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hyprland-headless-stream-pl…/docs/TODO/containers-do-not-bind.md
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Hermenix 7e0544ed70 docs: point the known-gaps list at the TODO folder, and un-stale its first item
Item 1 said the broker reads none of the container or pointer configuration.
That was true and is not: the settings are parsed beside Policy and a switched-off
container host reports itself unavailable with the key named. The item now
records what actually matters about it -- that containers are off on the
deployment machine because no window can be put in one -- and the section links
docs/TODO/, where each open problem has its impact written down.

The TODO folder itself landed in the previous commit by accident (a `git add -A
docs` swept it in with the scroll work); this commit only makes it findable.
2026-10-03 19:06:17 +00:00

61 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown

# Containers are built, tested, and switched off
## The issue
A session can be given its own container — its own headless output and a
numbered workspace — but **no window can be assigned to it**.
The broker stamps an identity on each session's app and matches a windowrule on
`match:initial_class`, on the assumption that an allowlisted app will carry that
stamp. None of them does: chromium reaches the compositor through a wrapper
script whose flags do not set a per-session class, and `foot` has no such
option. Every allowlisted app therefore lands in the *base* class set, the
broker judges it foreign to every container, and quarantines it.
The consequence is that enabling containers makes sessions unusable — which is
how this was found: not in tests, but live, immediately after the first switch
that enabled them. Containers are now off
(`containers_enabled = false`), and every session reports
`container: {state: "degraded", output: null}`, deliberately, so a disabled
machine cannot be mistaken for one whose compositor is down.
## Ideas
0. **This is already recorded from the other side**, in `README.dev.md` item 4:
a window rule only binds for an application that reads the environment, and
the fix proposed there is a per-app `--app-id` in the allowlist — a policy
change. Idea 1 below sidesteps the question instead of answering it, because
it needs nothing from the application at all.
1. **Adopt windows by the pid the compositor already reports.** *(recommended)*
`hyprctl clients -j` gives each client's pid, and the broker already knows each
session's pid — so the join is a lookup, and **no app has to take part**. No
stamp, no per-app flags, and it works for programs that will never co-operate.
It must use `(pid, starttime)` rather than pid alone, because the wrapper
replaces its own argv and that is exactly the pid-reuse confusion already
fixed once in `procmon`.
2. **Per-app identity argument, where one exists.** chromium accepts
`--class=hh-<id>`, so the wrapper could pass the session's value. Cheap for
chromium, and dead weight for every other app: it makes the allowlist a list of
apps that cooperate.
3. **Keep the stamp, set it in each wrapper.** Same shape as (2), more moving
parts, same ceiling.
4. **Hybrid: pid first, stamp as a fallback.** Only worth it if some app reports
no pid at all; the compositor's `-1` sentinel for "absent pid" already covers
the reporting side.
## Why it matters
The isolation milestone does not deliver while this is open. Sessions still
share one output and tile over each other on the same screen — two concurrent
sessions are both `ready` and both visible at once. Per-session ownership today
is bookkeeping only: a runtime directory, an idle clock, captured output, an
audit trail.
So the difference between what the design claims ("a session owns a workspace")
and what the machine does ("a session is an app on a shared screen") is entirely
this one join. And note which failure mode to expect on the way: the *first*
half of the feature — creating outputs and workspaces — worked on the first
attempt and looked fine right up until an app was put in one. A green container
test proves the compositor accepted the commands, not that anything arrived.