diff --git a/TODO.md b/TODO.md index bda6c83..c217055 100644 --- a/TODO.md +++ b/TODO.md @@ -125,3 +125,11 @@ Design: [`plan.md`](plan.md) ยท Review fixes: [`plan/review.md`](plan/review.md) - [ ] **H7** README NixOS section: flake input, token workflow, exposure model, `allowedHosts` - [ ] **H8** NixOS VM test: healthz, 401, mint token via CLI (`sudo -u`), 200, `/mcp`, revoke, 401, bad Origin 403, plus a TLS case - [ ] **Gate:** `nix build` and `nix flake check` pass. `ldd` shows no openssl. A fresh NixOS host serves `:1984` and a token can be minted from a login shell. + +## Future + +Logged from the final security review (2026-10-16). Not scheduled. + +- [ ] **F-1** Cap concurrent follow streams. Each journal follow, `tail_journal` call or docker follow pins a `spawn_blocking` thread for up to `limits.max_follow_secs`. Add a global semaphore shared by REST and MCP (suggested 16) returning 429/503 when full. A client that stops reading may hold the thread past the deadline (untested); add a write timeout or a hard `tokio::time::timeout` around the producer. +- [ ] **F-2** Bound line and message length. Docker `LineSplitter` and journal `MESSAGE` are buffered without limit before the 256 KiB result cap applies. Truncate per line (suggested 64 KiB, with a visible marker) and cap total bytes collected. +- [ ] **F-3** Unit hardening: `ProtectKernelLogs`, `ProtectHostname`, `RemoveIPC`, `LimitNOFILE`, `TasksMax`, `MemoryMax`, narrower `RestrictAddressFamilies`, `PrivateUsers` (check journal group access). Test under the hardened unit on a clean host before enabling. Document how the service user gets read access to the TLS key.