9347e31705757ae450da321a798571421ffbc2b2
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9347e31705 |
feat(nix): mcp.http, its unit, and a state directory of its own
`mcp.http.enable` is the fourth unit and the first that listens on a port. The comment on the `mcp` block said anything that started a daemon here "would be inventing a second thing to supervise", so it is rewritten rather than deleted: what changed is not the cost of supervising it but what it buys -- a port is reachable by a caller who never touched this filesystem, which is the first time a token on this surface means anything. The two options stay independent and neither implies the other. `mcp.stateDir` defaults to /var/lib/hhstream-mcp and is deliberately NOT `sessions.stateDir`. That directory is 0700 owned by the broker's user and holds `events.jsonl`; parking a token file in it would grant this shim write access to the audit trail's directory for no reason, and the two have different lifetimes besides. A tmpfiles entry rather than `StateDirectory=`, for the reason the broker's state dir is one -- `StateDirectory=` can only name a path under /var/lib and would stop applying the moment the option is pointed elsewhere. The unit runs as sessions.user with sessions.group, because its tools are the CLI's handlers called in process and that CLI opens a 0660 control socket owned by that user and a compositor runtime directory owned by that group. `Wants`/`After` the broker and not `BindsTo`: the frame verbs answer with the broker down and the rest answer exit 5, which is a true answer, whereas a listener that vanished with the broker would turn that into a connection refused and tell a client nothing. The systemd default KillMode is right here and `KillMode=process` -- which the broker and the driver both need -- would be wrong, because every process this unit starts is part of answering one request. Two assertions and two warnings, each for a failure that is otherwise discovered from the far side of an HTTP client: * http.enable without sessions.enable is an assertion, not the warning `mcp.enable` gets against the same condition, because there the frame tools still work and here `User=` names an account that does not exist. * a wildcard bind with no allowedHosts is an assertion, because the SDK's rebinding allowlist has no implicit localhost and the unit would come up refusing everything with a 421. * a non-loopback address warns that the token crosses the wire in clear text, since the option reads like a bind address and not like a decision about what is on it. * openFirewall warns and is not implied by http.enable, the same way sessions.stream.openFirewall is not implied by the stream. `mcp.http.enable` also puts the binary on PATH, because `token mint` is how the credential that unit demands gets issued. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KchcvnbfhhZhUHy83YL3Ya |
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242a2b9413 |
feat(mcp)!: a second transport, and the token it exists for
`hhstream-mcp serve --http` serves the surface over Streamable HTTP behind a bearer token, and `hhstream-mcp token mint|list|revoke|prune` issues those tokens. stdio stays the default and stays unauthenticated. The two are one feature, because neither works alone. A token checked by a process the caller spawned is a lock whose key is in the same pocket: over stdio the client starts the server and already holds the broker's 0660 control socket, which is why `mcp.enable`'s own option text says it "grants no access the `hhstream` CLI does not already grant". A port is the first time the caller is someone who passed no filesystem check on the way in, and that is the moment a credential starts meaning something. So the transport arrives with the credential, and the contract's "stdio, and only stdio" is rewritten rather than quietly broken. The store (`authorizations.py`) keeps SHA-256 digests, not tokens: nothing ever needs the secret back, so `authorizations.json` is not itself a credential. No salt and no KDF -- a token is 256 bits of `secrets`, so there is no dictionary to attack and a work factor would only slow the request path. Expiry is wall clock, the one place in this project where that is right: every broker deadline is CLOCK_BOOTTIME so an idle window survives an NTP step, but "valid for thirty days" is a calendar statement that has to outlive a reboot. Every read-modify-write takes a flock, because two processes write this file -- the server stamping `last_used` and an operator running `token mint` -- and the atomic replace alone prevents a torn read, not a lost update. `--toolsets` on a token, not just at launch, because the flag is per-process and one HTTP server has many callers: a per-process tool budget stops being a per-caller one the moment the transport is shared. The intersection applies, so a token cannot widen what the unit was started with. `server.build` takes a chooser instead of a fixed list to make that possible; the stdio path passes none and closes over its selection exactly as before. Three things in the request path are deliberate. `default_allowed_hosts` exists because the SDK's DNS-rebinding check is allowlist-only with no implicit localhost -- protection on with an empty list 421s *every* request -- so the allowlist is derived from the bind address rather than the protection being switched off to get a working default; a wildcard bind derives nothing and is refused, which makes binding every interface the case where the hostnames must be said out loud. The grant travels in the ASGI scope and not a contextvar, because in stateful mode the session manager runs the handler in a task owned by its own lifespan and a contextvar set in middleware would not be visible there. And a refusal is a 401 with an empty body that never echoes the token and never says which of unknown, revoked or expired it was -- the discipline `hhstream_live.server` already applies to a wrong phrase, with that app's own RateLimiter reused rather than a second one grown. This is NOT MCP's authorization specification, which is OAuth 2.1 plus RFC 9728 metadata discovery. A client that can only discover an authorization server will not connect; one that lets you set a header will. Documented as a limit rather than hidden, beside the two the SDK already imposes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KchcvnbfhhZhUHy83YL3Ya |
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e636472106 |
docs(mcp)!: mcp-v2, and the two limits the SDK imposes on it
`docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md` goes to mcp-v2 with a change table at the top, because v1 lasted a day and an agent that learned it deserves to be told what moved rather than to discover it. The new §4 freezes the resource surface: the eight URIs, their bodies, their query parameters, and the five rules the layer keeps (a read never writes; only declared parameters; a literal route beats a template; a frame's media type comes from its bytes; no subscriptions). §6 gains the other half of the error mapping -- for a resource read every exit code arrives as `-32602` with the remedy in `message` and the structured object in `data`, because `ReadResourceResult` has no `isError` to use instead. §2 records what `--toolsets` is and is not: there is no grouping primitive in MCP, the `Tool` object has nowhere to put a family, and tools are a flat list in the specification too -- so the only lever is which tools the server lists, decided by whoever spawns it. README.md leads with the split rather than with a tool count, since that is the thing a reader has to understand before any of the names make sense, and shows the `--toolsets` form for a client with a tight budget. ARCHITECTURE.md's sixth box grows its second half and says why `shot` is on both sides. A second TODO, `mcp-resources-cannot-be-subscribed-to.md`, records the limit that cost the most: `Server.get_capabilities` hardcodes `ResourcesCapability(subscribe=False, …)`, so registering a `subscribe_resource` handler changes nothing and a client is correctly told not to try. Subscriptions would have been the principled answer to the missing `logs --follow` -- it is the one place this design wanted a capability the SDK will not advertise -- so the file names the one-line local override, says what it risks, and recommends upstreaming the real fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE |
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56493721f0 |
test(mcp): the resource routing, the toolsets, and the guest check for both
46 more unit tests, and `vm-mcp` rewritten around the new split (21 subtests, up from 14). `test_mcp_resources.py` is the new file and its subject is what the resource layer actually decides: which entry a URI resolves to, which query parameters it will accept, and the argv each read builds. The cases that matter are the ones a reshuffle would quietly break -- a literal route beating a template (`hhstream://sessions` is the listing, not a session with a blank id), a switch parameter becoming a bare flag or nothing at all (`--all=false` is not something the CLI takes), an undeclared parameter being refused rather than dropped, a frame's media type being sniffed rather than assumed, and a refusal being *raised* instead of returned as the body. One test exists only to stop a future kindness: there must be no resource for the reconciling container read, because that one writes. `test_mcp_server.py` grows the protocol-level half -- both listings, a read that returns JSON, a read that returns a blob, a refused read arriving as `McpError`, and a toolset selection that narrows the tools while leaving the resources alone. The tool and toolset tests move with the surface: the read-only verbs are asserted *absent* by name rather than merely missing, so re-adding one is a failure instead of a silent widening of what mcp-v2 narrowed. In the guest, the subtest the whole surface turns on is now measured rather than described: two reads of `hhstream://sessions/<id>` must NOT move the idle deadline, and `session_touch` must. It also asks for the same container two ways and checks the answers agree, reads one output's frame as a blob and confirms the `shot` tool reports the same geometry, and proves `--toolsets` makes an omitted tool unreachable and not merely unlisted. `checks/lib/mcp_client.py` gains `--resources`, `--read` and `--server-arg`, and exits 3 rather than 2 on a protocol error -- so "the server refused this read" stays distinguishable from "the server did not answer at all", which is the distinction that keeps the refusal subtests from passing for the wrong reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE |
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0a63c9b7fc |
feat(mcp)!: state as resources, acts as tools, and --toolsets for the rest
BREAKING: `status`, `session_list`, `session_status`, `session_logs` and
`pointer_state` are no longer tools. They are `hhstream://…` resources. 26
tools became 21, and eight resources appeared beside them.
