`mcp.http.enable` is the fourth unit and the first that listens on a port. The comment on the `mcp` block said anything that started a daemon here "would be inventing a second thing to supervise", so it is rewritten rather than deleted: what changed is not the cost of supervising it but what it buys -- a port is reachable by a caller who never touched this filesystem, which is the first time a token on this surface means anything. The two options stay independent and neither implies the other. `mcp.stateDir` defaults to /var/lib/hhstream-mcp and is deliberately NOT `sessions.stateDir`. That directory is 0700 owned by the broker's user and holds `events.jsonl`; parking a token file in it would grant this shim write access to the audit trail's directory for no reason, and the two have different lifetimes besides. A tmpfiles entry rather than `StateDirectory=`, for the reason the broker's state dir is one -- `StateDirectory=` can only name a path under /var/lib and would stop applying the moment the option is pointed elsewhere. The unit runs as sessions.user with sessions.group, because its tools are the CLI's handlers called in process and that CLI opens a 0660 control socket owned by that user and a compositor runtime directory owned by that group. `Wants`/`After` the broker and not `BindsTo`: the frame verbs answer with the broker down and the rest answer exit 5, which is a true answer, whereas a listener that vanished with the broker would turn that into a connection refused and tell a client nothing. The systemd default KillMode is right here and `KillMode=process` -- which the broker and the driver both need -- would be wrong, because every process this unit starts is part of answering one request. Two assertions and two warnings, each for a failure that is otherwise discovered from the far side of an HTTP client: * http.enable without sessions.enable is an assertion, not the warning `mcp.enable` gets against the same condition, because there the frame tools still work and here `User=` names an account that does not exist. * a wildcard bind with no allowedHosts is an assertion, because the SDK's rebinding allowlist has no implicit localhost and the unit would come up refusing everything with a 421. * a non-loopback address warns that the token crosses the wire in clear text, since the option reads like a bind address and not like a decision about what is on it. * openFirewall warns and is not implied by http.enable, the same way sessions.stream.openFirewall is not implied by the stream. `mcp.http.enable` also puts the binary on PATH, because `token mint` is how the credential that unit demands gets issued. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KchcvnbfhhZhUHy83YL3Ya
hyprland-headless-stream-plugin
A Nix flake that runs a headless Hyprland session and publishes its frames on a persistent Unix socket, so any process that can open a socket can see the screen without owning a display.
Two parts:
- NixOS module —
services.hyprland-headless-stream: starts Hyprland with no physical monitor, and a small frame server beside it. - Package —
hhstream— the frame server (publishes frames) and its client (reads them). Pure Python standard library.
{
inputs.hhstream.url = "git+https://<host>/git/<owner>/hyprland-headless-stream-plugin.git";
# in your host config
imports = [ inputs.hhstream.nixosModules.default ];
services.hyprland-headless-stream = {
enable = true;
# Optional: the default is one 1280x720@30 rule with an empty name, which
# is Hyprland's wildcard and applies to whatever outputs the GPU has.
outputs = [ { width = 1920; height = 1080; refresh = 60; } ];
};
}
Then any consumer:
hhstream-client --socket /run/hypr-stream/stream.sock --count 1 --out frame.png
The socket is a plain file descriptor: the server serves every client that connects, and keeps running when one disconnects.
Watching a session: one port, a phrase per session
A session can publish its own screen on a web page, so a person can watch what an agent is doing from a phone. One port for the whole machine, and a path that is four words and a short tail:
hhstream session stream enable chromium-k3f9d2
# http://127.0.0.1:9988/amber-otter-lantern-harbor-7k2qp/
That URL is the whole interface — a browser <img> is the entire client, over
MJPEG — and the phrase in it is its only protection. No TLS, no second
factor: anyone who can reach the port and guess four words can watch. It is
never written to the audit log, and stream list does not print it.
Four things worth knowing before switching one on:
- It is per session and off by default. A session does not stream because it exists; it streams because somebody enabled it. What is published is that session's own container output, never the main one — the main output carries every other session, and putting it behind one session's phrase is the mistake this refuses to make.
