovery: without an issuer there is still no metadata to advertise. (recommended as the next step, if one is wanted — it is small, and it is the half that pays.) - Serve the metadata documents and be a resource server for real. Mint
tokens as signed JWTs with an audience and an expiry, serve
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource, and accept an external authorization server's tokens as well as locally minted ones. This is the complete answer and is a feature in its own right, worth doing when a client that needs it actually appears. - Drop the HTTP transport and tunnel stdio over SSH instead. Rejected, but
worth recording as the thing this competes with:
ssh host hhstream-mcpis genuinely more secure — real keys, real TLS-grade transport, and no new listener — and for one operator with one machine it is the better answer. The HTTP transport exists for the client that cannot spawn a process over SSH, which is most hosted ones.
Why it matters
Medium, and the severity is about interoperability rather than about safety. Nothing here is weaker than it claims to be: the token is 256 bits, the refusal leaks nothing, revocation is immediate, and loopback is the default. What is missing is the part that lets an arbitrary MCP client connect without a human pasting a header — so the cost is paid in which clients work, not in how exposed the desktop is.
It would move to high the moment this server is meant to be reached by a client somebody else configured, because at that point "set this header" stops being an instruction anyone can follow.