From b5b3466e1d165906d62bc0fd1d5f8c52ec65fac9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ari Sosnovsky Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 06:47:28 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] plan: DEC-11 decided; DEC-9 revised for LAN-reachable deployment Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 --- plan/decisions.md | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/plan/decisions.md b/plan/decisions.md index 6339d9e..9d3c0d4 100644 --- a/plan/decisions.md +++ b/plan/decisions.md @@ -108,11 +108,15 @@ The MCP spec requires Origin validation on Streamable HTTP servers. If the pinne --- -## DEC-9 — Port 1984 lives in the NixOS module +## DEC-9 — Port 1984 in the NixOS module, reachable from a remote server on the LAN -**Status:** Proposed +**Status:** Revised 2026-10-16, awaiting answers -The module defaults `port = 1984` and `bind = 127.0.0.1`. The binary's own default is unchanged, so non-Nix installs are unaffected. Exposure beyond loopback is an explicit opt-in (`openFirewall` or an interface-scoped rule). Bearer tokens over plain HTTP are readable on a LAN, so Tailscale or a TLS proxy is the recommended path. +The module defaults `port = 1984`. The binary's own default is unchanged, so non-Nix installs are unaffected. + +**Intended use:** another server on the LAN calls this host. So the host config sets `bind` to a LAN address (or `0.0.0.0`), the firewall opens 1984 for that traffic, and auth must be enabled (config validation already refuses auth-off on a non-loopback bind). For `/mcp`, `server.allowed_hosts` must include the hostname or IP the remote client uses, or rmcp answers 403. + +**Open:** (a) restrict the firewall to the remote server's IP or subnet, which is recommended, versus the whole LAN; (b) plain HTTP versus TLS in front, since bearer tokens are readable on the wire over plain HTTP; (c) the LAN address or hostname clients use. **Decision:** @@ -130,8 +134,8 @@ The DB is in a 0700 state dir owned by the service user, so a login user cannot ## DEC-11 — No declarative or bootstrap tokens in v1 -**Status:** Proposed +**Status:** Decided 2026-10-16 -A `bootstrapTokens` option would write plaintext secrets to disk, and importing pre-hashed tokens needs a `slinuxm` change. Tokens stay imperative: printed once, never stored in plaintext. +Tokens are minted with `slinuxm token create `, printed once, and never stored in plaintext. There is no `bootstrapTokens` option and no import of pre-hashed tokens in v1. -**Decision:** +**Decision:** Accepted by the user: print the token once, never store it.