Commit Graph
34 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ari 435a54a02d pulled out tests and validated them 2026-10-20 21:58:33 -04:00
ari 5f9f160666 H: keep the token listener open for the whole loop
The 500 ms accept window covered only the first case; a connection made later
went unseen. Accept once after the loop instead.
2026-10-20 16:26:52 -04:00
ari a78303c123 H: never open a token path that is not a regular file
Check is_file before opening and open with O_NONBLOCK, so a FIFO token file
cannot park a blocking-pool thread on every check and proxy call.
2026-10-20 16:26:11 -04:00
ari f9911f6c70 H: warn once about plain http
Validation runs at startup and on every reload, so the transport no longer
repeats the warning per peer on its first request; the helper is named for
the peer it reports.
2026-10-20 16:24:44 -04:00
ari a09c64de9a H: pin the token mode check for every group/world bit
Cover 0620, 0602, 0610 and 0601 in the loader and assert that startup
validation and the per-request load give the same reason for each.
2026-10-20 16:23:54 -04:00
ari 5ba6e820ca H: name the token mode check after what it rejects 2026-10-20 16:16:30 -04:00
ari 97c81f899c H: deny IPv6 link-local and metadata addresses by default Add fe80::/10, ::/128 and fd00:ec2::254/128 to the default deny_cidrs and sync config.example.toml, README and docs/consolidator.md 2026-10-20 16:13:25 -04:00
ari 6e74d3d99b H: canonicalise addresses in the deny check Match IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses against the IPv4 deny list at connect time, with tests for ::ffff:169.254.169.254 2026-10-20 16:12:07 -04:00
ari 39c1c91695 H: merge token loaders and peer helpers One loader in secrets.rs (header validity, canonicalised credentials dir) is used by the client; the deny-CIDR parser, loopback test and plain-http warning live once in config.rs 2026-10-20 16:10:24 -04:00
ari d2917b2483 G: F2 reflect peer status schemas from JsonSchema derives 2026-10-20 15:54:13 -04:00
ari 2af03308ba F: make the multi-address tcp test independent of /etc/hosts 2026-10-20 15:16:56 -04:00
ari dde6a12ce4 F: try every resolved peer address instead of the first
A peer whose name resolves to both families but which listens on only one
of them was reported unreachable, which the documented 0.0.0.0 binding
produces on a dual-stack LAN and in the NixOS test network.

resolve_target now returns the whole address set (still refusing the name
if any address is denied), the HTTP client pins it with
resolve_to_addrs so the connector falls through to the next address, and
tcp_check tries each address in order with a per-attempt share of the
remaining deadline. ClientKey keys on the set.

Regression cover: a client test that resolves localhost against a
single-family listener, a tests/peers.rs case declaring the peer as
http://localhost:<port>, and the VM test's TLS peer gamma now binds
0.0.0.0 (IPv4 only) while alpha and beta stay dual stack. Docs and the
contracts section 10 address note describe the new behaviour.
2026-10-20 15:04:09 -04:00
ari 3ae8e74a1d F: forward the peer's /api/v1 path and un-ignore the proxied tests
The proxy validated the route without its API prefix and handed the
transport "/systemd/units", which a peer answered with 404. Validation
still works on the bare route; the transport now gets
"/api/v1/systemd/units". Un-ignoring the two acceptance tests
(a_plain_peer_serves_its_own_data_through_the_proxy and
shutdown_ends_a_proxied_follow) is the check for that fix; the unit
tests in api/, mcp/ and the registry script their fakes on the peer's
real paths again.
2026-10-20 15:04:09 -04:00
ari 8b7569363c C: review round 2 proxy query unit rule and shared status classifier
Proxied journal/unit values now use the local unit-name helper instead of a
second, stricter check, so escaped units pass through as text, %5C or %5c.
The peer status table is one function shared with the transport, and the
segment/encoding cases left untested get allowlist and rejection cases.