The reason is the split the protocol itself draws, which the first cut ignored.
A resource is **application**-controlled context: the host decides what to put
in front of the model, and "what is on this machine right now" is the host's
question. A tool is **model**-controlled: an act the model chooses to perform.
Nothing in those five verbs acts. So the line between the halves is *who
decides*, not what a call costs.
hhstream://status text, the units and the frame socket
hhstream://sessions {?all} the broker's own list object
hhstream://pointer the lease holder, buttons and keys
hhstream://containers every container, plus the orphans
hhstream://screen a frame, as an image blob
hhstream://sessions/{id} {?events}
hhstream://sessions/{id}/logs {?lines}
hhstream://outputs/{name} one output's frame, as a blob
What did *not* move is the interesting part. `shot` and `record` stay tools
though neither changes the desktop: capturing is an act at a moment, and an
agent in a loop has to be able to decide to look *now* -- in many clients a
resource is something a person attaches rather than something a model can
fetch. The same frames are readable as `hhstream://screen` and
`hhstream://outputs/{name}` as well, for a host that wants one in context
itself. `session_container` stays a tool for a harder reason: with an id the
CLI runs `container.reconcile`, which writes the record back, so it is not a
read at all. Only the no-id listing is a resource. **A resource read must never
write**, and `resources.py` says so where it would be tempting.
Three consequences worth naming:
* A refusal cannot be content. `ReadResourceResult` has no `isError`, so a CLI
refusal is raised as `-32602` with the same remedy text in `message` and the
same `{ok, exit_code, error, reason, hint, remedy}` in `data`. Returning the
broker's failure object as the *body* would make "no such session" read as a
successful read of a session.
* Arguments become query parameters, and only declared ones are accepted -- for
the reason every tool schema sets `additionalProperties: false`. A parameter
silently ignored is a read that answered a different question.
* A v1 tool name is told where it went: `session_list` comes back with "It is a
RESOURCE now ... read hhstream://sessions instead". "No such tool" alone
reads as a broken server rather than a moved surface.
`--toolsets frames,sessions,pointer,keyboard` lands with it, because 21 flat
tools is the same problem one size smaller. There is **no grouping primitive in
MCP** -- `Tool` carries name, title, description, inputSchema, outputSchema,
icons, annotations, _meta and execution, and nowhere to put a family -- so the
only honest lever is which tools the *server* lists, chosen at launch. An
unknown name is argparse's exit 2, never a silently empty server, and a tool
outside the selection is unreachable rather than merely unlisted. Resources are
deliberately not filtered by it: they are the host's context, not the model's
budget.
`--list-resources` joins `--list-tools`; both are in the package's own
entry-point check, with `--toolsets` beside them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE
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6a40c7e2e4 |
docs(mcp): freeze the tool surface, and record what the in-process seam costs
`docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md` (mcp-v1) is the new interface, written the way this repository writes interfaces: the tool names, the arguments each takes, the flag form, what is deliberately absent and why, and a row per exit code saying what it arrives as and what an agent should do about it. An agent that has learned these names is a consumer like any other, so renaming one needs a version bump. README.md gains the section an operator reads: the `mcp.enable` option, the `mcpServers` block to register it with, why both environment variables are shown at their defaults, and what to do when `shot` cannot read the frame socket. README.dev.md gains the `nix build .#hhstream-mcp` half of the build section, the `vm-mcp` row, the new files in the layout, and the reason `mcp` is in the unit check's environment. ARCHITECTURE.md gains the sixth box, drawn above the CLI rather than beside the broker, because that is where it sits. `docs/TODO/mcp-in-process-has-no-call-deadline.md` records the two things the in-process seam costs, rather than leaving them to be rediscovered. A thread cannot be interrupted, so there is no per-call deadline and a wedged call queues every later one behind it; and `cli.main`'s `sg` re-exec is an `exec` this server cannot perform, so a frame verb that cannot read the socket fails where the CLI would have recovered. The second is the one an operator meets first -- the CLI works from their shell and the tool does not -- which is why the failure says what the CLI would have done and how to not need it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE |
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fea55eecde |
test(mcp): the argv each tool builds, the mapping, and the server in a guest
101 unit tests under `tests/unit/` and one new VM check. The unit suite's subject is the only thing this layer decides: the argv list. `mcp_fake.FakeCli` is a recording stand-in put where the CLI goes, so every test can assert on the exact argv a tool handed over -- the `=` form of each flag, the `--` before each positional, the omission of a flag the caller did not give. Three tests drive the **real** entry point against a control socket that does not exist, which proves the dispatch, the capture and the exit-code mapping against the CLI's actual parser with no daemon standing up: argparse's exit 2 for a bad `--button`, exit 5 for the unreachable broker, exit 9 for a gesture with no lease. `test_mcp_server.py` imports the MCP SDK unconditionally and runs the server in process over the SDK's memory transport. It is not allowed to skip: the tool table is stdlib and tested without the SDK, but whether every schema validates and every name is one the specification allows is a question only the SDK can answer, and a file that skipped when it was absent would be green in exactly the build where that mattered. `checks/unit.nix` therefore puts `mcp` in the test environment and `hhstream-mcp` on PYTHONPATH beside `hhstream`. `checks/vm-mcp.nix` boots the session machine with `mcp.enable = true` and drives the real binary over a real pipe with `checks/lib/mcp_client.py` -- raw JSON-RPC, deliberately not the SDK's client, for the reason `tests/assert_stream.py` is a second implementation of the frame contract. It asserts the handshake, the 26-tool listing with its annotations and its two rules, a call that reaches the live broker, `shot` as image content, the lease granted/used/returned against the real driver, and exits 9 and 3 arriving as tool errors. The geometry assertion in that check is one it got wrong first time and now records: the published frame is 2560x720 on a guest configured for 1280x720, because the publisher's default capture takes the whole compositor layout and a session's container is a second output beside the main one. `shot` with the container's own `output` is the one that is exactly 1280x720. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE |
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549c73e8ae |
feat(nix): hhstream-mcp as its own derivation, and an option to install it
`packages.hhstream-mcp` (`nix/mcp.nix`), separate from `packages.hhstream` and the separation is the point: the frame socket, the CLI and the broker are stdlib-only by policy, the MCP SDK is a third-party dependency, and `packages.hhstream` runs as the compositor's own units. Verified: the hhstream closure gains no `mcp`, no `pydantic` and no `httpx`, and `hhstream_mcp` is not in its site-packages. The join to `hhstream` is a *library* one -- `toPythonModule`, because the tools call `hhstream.cli`'s handlers in process. `grim` and `ffmpeg` are prefixed onto the wrapper's PATH, because the CLI spawns them and the server is launched by an MCP client whose PATH is not ours to predict. The entry point is smoke-tested with `--list-tools` in a `postPhases` phase, not `postInstall`: the script is wrapped in `fixupPhase`, so any earlier and the check runs against a script with no PYTHONPATH and tests the wrong thing. (`installCheckPhase` is no use either -- `buildPythonPackage` does not include that phase at all.) `services.hyprland-headless-stream.mcp.enable` (default false) puts the binary on the system PATH, which is the whole of the option: the server is stdio and spawned per client, so there is no unit, no socket and no state directory. `mcp.package` defaults to this flake's build against `cfg.package`, so the server and the CLI it runs are one build. A warning, not an assertion, when it is enabled with `sessions.enable` off: 22 of the 26 tools then answer exit 5, but the four frame tools are genuinely useful alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE |
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ca5e309e51 |
feat(mcp): the hhstream CLI as Model Context Protocol tools
`hhstream_mcp` serves the whole `hhstream` surface -- the four frame verbs, the ten session verbs, the eight pointer verbs and the four keyboard verbs -- as 26 MCP tools over stdio, so an agent drives this desktop through typed tools instead of writing command lines. It is a shim and nothing more. Each tool builds the argv list the CLI's own parser takes, hands it to the CLI's own handler **in this process**, and maps what came back. The idle clock, the pointer lease, the allowlist, the exit-code table and every refusal message stay where they already were. Four decisions worth stating, each argued at length where it lives: * **One tool per verb**, not one per family with an `action` enum. The arguments do not rhyme, the two rules an agent gets wrong have to be on the tool it gets wrong, and `readOnlyHint` is a real per-verb distinction here -- `session_container` with an id runs `container.reconcile`, so it is not marked read-only. * **In process, not as a subprocess.** `hhstream.cli`'s parser already takes an argv list and its handlers already return a code from the frozen table. Two of its paths cannot be called here and both end in an `exec` that would replace this server: `main`'s `sg` re-exec, and `cmd_run`'s `execvpe`. The first is therefore unavailable and said out loud (`access_hint`); the second is why `run` goes through `posix_spawn` into its own session. * **The transport leaves file descriptor 1.** The CLI prints, and `record` spawns an `ffmpeg` whose output it does not capture. `claim_transport` takes a private duplicate of stdin and stdout at start-up and points fd 1 at the log, so a stray write is a log line and never a corrupted JSON-RPC stream. * **No state, and the lease is an argument.** The CLI caches a lease id between invocations because its surface is flagless; this passes `--lease` on every call and never reads that cache. A cached lease is a lease an agent cannot see. Refusals come back as tool errors -- never as a success -- carrying the remedy sentence, the CLI's own `error`/`reason`/`hint`, everything it said, and the frozen exit code in `structuredContent`. Exits 8 and 9 are held apart by a test, because an agent that sees 8 must wait and one that sees 9 must acquire. The root pyproject excludes `hhstream_mcp*` from package discovery: without that, `packages.hhstream` would ship a module whose first import line fails. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011ZeH65zd6pFTgBSu52W9PE |
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f3ac9ada27 |
Merge pull request 'Keyboard input for sessions: typing on the compositor's one seat' (#1) from feat/keyboard-input into main
Reviewed-on: http://gitea.app.internal:3000/Hermenix/hyprland-headless-stream-plugin/pulls/1 |
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443efd8da8 |
docs(dev): register vm-keyboard and vm-keyboard-de where a reader looks
The keyboard checks were in `README.dev.md`'s `checks/` layout listing and
nowhere else: not in the table of what each check proves, and not in the
one-at-a-time `nix build -L` list that the same section tells you to use
instead of `nix flake check`. So the two checks this branch adds were
invisible exactly where someone goes to find out what is gated and how to
run it, while `vm-stream-firewall` (from main) was in all three places.
