# WS-H: Phase 5 final-review fixes | Field | Value | |---|---| | Status | Done (awaiting merge) | | Owner | goose | | Owned files | `src/peers/**`, `src/telemetry/mod.rs`, `src/main.rs`, `tests/**`, `docs/consolidator.md`, `config.example.toml`, `README.md` | ## Log ### 2026-10-20 Handoff The review text (`loop/final-review.md`) is not present in this worktree; the six items below were taken from the task statement that quotes it. Nothing in `contracts.md` was touched and no contract looked wrong. All items are done, one commit each, `dev`-level gate green after every commit (`cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test`, `cargo tree -i openssl` empty). No Nix files changed, so no nix build or VM test was run. 1. **One token loader, one set of peer helpers** (`H: merge token loaders and peer helpers`). `src/peers/client.rs` no longer has a loader: it calls `secrets::load_token` for every request. The header-validity rule (no CR, LF or NUL, and the value must be a valid `Bearer` header) lives in `secrets.rs`. `secrets::under_credentials` canonicalises both paths and fails closed, so the client's non-canonical `starts_with` is gone with `load_token_in`. Deny-CIDR parsing (`config::deny_networks`), the loopback test (`config::url_is_loopback`), the plain-http rule (`plain_http_allowed`, `plain_http_off_loopback`) and its warning wording (`warn_plain_http`) exist once in `config.rs` and are used by validation, the transport and `registry::reload`. Tests: `secrets::tokens_that_cannot_be_a_header_value_are_refused`, `client::a_refused_token_file_sends_nothing` (no request reaches the peer), `config::deny_networks_rejects_a_bad_cidr_once_for_every_caller`, `config::loopback_detection_covers_localhost_and_both_families`. Deviation: the merged mode check is the stricter union of the two old ones (`0o077`, message "group or world accessible" instead of the client's "readable"), so a group/world-writable token file stays refused; wording updated in `secrets.rs` and `docs/consolidator.md`. A doubled trailing newline is now `invalid` (it would end the header line) instead of being forwarded with one newline left. 2. **`denied()` canonicalises** (`H: canonicalise addresses in the deny check`). `config::denied` calls `IpAddr::to_canonical`; config validation and the transport both use it. Tests: `config::ipv4_mapped_ipv6_literals_match_the_v4_deny_list` (unit) and `client::an_ipv4_mapped_address_is_matched_against_the_v4_deny_list` (`::ffff:169.254.169.254` refused before any connect); both fail if the canonicalisation is removed. 3. **IPv6 deny defaults** (`H: deny IPv6 link-local and metadata addresses by default`). `types::DEFAULT_DENY_CIDRS` adds `fe80::/10`, `::/128` and `fd00:ec2::254/128`; synced in `config.example.toml`, `README.md`, `docs/consolidator.md` and `tests/peers_config.rs` (`PEERS_DEFAULT`). Test: `config::the_default_deny_list_covers_metadata_in_both_families_but_allows_lans`. 4. **`peer.request` is a client span** (`H: mark the peer.request span as an OTel client span`). `otel.kind = "client"` on the span, asserted in `telemetry::tests::peer_request_span_names_the_peer`. 5. **Gauge gating in the docs** (`H: correct the peer gauge gating in the docs`). `docs/consolidator.md` now names `otel.enabled` with `otel.export_unit_metrics` (there is no `otel.metrics.enabled`) and states that `enabled = false` peers have no series; behaviour was already covered by `metrics_export::tests::disabled_peer_is_not_reported`. 6. **Port-stealing flakiness** (`H: make the SIGTERM tests immune to a stolen port`). `tests/tls.rs::try_start_on` and `tests/integration.rs::sse_stream_then_sigterm_on` only accept a socket that answers as this server (a TLS handshake against the test pair; a `200` from `/healthz`) while the child is still running, and report "retry" otherwise; `start`/the test then retry on a fresh port, up to three times. The SSE exit bound is 10 s. New tests `tests/tls.rs::a_probed_port_taken_by_someone_else_is_retried` and `tests/integration.rs::a_probed_port_taken_by_someone_else_is_retried` fail if the identity check is weakened back to a bare `connect()`.