- The phrase survives a restart. It lives in the session's record, so
somebody you read it out to keeps the URL you gave them.
disablethenenablerotates it. - Capture runs only while somebody is connected. An enabled stream nobody
is watching costs no
grimand no CPU. - Watching counts as activity. This is the one exception to "
touchis the only mark of activity": about once a minute the broker notices a connected viewer and resets that session's idle clock, so a long job you are watching on a phone is not reaped at three hours. An enabled stream with nobody watching keeps nothing alive.
services.hyprland-headless-stream.sessions.stream = {
enable = true; # runs hhstream-live; turns no stream on
# bind = "0.0.0.0"; # and openFirewall, to reach it from another device
# openFirewall = true;
};
Loopback by default, where the path to a phone is ssh -L 9988:127.0.0.1:9988.
hhstream session start <app> --stream starts an application and prints its
URL in one go, which is the usual way an agent sets one up.
Driving it from an agent: the MCP server
hhstream-mcp is the hhstream CLI behind a Model Context
Protocol surface, so an agent can look at this
desktop, put an application on it, and aim its one pointer and keyboard at that
application without writing command lines. The interface is frozen in
docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md.
It is split the way the protocol splits things:
- Resources are the state — ten of them, read by URI, and reading one
changes nothing.
hhstream://statusis whether the desktop is up,hhstream://sessionsis what is running,hhstream://sessions/<id>/logsis an application's own output,hhstream://pointeris who holds the input lease,hhstream://screenis a frame of the screen,hhstream://streamsis what is being published and who is watching. - Tools are the acts — twenty-three, one per CLI verb that does something.
session_startputs an application on the screen,pointer_acquiretakes the input lease,keyboard_typetypes,session_stream_enablepublishes the screen for a person to watch,session_killends a session.
A host decides what state to put in front of its model; the model decides what
to do. That is the whole of the split, and it is why shot is still a tool
(capturing is an act at a moment) while hhstream://screen exists beside it.
It is a thin wrapper and nothing more: every tool and every resource builds the argv list the CLI's own parser takes, runs the CLI's own handler, and maps what came back. The idle clock, the pointer lease, the allowlist and the exit-code table all stay where they were.
Install it with the module — off by default, because it is the surface through which a language model starts processes on this machine:
services.hyprland-headless-stream = {
enable = true;
sessions.enable = true; # the session, pointer and keyboard tools need the broker
mcp.enable = true; # puts `hhstream-mcp` on the system PATH
};
Then register it with a client. The transport is stdio — one process per client, spawned by the client, no port and no daemon — so the whole configuration is a command and an environment:
{
"mcpServers": {
"hhstream": {
"command": "hhstream-mcp",
"env": {
"HHSTREAM_SOCKET": "/run/hhstream/control.sock",
"HHSTREAM_FRAME_SOCKET": "/run/hypr-stream/stream.sock"
}
}
}
}
Both variables are the CLI's own and both are shown at their defaults, so they
can be left out unless this machine moved a socket. The account the client runs
as needs what the CLI needs: membership of the compositor's group (hhstream)
to read the frame socket, and of the broker's to reach the control socket. The
server cannot recover that for itself the way the CLI does — see
docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md §5 — so if shot reports it cannot read the socket, the
answer is "command": "sg", "args": ["hhstream", "-c", "hhstream-mcp"] or an
account in the group.
hhstream-mcp --list-tools and --list-resources print the two tables and
exit, which is the quickest way to check an install.
If twenty-three tools is more than a client has room for, --toolsets narrows
what is offered to whichever families are wanted — frames, sessions,
pointer, keyboard:
{ "command": "hhstream-mcp", "args": ["--toolsets", "frames,pointer,keyboard"] }
Resources are deliberately not narrowed by it: they are the host's context, not the model's tool budget. Nothing else about the server is configurable — it holds no state and caches no lease, and the pointer lease is an explicit argument on every gesture tool for exactly that reason.
| Document | What it is |
|---|---|
docs/CONTRACT.md |
the wire protocol and the module surface — the interface other people build against |
docs/CONTRACT-sessions.md |
the broker, the containers and the input lease |
docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md |
the MCP surface: the resource URIs, the tool names, their arguments and the error mapping |
docs/ARCHITECTURE.md |
how the pieces fit: compositor, capture, server, client |
README.dev.md |
how to build, test and hack on it |
examples/README.md |
the demo that films the screen: agent-eyes-demo.py |
Status: work in progress — the module and the test suite are being built.