Four lines, no behaviour. The table rows state what each run actually
asserts, taken from `checks/vm-keyboard.nix`'s header and its
`expectations` attrset rather than paraphrased:
* `vm-keyboard` -- the uploaded keymap reaching a real compositor,
`pointer acquire` leaving the aimed window holding the keyboard and
not merely the cursor, and `hhs-keyboard-target` decoding `hello`
from the keymap it was forwarded. The mutation is named, because it
is the point of the victim decoding rather than counting keycodes: a
driver that stopped uploading a keymap leaves every key arriving as
`sym=?`.
* `vm-keyboard-de` -- why one file is exposed twice, which is that
`sessions.keyboard.layout` reaches the keymap only through
`--xkb-layout` on the driver unit and a single-layout run cannot
tell that path from a hardcoded `us`. The three differences it
pins: keysym `y`'s evdev code (21 against 44), the forwarded
`symbols=` name, and `ü` going from exit 2 to `udiaeresis`.
Both rows say `yes` under "Needs a VM", and the build lines sit between
`vm-pointer` and `vm-stream-firewall` so the list keeps the order the
layout listing and `checks/default.nix` already use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PjpHyir6hxyjdw2o1RwQmn
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5f94833a76 |
Merge origin/main into feat/keyboard-input: keep both the stream and the
keyboard sides
origin/main brought the session live-stream feature (stage 1): the
`hhstream_live` router, its phrase generator and wordlist, the
`sessions.stream.*` module options with their loopback-vs-openFirewall
assertion and the one firewall port, the `vm-stream-firewall` check, and
`tests/live/`. This branch adds keyboard input: the `key`/`type` ops, the
uploaded XKB keymap, `sessions.keyboard.{layout,model,variant,options}`
and the four `--xkb-*` flags on the driver unit, `vm-keyboard` and
`vm-keyboard-de`, and their docs.
The two features are independent, so every conflict wanted both sides.
Four files, resolved as follows.
checks/default.nix -- both the header list and the attribute set take all
three new checks: `vm-keyboard`, `vm-keyboard-de` (the same file with
`keyboardLayout = "de"`, because the layout reaches the keymap only
through the driver unit's argv) and `vm-stream-firewall`, which stays a
non-`sessionArgs` consumer with main's comment saying why. Neither side's
check list is reduced; the flake now exposes ten.
nix/package.nix -- one `pythonImportsCheck` list with both sides' entries:
`hhstream_pointer.keymap` and the vendored
`virtual_keyboard_unstable_v1` from here, `hhstream_live.server` from
main. The surrounding hunks were not in conflict, so the branch's
xkbcommon dependency and main's wordlist `postFixup` both survive, and
both ran in this merge's `checks.unit` build (`wordlist ok: 7772 words`).
nix/module.nix -- the sole conflict was textual: both sides open a new
sub-option block immediately after `sessions.pointer`. Both blocks are
kept, `keyboard` then `stream`, each with its own closing. Everything
else in the file merged cleanly, so `loopbackBinds`, the
openFirewall-on-loopback assertion and
`networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts` are present alongside the driver
unit's `--xkb-layout`/`--xkb-model`/`--xkb-variant`/`--xkb-options`.
README.dev.md -- the `checks/` layout listing keeps both entries in the
file's existing order, `vm-keyboard.nix` then `vm-stream-firewall.nix`.
Verified: `nix flake check --no-build` evaluates every output green, and
`nix build .#checks.x86_64-linux.unit` passes -- 977 passed, 2 skipped,
0 failed, over both sides' suites. The VM checks were not run (they boot
a software-rendered compositor and must run one at a time).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PjpHyir6hxyjdw2o1RwQmn
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c6cfd02bf3 |
Merge pull request 'Session live stream: one port, a router, and a phrase per session (stage 1)' (#2) from feat/session-live-stream-webapp into main
Reviewed-on: http://gitea.app.internal:3000/Hermenix/hyprland-headless-stream-plugin/pulls/2 |
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4461660c6d | Merge branch 'main' into feat/session-live-stream-webapp | ||
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4fefb448ac |
docs(todo): the capture binary needs an absolute path under a unit
Found on the deployment machine on 2026-10-11, the first time `hhstream-live` was run **as a unit** rather than from a login shell: a systemd unit's PATH has no system profile, so the capture command `grim` is not found, ten times, and the stream gives up. It answers on its port, serves the landing page and reports `"stopped": true, "failures": 10` while showing nothing -- the quiet half of the failure is what makes it worth a file. The module already solves this for `sessions.apps` by requiring an absolute store path; the stream's unit has to do the same (or set PATH, which is what made the deployment run work). Recorded in `docs/TODO/` with the two fixes, and named as a risk on stage 3 of the plan, which is the stage that turns this from an experiment into the only path. |
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7141900070 |
module: declare the stream's port, and the one hole it needs
`sessions.stream { port, bind, openFirewall }` -- the piece of stage 3 that
does not need the broker. It exists because a machine had to be able to *reach*
a stream before the rest of the app is settled: the operator asked for the port
to be open on the deployment machine, where the app still runs by hand, and a
bare `networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts` line in one machine's config is the
wrong place for a fact about this flake.
- `openFirewall` defaults false and is deliberately not implied by
`sessions.enable`: a live view of the desktop is readable by anyone who can
reach the port, the phrase in the URL is its only credential, and there is no
TLS. It opens exactly one port -- the one the option names.
- `bind` defaults to loopback and is *checked*: `openFirewall = true` beside a
loopback bind is refused, because that is a hole with no service behind it.
- `checks/vm-stream-firewall.nix` boots the module with a configured port that
is not the module's default, puts listeners on that port and on a neighbour,
and asserts from a second machine on the same VLAN that the peer reaches the
configured port and is refused on the other -- while both answer on loopback
inside the guest, so the refusal is the firewall's doing and not an empty
socket. The peer is a second machine because a probe from the test driver
proves nothing: the driver is not on the test VLAN.
Nothing here turns a stream on -- no unit, no phrases, no `session stream`
verbs, which stay stage 2+3 -- and docs/plans/2026-10-04-session-stream-webapp.md
now records which part of its stage 3 landed and why out of order.