2026-10-19 22:35:51 -04:00
ari 7a4d64c051 C: review round 1 proxy fixes
Unit names go through the local route's validation, so escaped and
dash-rooted units work through the proxy; backslashes stay legal only
there. Response preparation (status classification, content-type check,
size/stream bounds) moves into proxy.rs for REST and MCP to share.
x-slinuxm-peer is only set for configured peers, proxied SSE is no-cache,
and the unreachable handler fallbacks are gone.
2026-10-19 22:35:51 -04:00
ari 58012018d9 C: C3 x-slinuxm-peer response header on every proxied outcome 2026-10-19 22:35:51 -04:00
ari bab6959a94 C: C2 GET-only pass-through proxy with allowlist, hop guard and query filter 2026-10-19 22:35:51 -04:00
ari 92ad3c8128 A: wire peer check to the real client and probe a real socket in tests
B1/B2 are merged, so `real_transport` builds the `ReqwestTransport` with the
configured limits and deny list instead of bailing. Binary tests now probe a
real loopback server: ok with latency, rejected credential, unreachable peer
and an unknown name, none of which may print the token.
2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari de7a47d040 A: cover a directory and a symlink escaping the credentials directory in the loader 2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari a02e4f181b A: open peer token files only from serve and peer check
`Config::load` now runs structural checks only (names, URLs, CIDRs, paths,
timeouts) and never touches the host, so `token create|list`, `peer list`,
`peer check` and `--print-config` work where the credential is absent, e.g.
outside the unit. `Config::validate_token_readiness` opens the enabled peers'
files and runs at the top of `serve`; `peer check` checks the probed peer.
Also canonicalise IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals against the deny list and stop
putting the host in the plain-http error while the warning omits it.
2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari c4850d0764 A: align the registry reload test with the peer timeout rule (B's fixture, exposed by the rebase) 2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari d3bef6bd94 A: share tracing capture and peer config fixtures in tests (gate round 1) 2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari 2eb1d2a78b A: A4 peer list and one-shot peer check CLI 2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari 7d10153677 A: A3 secrets loader reads token files with redaction and permission checks 2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari bcac6c76e6 A: A2 validate peer names, URLs, token files and timeouts 2026-10-19 22:31:29 -04:00
ari c1a12abc19 B: refuse to proxy disabled peers and reject reloads the transport cannot apply
Also reset status when a peer URL changes, keep loops retired by a
reload and await them at shutdown, and cover the SIGHUP fan-out.
2026-10-19 20:55:25 -04:00
ari 26b9f8bdff B: report healthz latency and keep the last peer version below the threshold 2026-10-19 20:55:25 -04:00
ari 5ad94f249e B: bound peer calls with one deadline and let streams outlive it
Count DNS, token/CA reads and headers inside the timeout, treat SSE as
long-lived with an idle bound, take targets from url::Host so IPv6
literals work, exempt health probes from the concurrency limits and
tighten error classification. Reuse validate_target in request_url and
mark the Authorization value sensitive.
2026-10-19 20:55:25 -04:00
ari 9d6fbd3288 B: B4 empty the peer snapshot when a reload disables the feature 2026-10-19 20:55:25 -04:00
ari 000659a552 B: B5 enforce deny CIDRs and plain-HTTP opt-in before connecting 2026-10-19 20:55:25 -04:00
ari d94c2b3a1d B: B2/B3 health probes, loops and the in-memory status model 2026-10-19 20:55:25 -04:00
ari bd5b21bcc4 B: B1 real reqwest peer client with caps, timeouts and ring TLS 2026-10-19 20:55:25 -04:00
ari 0dbaf58c8c A0: review round 1 peer entry defaults and class strings 2026-10-19 20:02:17 -04:00
ari 4bfb097be6 A0: contract stubs types, transport, fake and registry seams
Land the shared peer contracts: types, error mapping, transport trait,
fake transport and fixtures, registry/proxy/health skeletons, the
AppState.peers and Config.peers seams, the ping and peers route stubs,
and unit plus integration tests. No loops, no network, feature off by
default.
2026-10-19 20:02:17 -04:00