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934774f15e | fixing a test | ||
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db7aaf8276 |
build(nix): prove the wordlist is actually installed
`pythonImportsCheck` only imports, and `hhstream_live.phrase` reads its wordlist lazily, so a wheel that dropped `wordlist.txt` sailed past the check and would have failed at the first `enable` instead. The package now reads the list from the installed tree and mints a phrase through `validate`, which is the only place the packaged data is exercised -- `doCheck = false`, the suite runs in the flake's `checks`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01URhyHGQnmKH9zBXxoznfQY |
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bd3ca2e644 |
fix(live): hhstream-live with no subcommand serves, and SIGTERM stops it
`cmd_serve` read `args.capture_command`, which only exists on the `serve` subparser, so a bare `hhstream-live` died with an `AttributeError`. The word `serve` is now inserted before parsing rather than defaulted afterwards: the top-level parser would otherwise reject `hhstream-live --port 9999` for an unknown option before anything could be filled in. `--help` is left alone so it still shows the program's own help. `--log-level` gained a copy on each subparser, defaulting to `SUPPRESS` so that naming the subcommand does not reset it. SIGTERM had no handler, so the default action killed the process and `server.stop()` never ran -- the exit status was a signal, not a 0. The handler is installed before the listener is bound, so a supervisor's first signal is never the fatal one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01URhyHGQnmKH9zBXxoznfQY |
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a9299682d2 |
fix(live): bound connections, a delimited stream, and a quiet access log
Four things the HTTP side owed. A connection had no read timeout, so a client that connected and sent nothing held a handler thread in `readline` for ever -- and on the MJPEG route it also held a viewer slot, which keeps grim running for nobody. Handlers now carry a 15 s header timeout, cleared once the MJPEG headers are out because from there the wait is on frames, not on the client. TCP keepalive covers the other half: a black-holed viewer that never closes. The MJPEG response had no `Content-Length`, no chunked encoding and no `Connection: close` -- `close_connection = True` was set after `end_headers()`, so it never became a header. An intermediary was entitled to buffer the whole thing waiting for an EOF that never comes. `log_message` formatted the request line, which is the phrase, at debug level; so did the client-error line. Both now log the method, the status and the peer, never the path. `RateLimiter` pruned only the key it was asked about, so every source address that ever missed stayed in the table for the life of the process -- a leak any LAN host could drive. The sweep now covers the table. Finally, `LiveServer` says where it is really bound: `address` still returns something dialable, and `describe_bind` is what names `0.0.0.0` as all interfaces. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01URhyHGQnmKH9zBXxoznfQY |
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19338af17c |
fix(live): a phrase is four plain words and a tail, and nothing weaker
Two holes in the one credential a stream has.
The wordlist has four hyphenated entries (`drop-down`, `felt-tip`,
`t-shirt`, `yo-yo`). A phrase drawn from one is six tokens --
`abacus-drop-down-lantern-harbor-7k2qp` -- and a listener cannot hear where
the tail starts. `words()` now keeps only `^[a-z]+$`; 7772 words costs
0.003 bits, so the ~77.5-bit figure is unchanged. The shape test asserted
over 50 draws, which caught this about a tenth of the time; the property is
now asserted over the whole list.
`validate` accepted `a-b-c`. It is what an operator-supplied `--phrase` is
checked against, so everything it accepts is a password someone can choose
for a LAN-facing stream. The floor is now exactly what `generate` produces:
four `[a-z]{3,}` words and a five-character `[a-z0-9]` tail. The router
still looks phrases up without validating, so an unknown phrase is the same
empty 404 it was.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01URhyHGQnmKH9zBXxoznfQY
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52e3786bfb |
fix(live): a dead output stops the stream even after a good frame
The failure cap read `consecutive_failures >= FAILURE_LIMIT and captured == 0`, so it could only ever fire on a cold start. An output removed while someone was watching -- grim answering "unknown output" to every grab from then on -- kept the loop retrying twice a second for as long as the viewer held the page open. That is the busy loop the cap exists to stop, so the count is now of failures in a row and nothing else. Giving up stays sticky: a removed output does not come back, and re-enabling the session is how it returns. While here, the capture thread is named for its output and the give-up is logged by output. The phrase is the stream's only credential, and faulthandler, `threading.excepthook` and any sampling profiler all print thread names. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01URhyHGQnmKH9zBXxoznfQY |
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9744d35945 |
feat(live): one port, a router, and a phrase per session (stage 1)
The session-stream web app: a single HTTP listener (9988) that serves a page
per enabled session, keyed by a spoken phrase. Off by default, so a stream
exists only for the sessions it was enabled on.
src/hhstream_live/phrase.py four EFF-large words + a 5-char base-36 tail
(~77.5 bits); the phrase is the password
src/hhstream_live/publisher.py one capture thread + one frame slot per
output; one slot/no queue; capture paused at
zero viewers
src/hhstream_live/server.py the router: /, /<phrase>/, /stream.mjpg,
/frame.jpg, /status.json; unknown phrase is
an empty 404, rate-limited
src/hhstream_live/pages.py the built-in dark pages (no CDN, no build)
src/hhstream_live/__main__.py hhstream-live serve|phrase, standalone
The root page is a form, never a list: the phrase is known only by whoever
enabled the stream. Transport is MJPEG (multipart/x-mixed-replace), reusing
the JPEG grim already produces. Not yet wired to the broker -- that is
stage 2. Tests: tests/live (51).
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561e0c28f5 |
Stage 2 fixes: the two tests the review named, and the docs drift
From docs/reviews/2026-10-04-stage2-3-review.md (Stage 3 done; Stage 2
done-with-fixes). Its findings 1, 2, 3 and 5, which it called the only
things standing before merge.
(A) REPLAY, THROUGH THE SINK. What existed was
`test_every_keyboard_verb_is_cached_for_the_same_reason`, which
asserts the two verbs are in MUTATING_VERBS -- and the verification
doc had already named that as the false pass: "asserting
`deduplicated` and not the sink. A handler that types and then sets
the flag stays green." Two integration tests now, modelled on
`test_a_retried_click_with_the_same_request_id_clicks_once`:
test_a_retried_type_with_the_same_request_id_types_once
`keyboard.type` of "ab" twice with request_id="retry-me".
Asserts `deduplicated`, chars == 2 on both, and that the sink
still has exactly 4 key events -- two characters, a down and an
up each -- so a replay that typed again is caught by the count
and not by the flag.
test_a_retried_unmappable_type_stays_refused_and_types_nothing
`café` twice with one id. Both refusals are `invalid_argument`,
the second carries `deduplicated` (a recorded failure is
replayed as the failure it was), and the sink is empty after
both -- there is no partial type on either call.
Mutation-checked rather than assumed: removing `keyboard.key` and
`keyboard.type` from MUTATING_VERBS fails both.
(B) KILL, THROUGH kill(). `test_killing_the_holder_lifts_its_keys` calls
`_drop_lease_for` directly, so it proves that helper lifts keys and
says nothing about whether `kill` still calls it. The integration
kill test now holds `Shift_L` before the kill and asserts the SINK
saw `("key", 42, 0)` and `("modifiers", 0, 0, 0, 0)` -- the lease
forgetting a key is not the compositor being told it came up, and
only the second matters to the application. Code 42 because `type`
never emits it, so the release cannot be a leftover.
Mutation-checked: stubbing out the `_drop_lease_for` call in
`kill()` fails it. Before this it stayed green.
(C) DOCS. The plan's stage table and risk paragraph still said acquire
is one warp and that `focuswindow` was unbuilt Stage 4 work. The
contract (v3 §4) describes what shipped; the plan did not. Rewritten
so they agree, and the plan now says outright that the contract wins
where they differ:
* risk 1 marked RESOLVED, describing the two warps, the pinned
`follow_mouse_threshold`, and `focuswindow` as the
nudge-failure fallback selecting on `address:` (not
`stable_id`, which is not a Hyprland selector)
* Stage 3 marked Done; Stage 4 struck as not existing -- the
answer to Stage 0 was the second warp, not a focus dispatch
* the top banner, the §5 VM assertion list and open question 2
no longer say "one warp"
* verification §B3 subtest 1 amended: it is a live assertion
rather than an expected red, and the check additionally requires
`focus == "warp"` so the fallback is not accepted as success
Also amended one sentence the review did not list, because leaving
it would contradict the edit above inside the same document:
verification §"Warp does not guarantee wl_keyboard.enter" predicted
`focuswindow` was "likely mandatory". It was not; the second warp
was.
Written down rather than smoothed over: the `focuswindow` branch
itself has no test, and if both mechanisms fail acquire still
returns ok with `focus="none"` -- a lease whose first key may go to
the previously focused window.
(D) The tap docstring claimed the `up` is sent even if the `down` was
refused after sending. The next lines return early on `not ok`, and
that early return is right: a refusal means the key was never
pressed, so an `up` would ask the compositor to release something it
never had. Sentence replaced with why the early return is correct
and what actually covers a lost reply (the broker's `release_all`,
not the CLI, which cannot know whether the request arrived).
Not done, and not claimed: findings 4, 6 and 7 (the broker chord test
checking first/last mask rather than the key; the at-cap test not
looking at the sink; the module-defaults test being a substring match).
The review rates all three as not holes in the claim, and the driver
tests are the locks for the first two.
nix develop -c python -m pytest tests -q
907 passed in 67.71s
nix develop -c python -m pytest tests/pointer tests/sessions/unit -q
605 passed in 27.16s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM
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54dd109dde |
checks(vm-pointer): the two-warp acquire invalidated a premise, not a property
Found by running vm-pointer after fixing the helper derivation, which is
the only reason it could be found: the heredoc bug meant this check had
not run, so nothing noticed that Stage 2 had broken it. Two bugs hiding
each other.
The subtest "the cursor reaches a session that does not hold focus"
needed the lease holder and the focused window to be different sessions,
and used to get that for free -- the second session's window took focus
when it opened, and `acquire` left it there, because one warp moves the
cursor and not keyboard focus. `pointer acquire` now takes the keyboard
too, so after the acquire the focused window IS the holder's and the
precondition assertion fired:
this subtest needs the OTHER session focused; ['hh-target-epoqmb'] is
The property is still worth proving, so it is still proved: the premise
is now arranged with one `hyprctl dispatch focuswindow` on the other
session. That is SETUP and not the thing under test -- what is measured
is which client the compositor hands the warp to, which is unaffected by
how focus came to be where it is. Asserting "acquire takes focus" here
as well would make the subtest about the acquire rather than about
routing, and vm-keyboard already asserts that against both layouts.
Re-run, and the discriminator is intact:
nix build --no-link -L .#checks.x86_64-linux.vm-pointer
test script finished in 181.53s (12/12, exit 0)
the compositor's focused window belongs to: ['hh-target-qnly47']
aimed at target-awyant: it reports [..., (747.0, 267.0)]
focused is target-qnly47: it reports []
The warp went to the session it was aimed at and the focused one was
told nothing, which is what this check exists to catch.
One behavioural consequence of the two-warp acquire, visible in that
same log and worth knowing: the focus nudge is delivered to the client
as a real motion. `[(299.0, 521.88), (299.0, 519.0), ...]` is the nudge
and then the target, about 3 px apart, so an application sees a small
cursor jiggle on every acquire.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM
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a6a4094e6a |
Stage 3: vm-keyboard, and the helper derivation that never built
The keyboard's only purpose is that a client receives symbols, so a unit
suite alone was testing the shape of a request nobody answered --
docs/TODO/scroll-has-no-compositor-proof.md is the precedent. This is
the compositor proof: two nixosTests, 16 subtests each, real time, no
injected clock.
nix build --no-link -L .#checks.x86_64-linux.vm-keyboard
test script finished in 281.06s (16/16, exit 0)
nix build --no-link -L .#checks.x86_64-linux.vm-keyboard-de
test script finished in 278.15s (16/16, exit 0)
The victim, checks/lib/keyboard_target.py, decodes every keysym from the
keymap the COMPOSITOR forwarded rather than from a table of its own.
That is the mutation rule PLAN §14 asks for: a driver that stopped
uploading leaves the client with nothing to decode with, every key
arrives as `sym=?`, and the character assertions go red. A victim with
its own keymap would decode `hello` either way and the check would be
asserting that the check can spell.
What the client actually reported, which is the point of reading back
the application's state rather than the broker's intention:
type A [(30, 1, 'A'), (30, 0, 'A')] masks [1, 1, 0, 0]
-- evdev 30 decoded as A, so the mask arrived BEFORE the
key, and no code 42 anywhere
key Return [(28, 1, 'Return'), (28, 0, 'Return')]
TTL expiry [(42, 1, 'Shift_L'), (42, 0, 'Shift_L')] masks [1,1,0,0]
-- lifted by the sweeper alone, mask cleared with it
chord depressed mask [4, 4] while Control held, still held
after the type returned
It runs TWICE because `sessions.keyboard.layout` reaches the uploaded
keymap through exactly one path -- `--xkb-layout` on the driver unit's
argv -- and one layout cannot tell that path from a hardcoded `us`:
us: symbols=pc_us_inet(evdev) bytes=35572
type y -> [(21, 1, 'y')] type z -> [(44, 1, 'z')]
type cafü -> exit 2, "scalar 3 (U+00FC) is not typeable", and the
client reported [] -- no prefix typed
de: symbols=pc_de_inet(evdev) bytes=37532
type y -> [(44, 1, 'y')] type z -> [(21, 1, 'z')] (swapped)
type cafü -> {'chars': 4, 'ok': True}
client decoded ['c', 'a', 'f', 'udiaeresis']
Hyprland's own input:kb_layout is left at `us` in BOTH runs, so a client
that ignored our keymap would decode the us answer on the de machine.
The decisive subtest is "acquire takes the KEYBOARD as well as the
cursor". With session B holding keyboard focus because its window mapped
last, acquire on A delivered wl_pointer.enter AND wl_keyboard.enter to A
and wl_keyboard.leave to B, with focus == "warp". A check that asserted
only pointer delivery would have gone green while A had the cursor, B
had the keys, and the first keystroke of the lease went to B -- which is
exactly what one warp does. §B3's "one warp" and the Stage 0 review's
"do not assert enter on acquire" are superseded by the two-warp acquire,
and the header says so.
One deviation from §B3, with reasons in the header: its subtest 4 says
`type y` decodes to sym `z`, which is wrong for a victim that decodes
from the forwarded keymap -- the same paragraph requires that. `type y`
resolves keysym y against the uploaded layout and sends that layout's
code; the client decodes it back to `y`. The sym is `y` on both layouts
by construction. What differs is the CODE, the symbols name, and whether
ü is typeable at all, and those are what this asserts.
── AND A PRE-EXISTING BUG THE FIRST RUN EXPOSED ──────────────────────
checks/lib/session-tools.nix opened a heredoc with `<<EOF` and closed it
with an INDENTED ` EOF`. A delimiter has to be at column zero, so it
never closed: it swallowed the rest of the builder -- both `install`
lines and every self-test -- into the shim's own text. The derivation
built anyway, with `hhs-ipc-watch` alone in $out/bin:
$ ls /nix/store/wy3lp3...-hhstream-session-tools/bin/
hhs-ipc-watch
So hhs-pointer-target has NEVER existed in that derivation either.
vm-pointer execs that absolute path, and vm-keyboard failed the same
way: the broker reported `target exited immediately (exit code 127)`,
which is true about a path that was never created and says nothing about
why. hhs-ipc-watch's own first line was ` #!...`, indented, which is
not a shebang, so vm-ipc is affected too. The build-time self-tests that
exist to catch exactly this had themselves become heredoc text. The
unquoted delimiter also expanded the swallowed text, so the builder ran
`hhstreamd.ipc` as a command.
The shim is a writeTextFile now -- no delimiter to indent wrong -- and
`test -x` on all three programs is the guard that would have caught it.
NOT DONE, and it needs doing: vm-pointer and vm-ipc have not been
re-run. checks/default.nix says one VM at a time on this two-core box
and I did not want to perturb the keyboard runs. That they WOULD have
failed is read off the store listing above, not off a run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM
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7890315cf6 |
checks(unit): xkbcommon in the suite's env, and the two-warp acquire
Two gaps found by running more than the gate command. `checks/unit.nix` builds its own `python3.withPackages` and had only pytest and pywayland in it, so `nix build .#checks.unit` would have collected tests/pointer/test_keymap.py and failed on the import. The dev shell has xkbcommon through nix/package.nix and the gate command therefore never noticed. It is not an optional dependency: that file compiles a real `us` keymap and a real `de` one, because only xkbcommon can say `é` is unmappable on `us` and that `@` on `de` needs a level-three mask. And two integration tests asserted acquire's single warp, which is now two. They are the whole-gesture trace and the bookmark-survives-a- restart case, and both now assert the pair -- with the restored position as the SECOND warp, since the bookmark is where the cursor is left and the reverse order would restore every session a few pixels off. nix develop -c python -m pytest tests -q 905 passed in 65.91s nix build --no-link .#checks.x86_64-linux.unit 903 passed, 2 skipped in 73.24s unit suite: 905 collected, 903 executed, 0 failed, 0 errored, 2 skipped Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM |
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e6f4c3bb3f |
Stage 1 review fixes, and Stage 2: the broker, the CLI and the module
The Stage 1 review (docs/reviews/2026-10-04-stage1-review.md, verdict
yes-with-fixes) found a real bug, and it was the kind Stage 2 would have
cemented. All five findings:
(1) HIGH, and reproduced before fixing: `key` resolved the action and
then used only its `code`. So `keyboard key A` sent a bare code 30
and the window received `a`; on `de`, `at` lost its level-three mask
and typed `q`. `type` was the only path that used the mask, which is
why every `type` test stayed green. `key` now sends
modifiers(baseline | mask) before the down and restores the baseline
on the up -- the one-character `type` sequence -- and `Shift_L`
keeps its key-then-mask order, which is the other path on purpose.
The same hole aliased two names onto one keycode: `down A` then
`down a` recorded both and pressed 30 twice, Hyprland dropped the
second, and the held set lied until the lease ended. A second name
for a code already down is now refused.
(2) HIGH: the shutdown comment claimed hyprland-conf.nix sets
input:virtualkeyboard:release_pressed_on_close. It did not. The line
is there now, with the note that it releases keys and still never
clears a mask -- which is why release_all zeroes the mask on every
path we control rather than relying on it.
(3) MEDIUM: nothing would have noticed the keymap upload stopping. A
`main` that connected and listened without uploading passed every
test in the tree. Now asserted on the real sink: uploaded once,
before `listen` (one shared ordering log across both stand-ins), the
payload NUL-terminated with `size == len(utf8) + 1` read back
through the fd, format 1, one terminator not two, and modifiers(0)
straight after.
(4) LOW: `key` up now forgets the name only after a successful send,
like `button` -- otherwise a raise between the two leaves us
believing a key is up that the compositor still has down, and
release_all will not try again.
(5) LOW: `\r` no longer aliases to Return (CRLF would have become two
newlines silently), and an empty layout is refused -- xkbcommon
compiles "" as the same keymap as `us`, so `--xkb-layout ''` looked
configured and typed `us`.
Several of the review's named false passes are closed too: Control's
mask is compared against mod_get_index("Control") rather than merely
"not Shift's"; the keymap text assertion names pc_us_inet/pc_de_inet
instead of substring-matching "us"; the capital-under-Control case
asserts the whole sequence; the exit-code mirror is compared against
hhstreamd.protocol; and the module's defaults are read out of
nix/module.nix rather than asserted against themselves.
Stage 2 proper:
* broker verbs keyboard.key / keyboard.type, both in the mutation set,
both through _refresh (so they refresh the lease and, like every
pointer verb, do NOT count as activity)
* the driver's `kind` token mapped: a bad keysym or character is
invalid_argument (exit 2), a missing keyboard global stays
driver_refused (exit 10). The 4096-scalar cap and the shape checks
are broker-side, because only a broker-side invalid_argument is 2
* keys[] on pointer.state, keys_lifted[] on pointer.release and on
pointer_lease_timeout, one release_all for both halves
* CLI `session keyboard type|key|down|up`, reusing the pointer lease
and its cache; `type` takes one raw argument and interprets nothing;
the audit records a character count and never the text
* sessions.keyboard.{layout,model,variant,options} on the unit's argv,
layout defaulting to "us" with a type that refuses a comma. NO
[keyboard] TOML table: hhstreamd reads that file and the driver is a
different unit, so it would be a setting with no effect
* CONTRACT-sessions.md bumped to v3; README.dev.md item 3 and
vm-pointer.nix's header corrected (both still said the conf ships
follow_mouse = 0 and that the keyboard work would choose)
And the operator decision that acquire grabs both devices: it now sends
two warps a real pixel apart, because one warp onto an idle cursor moves
the cursor and not keyboard focus. follow_mouse_threshold = 0 is set
explicitly in hyprland-conf.nix since the second warp depends on it,
`dispatch focuswindow` is the fallback when the nudge cannot be sent,
and the reply and audit carry which mechanism ran. The acquire test
asserts the pair and that they floor to different pixels -- a test that
only saw wl_pointer.enter would pass while the first keystroke went to
the wrong window.
nix develop -c python -m pytest tests/pointer tests/sessions/unit -q
605 passed in 27.11s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM
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b1f2744cf0 |
Stage 0 review: correct what the log does not say, and edit the plan
The Stage 0 review (docs/reviews/2026-10-04-stage0-review.md, verdict
yes-with-fixes) found that the measurements were sound and the write-up
was not. All four of its high and medium defects, verified against the
committed transcript before fixing:
(1) 19e484b's README claimed a verbatim excerpt and printed serial=336
while the run's (a2) enter was serial 371. It also claimed six
reproductions with one transcript, and cited a `keys=[42, 0, 0, 0]`
enter from a run whose log was never kept -- every enter in the
committed file is `keys=[]`. The excerpt is now copied from the log
with line numbers to check it against, the reproduction claim is
gone, and the Shift observation is named as not-in-this-log.
(2) THE (a) CONCLUSION WAS WRONG, and it is the one that matters. The
first idle warp onto the unfocused window gave wl_pointer.enter and
NO keyboard enter; the leave/enter arrived on the LATER motion. So
it is not "enter, one warp late" -- the first warp's delta is set to
0, the threshold is 0.0, and the second motion's own non-zero delta
is what focused. Two corollaries the old text got backwards: a
second warp to the SAME point returns before mouseMoveUnified
touches the delta and proves nothing, and waiting longer does not
help. The probe now prints both targets and the measured gap
(0.401s) instead of hardcoding the word "immediately", and its
ANSWER string says the mechanism.
Consequence, now stated everywhere it belongs: `pointer acquire` is
one warp, so the first key of a lease can land on whatever was
already focused. Stage 3's enter subtest must not be designed from
acquire's single warp, and must not be made to pass by warping twice
to the same bookmark.
(3)
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f931858f30 |
Stage 1: the driver learns to type
`zwp_virtual_keyboard_v1`, spoken by the process that already speaks
`zwlr_virtual_pointer_v1`. One device for the seat, one keymap uploaded
once, keysym names on our socket and evdev codes only on the Wayland
request -- the division buttons.py already draws.
keymap.py is the new seam, and it holds the three decisions that have a
wrong version which looks right:
* A capital is the MASK, not a synthetic Shift keycode. Hyprland's
virtual keyboard never runs updateXkbStateWithKey, so a virtual
KEY_LEFTSHIFT changes no modifier state at all -- and sending both
is how a toolkit applies Shift twice.
* A modifier is whatever the keymap says is one, measured by pressing
each key in a throwaway xkb state. Not a name list: `@` on `de` is a
level-three symbol, and a Shift-only special case types the wrong
character. (The measured set is also smaller than the canonical one,
because no keycode on us/pc105 carries Meta or Hyper.)
* A lock is not a modifier. Caps_Lock reports a *locked* mask, so
`type` refuses while it is held rather than guessing the case.
The whole string resolves before anything is emitted, and every refusal
names the scalar INDEX, never the character: these messages reach the
driver's log and the string is a password as often as not.
Folding in the review's changes 1, 2, 3 and 6:
1 a Rejected now carries a `kind`. A bad keysym or an unmappable
character is `invalid_argument`; a missing keyboard global is
`refused`. Without the token the broker would have to tell exit 2
from exit 10 by reading English, and _drive maps every `ok: false`
to driver_refused today.
2 the keymap `size` on the wire includes the trailing NUL, and the fd
outlives a roundtrip rather than a flush. Hyprland mmaps exactly
that many bytes and hands the pointer to xkb_keymap_new_from_string.
3 release_all lifts buttons, then keys in press order, then zeroes the
mask -- and the mask only if something set it, so a compositor with
no keyboard global still gets its buttons lifted. One release_all is
the whole of expiry; an exception in the key half would abandon it.
6 `key` and `type` never call _aimed(). A keyboard has no output, and
one test deliberately never warps so that stays true.
Also: `--xkb-layout/-model/-variant/-options`, compiled BEFORE any
Wayland call so a bad layout is exit 2 rather than exit 10; a comma in
the layout refused outright, because v1 always sends group 0 and
xkbcommon would hand back a second group nothing could reach; the
keymap uploaded after connect and before listen, with one
modifiers(0,0,0,0) after it; and xkbcommon as a hard, non-optional
dependency -- an optional one would let test_keymap.py skip, and the
unmappable-character path is the one that must not rot.
nix develop -c python -m pytest tests/pointer tests/sessions/unit -q
549 passed in 25.70s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM
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19e484b388 |
Stage 0: measure the compositor instead of reading its source
A throwaway client against the live /run/hypr-stream that answers the
four open questions. It touches no broker, no lease and no session; it
opens two windows of its own and moves the one cursor, because keyboard
focus cannot be measured without doing both, and it refuses to send a
key until it sees wl_keyboard.enter on a surface it owns.
What it found, with the transcript beside it:
1 zwp_virtual_keyboard_manager_v1 is present at version 1. The gate
the plan hangs on holds against the running binary, not just
against §6.7's [RAN] claim.
a ONE IDLE WARP DOES NOT MOVE KEYBOARD FOCUS. A second warp
immediately after does. Measured with an unfocused fullscreen
window under a focused floating one, warping into the margin that
belongs to the first alone -- and `pointer acquire` is one warp, so
the first key of a lease can land in the previously focused
window. Neither plan permits building the fallback here, so this
branch does not; it is the objection in the final report.
b destroy with a key down releases nothing and clears no mask
(release_pressed_on_close is 0 and unset). An earlier run proved it
by accident: it exited with Shift_L down and the NEXT run's first
enter carried keys=[42, 0, 0, 0].
c one held key is one wl_keyboard.key, with repeat_info 25/600. The
flood is the client's repeat, not ours -- which is why `down` warns
unconditionally rather than only if the probe saw repeats.
The XML both plans name does not exist in this nixpkgs: not in
wayland-protocols 1.49, not in wlr-protocols, not in wlroots. Hyprland's
own copy is the only one, so that is what is used -- and because it
names keymap_format and key_state without defining them, both are
written down as cited constants instead of read off an enum.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM
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d07a1fd045 |
docs(plan): fold in the independent review of the keyboard plan
An adversarial read of 2026-10-03-keyboard-input.md against this tree and
against Hyprland v0.56.2. Its verdict is "safe to build on, not safe to
implement as written", and its §"Changes required before code" is the list
Stages 0-2 are built to rather than the original plan where the two differ:
1 exit 2 vs driver_refused -- _drive maps every `ok: false` to
driver_refused (exit 10), so the plan's "exit 2 for a bad keysym"
needs a token the broker can map to invalid_argument
2 the keymap `size` must include the trailing NUL
3 release_all must no-op its key half with no keyboard object, and
must end with modifiers(0, 0, 0, 0)
4 input:virtualkeyboard:release_pressed_on_close defaults to false
5 the layout reaches the keymap only as --xkb-layout on the driver
unit; a [keyboard] table in the broker TOML would be a false pass
6 the modifier-keysym set has to be written down; no Shift special case
7 Stage 0 expectations, including a two-window probe
8 acquire's stderr, and an index rather than the string in logs
It also writes the test specs for Stages 1-3, including the false pass
beside each assertion, which is the part the unit tests are written from.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GhNPM6rGcuzxocM1nATnuM
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14b3f691c4 | docs(plan): keyboard input for sessions — approach and open questions | ||
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4b5cb5197a |
docs+examples: log the cursor marker as open, and film each desk on its own
The marker is now written up as the *open* item rather than a research note: it is not implemented, the video went out without it, and everything else about the pointer is exact and readable. proof-video.py is rewritten for desks, one command, no arguments. It films the session's own output with `record --output` instead of the published socket -- with desks, the socket carries every output stitched together, so a viewer would watch two thirds wallpaper. The scrolling beats are real pointer axis events, down twice and back up once, so the movement cannot be mistaken for a page that merely loaded a different part of itself. |
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cbf58f6443 |
docs: two TODO items closed, and the cursor question answered
Closed: containers-do-not-bind and pointer-needs-a-container-or-a-screen. Both were the same defect seen from two sides, and both are fixed by assigning windows by pid -- two sessions now hold two outputs with a real browser on each, and the pointer aims at a desk that has something in it. The cursor item is rewritten with the answer rather than the speculation: the compositor draws no cursor image for a virtual pointer, so no capture setting can make one appear. The evidence is in the file, including the three wrong answers that came before it and the boring measurement that settled it. New item: killing a session left two browsers alive, found by counting windows rather than sessions. |
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acdfb2801e |
the default capture command now asks for the cursor
grim's `-c` ("include cursors in the screenshot") exists because the screencopy
protocol takes the decision from the client: Hyprland's capture_output carries
an overlayCursor argument and the frame is only composited with the cursor when
it is set. Without it a frame shows that *something* changed and never where it
was clicked -- and a click on the wrong element looks exactly like a click on
the right one, which is the whole reason the pointer work is verifiable at all.
Found by reading Hyprland's Screencopy.cpp rather than guessing at a compositor
setting: `no_hardware_cursors` was already on, and the cursor was invisible
because nobody had asked for it.
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352cfdcb24 |
claim windows by pid, and find the compositor after a restart
Two things stood between "containers enabled" and an application actually sitting on its own output, and neither was where I said it was. ipc: discovery refused whenever two instance directories existed, which every compositor restart leaves behind (a log file where a live compositor used to be). After two rebuilds the broker could not reach any compositor at all, so no container could be created and the pointer had nothing to aim at. It now asks each candidate for its version and uses the one that answers, preferring the newest only when two answer, and still refusing when none do. container_host.claim: windows are assigned by the pid the compositor already reports, not by the class stamp the per-session rule matches -- foot, GTK, Qt and the chromium wrapper all ignore that stamp, so the desk was created and left empty while the window sat in special:quarantine. The claim moves the window to its desk's workspace, makes that workspace the one the desk is showing, and reads back: the record says where the window is, never where it was sent. Called from both places a window can appear -- the read-back at start and container.reconcile -- and skipped in the steady state, because a move is a real change on screen and should not be dispatched for its own sake. |
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336474793f |
docs: the pointer is unusable while containers are off
Found live while trying to demonstrate the scroll verb that was just deployed: every cursor verb resolves its target through _pointer_output, which requires a container output, and no session has one -- because containers are off. So the verb exists and cannot be used, and the acceptance video's missing cursor was never a capture artefact: nothing could have moved it. Recorded with the routes out (aim at the shared output when a session owns no container; or fix the binding first and leave this alone), the cost of the quick one, and the misleading hint that blames the compositor for a switched-off feature. |
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7e0544ed70 |
docs: point the known-gaps list at the TODO folder, and un-stale its first item
Item 1 said the broker reads none of the container or pointer configuration. That was true and is not: the settings are parsed beside Policy and a switched-off container host reports itself unavailable with the key named. The item now records what actually matters about it -- that containers are off on the deployment machine because no window can be put in one -- and the section links docs/TODO/, where each open problem has its impact written down. The TODO folder itself landed in the previous commit by accident (a `git add -A docs` swept it in with the scroll work); this commit only makes it findable. |
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6b395305e0 |
scroll: one verb, two axes, and the sign carries the direction
A session could move a cursor and press it, but not scroll. The protocol already had the request -- zwlr_virtual_pointer_v1.axis(time, axis, value) -- it had simply never been implemented, in the driver or the broker. hhstream session pointer scroll <id> --axis vertical --amount 3 Positive is down (vertical) or right (horizontal): the protocol's direction, not a choice of ours, which is why direction travels in the sign and there is deliberately no up/down vocabulary layered over it. The output is whatever the last warp aimed at, exactly like a button, so scrolling somewhere else is a warp first -- and the lease is what keeps the whole gesture atomic. Bounded at 100 wheel clicks per request on both sides, because a decimal-point slip should be a refusal rather than a session scrolled somewhere unrecoverable. The resume point is re-stamped, not moved: the cursor did not go anywhere, so the coordinates are re-affirmed and only the stamp advances. Recorded in the contract as an amendment to the frozen op set, because adding an op to a frozen interface should be visible rather than implied. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d0efba0877 |
examples: the acceptance proof video, as a script
Driving the session's browser over CDP, then a terminal with cowsay, was a scratch script twice and got pruned from scratch once -- which produced an 80-second video of an idle browser and no error. It is asked for repeatedly, so it belongs with the rest of the agent-eyes tooling, takes a session id, and says in its docstring that the URLs are real (the search uses key= singular, the bug that once silently cost every Gunpost search its filtering). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8f3f000783 |
read the config the module writes: containers can be turned off
The module rendered containers_enabled, workspace_base, container_mode, max_containers and the pointer lease keys into the TOML, and policy.py read only [defaults] and [apps] -- so the settings were inert. The defaults coincided, which made it look honoured, until a deployment tried to turn containers off and found it could not. Settings now come from the same file: parsed beside Policy (read by __main__, so the manager keeps taking a plain ManagerConfig its tests build directly) and carried into ContainerHost, which reports itself unavailable when switched off. That is the whole mechanism -- the manager already treats an unavailable host as 'sessions without containers', which is what turning them off means -- and the reason names the key, so a disabled machine cannot be mistaken for one whose compositor is down. This is what made the rollback on the host possible; the machine had containers built, tested, and impossible to disable. |
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c1dc60af00 |
hyprland-conf: follow the pointer, because one now exists
vm-pointer measured what this setting actually does: with follow_mouse=0 Hyprland delivers pointer events only to the keyboard-focused window, so a click aimed at 0.25,0.75 of a session's container put the cursor at x=299 y=519 -- inside that window -- and both clients reported nothing. The click was aimed correctly and delivered nowhere. The comment here said 'no pointer will ever exist; do not let focus depend on one', which was true when written and is false now that the broker injects a virtual pointer. The cursor lease already serialises input, so focus following the pointer cannot make two sessions fight over the keyboard. |
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1c886eec3f |
merge surface/cli-module-checks into main
The surface the plan described, and the first composer of real compositor evidence: seven checks green one at a time, including three new ones. They proved `hyprctl output create headless` works (PLAN experiment 3, until now unverified), that a click lands where it was aimed read from the application itself, and that an unmatched window is quarantined. They also found three defects no fake could: Hyprland's IPC directory is mode 0700 so the broker could not reach either socket and degraded silently, a broker restart deleted the driver's socket out from under it, and input:follow_mouse=0 sends pointer events only to the keyboard-focused window, so an aimed click reaches a client that reports nothing. |
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de408e4b7f |
the surface: CLI verbs, the module's options, and three checks the compositor votes in
Everything below the CLI was merged and green against fakes; none of it was
reachable and none of it had ever met a compositor. This wires it up and then
puts the compositor in a position to disagree.
CLI (src/hhstream/cli.py, src/hhstream_session/**)
session container [ID], session reconcile [ID], and the seven pointer verbs
from PLAN §9. `start` still prints the bare session id and nothing else.
`list` gains WS / OUTPUT / POINTER, with the gap marker where a value is
genuinely unknown rather than a blank that reads as zero -- the POINTER
column needs a second, read-only `pointer.state` call because the `list`
reply carries no lease state.
The lease id is cached in `hhstream_session.lease` (under
$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), because PLAN §9's gesture verbs take no --lease and the
wire requires a lease_id on every one of them; --lease and $HHSTREAM_LEASE
override it, and a `no_lease` refusal drops the stale entry.
Exit codes are the contract's: a gesture with no lease is 9 and never
reaches the broker, and a compositor failure is 10 with a message that says
the session is still running. `kill` now warns about
`session.container_survivors` -- windows the compositor still shows -- and
distinguishes `null` ("could not ask") from `[]`.
`shot`/`record --output NAME` capture one container through `grim -o`; the
frame socket publishes the main output only, so it cannot do it.
Module (nix/module.nix)
sessions.containers.{enable,max,mode,workspaceBase},
sessions.pointer.{enable,leaseTtl,leaseMax}, rendered into the generated
TOML with §10's key names. hhstream-pointer.service: the operator's account,
supplementary group hhstream, After=/BindsTo= the compositor,
Restart=on-failure, KillMode=process, and the command line §3.4 freezes.
tmpfiles for /run/hhstream plus RuntimeDirectoryPreserve on the broker,
without which restarting the broker deletes the driver's socket out from
under it. The runtime-directory length assertion is untouched.
And ExecStartPost on the compositor, opening its IPC directory to its own
group: Hyprland creates <runtime>/hypr with S_IRWXU, so the broker -- a
different account by design -- could not reach the request or event socket
at all, and degraded silently exactly as it is built to.
Checks (checks/**)
vm-ipc: both sockets at their frozen names, measured against sun_path's 108
bytes, and a socket2 subscriber that receives an openwindow for a window the
test creates. The subscriber is the shipped HyprlandIPC, not a second
implementation: this check exists to prove that this client hears this
compositor.
vm-containers: one hh-* output per session at the container mode, the window
on it, a second window of the same application beside it, an unmatched
window quarantined, grim -o isolating one container, teardown removing the
output and freeing the slot. PLAN experiment 3 is answered: `hyprctl output
create headless` works.
vm-pointer: a version-2 virtual pointer, a warp and a click whose
coordinates the *application* reports, BUSY naming the holder, an expired
lease swept with its held button lifted, and a broker restart that leaves
the lock free, the bookmark intact and the driver reachable.
checks/lib gains the guest the three share, their test-script helpers (no
assertions live there), an event-socket subscriber and a Wayland client that
says where it was clicked -- nothing in nixpkgs both honours
$HHSTREAM_APP_ID and reports pointer events.
Reported, not worked around: the broker reads none of the container or
pointer config (policy.py takes [defaults] and [apps] only), `start` has no
no_container field so --no-container is refused rather than silently ignored,
and nix/hyprland-conf.nix sets input:follow_mouse = 0, which sends pointer
events to the focused window only -- measured, with the cursor at the aimed
pixel and no client told. README.dev.md has the evidence for each.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQy29x9AfHWyzNd1f7XPGK
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57fdd4f636 |
ipc: Monitor gains the id that CONTRACT-sessions v2 promised
The contract bump added Monitor.id and nobody implemented it: slice B predates v2, so the integration slice had to join a client to its output through Workspace.monitor instead. Field added, parsed from `monitors -j`, and -1 when a reply omits it -- a missing id must not default to 0, which would silently bind every such client to the first output. Two tests: the id is parsed, and omitting it yields -1. |
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39f0180d2d |
merge integration/broker-wiring into main
The four modules built against the frozen contract finally have a caller. Record schema 3 with migration, container lifecycle (create on start, teardown on kill, reap, gc and unprompted exit, reconcile at start-up), the pointer verbs over the lease with a 1s expiry sweep, quarantine_argv, and the new wire verbs and error codes. Its own report is explicit that the fake compositor proves the broker's half only; whether Hyprland accepts these commands is the VM checks' question. |
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129430bffd |
wire the broker to the compositor, containers and pointer
The four slices existed and nothing called them. Now the broker builds a
spatial container per session, reads back what the compositor actually did,
and aims the cursor into one container under a broker-wide lease.
Record schema 3 (registry.py): `container` {output, workspace, mode,
created_by, state}, `pointer` {bookmark, last_released_at, released_by} and
the compositor's `signature`. A v2 record is migrated on load, not refused —
its application is still running. Every field that could not be verified is
null; `container: null` means "no container", never "probably something".
Containers (new container_host.py, manager.py, launcher.py): `start`
allocates a slot from `WorkspaceAllocator`, runs `container_plan()`'s argv,
launches the app with the container stamp in its environment, then reads the
workspace, output and window back out of `clients -j`. Teardown removes the
output, releases the slot and reports survivors rather than claiming success
— and runs for an unprompted exit and for `gc` too, so no container is ever
left unattended. Broker start-up reconciles: adopt `hh-*` outputs a live
session claims, remove the rest, `contains_output()` being the only filter.
No IPC means `container: degraded` and lifecycle verbs unchanged.
The plans' argv are dispatched over the compositor's request socket rather
than by executing `hyprctl`, which is what hyprctl does with the same words;
the reply is checked, so a refused command is not recorded as a container.
Pointer (new driver.py, manager.py): a client for the driver's private
socket, and `pointer.acquire|move|button|click|release|state` on top of
`PointerLease`. The broker owns the lease, the driver executes. The bookmark
is marked on every move and before release and stored in the record, so it
survives a restart. On expiry `pressed()` is read before `expire()` and
`release_all` goes to the driver, because the lease cannot lift a button
itself; a sweep runs unprompted so the TTL is a promise.
containers.py to v2: `quarantine_plan()` -> `quarantine_argv()`, with the
before-any-per-session-rule ordering stated where the caller could get it
wrong. protocol.py: 9 NO_LEASE, 10 COMPOSITOR, the verb table, and the
`request_id` cache moved out of the server so the CLI agrees with it.
Tests: real AF_UNIX everywhere — a stateful fake compositor and the shipped
pointer driver behind a recording sink. No mocked sockets, no compositor, no
VM. 551 -> 693.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017mUq7QvQ9EZb2Wi35xj4cs
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20b2aee109 |
unit check: run the whole tests/ tree, not just tests/unit
The check took ../tests/unit alone, so the broker's, the pointer driver's and the sessions suites were collected by no check at all -- 432 of 551 tests ran only when someone happened to enter the dev shell. It now takes ../tests, which surfaced two real defects in the harness rather than in the code: - tests/sessions/integration/test_lifecycle.py locates the repository by looking upward for a pyproject.toml, which a build has no reason to contain; it raised at import and took the whole run down as a collection error. The check now copies the marker in, which is what the test documents it needs. - That file also REPLACED PYTHONPATH for the daemon it spawns instead of prepending to it. In a checkout src/ is the package, so it worked; under a build it discarded the package under test, and 'python -m hhstreamd' died at startup with an ImportError -- reported as a daemon failure on every test in the file. Prepending is the fix, and the right behaviour anywhere. pywayland joins the test environment because the pointer driver imports it. unit: 551 collected, 550 passed, 1 skipped (a deliberate skip). |
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e8b3855a05 |
move every live default to /run/hypr-stream, and resolve the slices' contract gaps
Slice A renamed the runtime directory in the module, but the old path was still live in the code and checks it does not own, so the VM gates pointed at a directory the module no longer creates. This moves the 21 remaining live occurrences (client/server defaults, the unit tests that pin them, all three VM checks, the diagnostics script, both READMEs) and deliberately leaves the three mentions that are history rather than configuration: the plan's problem statement, module.nix's note about the previous name, and cli.py's explanation for spelling its default out. Also here: docs/CONTRACT-sessions.md is now v2 with every gap the four slices reported resolved as a decision (Monitor.id, stable_id, pid -1, Event.data, mark(), the quarantine argv type, the corrected wlr XML path, and the state dir/frame socket rows), and docs/CONTRACT.md is v2 because its documented socket default moved -- wire format unchanged. Two comments that stated the old, wrong diagnosis (a 'misnamed' IPC socket) now state the measured one: the event socket did not fit in sun_path. |