HermenixandClaude Opus 5 fd6d48099b test(mcp): the store, the token verbs, and every way a request is refused
373 unit tests, up from 266.  Three files, split the way the modules are:
`test_mcp_authorizations.py` is standard library and touches no SDK,
`test_mcp_http.py` drives a real ASGI stack, and the additions to
`test_mcp_server.py` are about the command line now that it has
subcommands.

Four of these exist for properties that a refactor breaks silently rather
than loudly, which is the only reason they are worth their length:

* **the file never holds a token.**  A store that started writing the
  secret instead of its digest would pass every functional test here, so
  one test reads the bytes on disk and looks for the token and for a
  usable prefix of it.
* **a concurrent mint is not lost.**  Thirty threads mint into one table
  and all thirty tokens must still verify.  The atomic replace stops a
  torn read; it does nothing about two writers loading the same table and
  the second replacing the first's addition.  Without the flock this
  fails.
* **`--toolsets` before the subcommand survives it.**  argparse copies a
  subparser's namespace over the top-level one, so an ordinary default on
  the subcommand's copy would overwrite the value with `None` and
  `hhstream-mcp --toolsets=frames serve` would quietly serve all
  twenty-one tools.  `SUPPRESS` prevents it and this test notices if it
  goes.
* **a token verb never claims the transport.**  `mint` prints a secret on
  stdout, which on stdio *is* the transport, so `claim_transport` is
  monkeypatched to fail the test if it is ever reached.

The refusal tests assert the absence of information as much as the status
code: an empty body, no echo of the token in body or headers, and
unknown/revoked/expired arriving as one answer byte for byte -- telling
them apart would tell someone who guessed a real id that they had. An
unknown path is a 401 before a 404, so an unauthenticated caller does not
learn what is mounted; the token is checked before the Host, so it does
not learn the allowlist either.

`test_resources_are_not_narrowed_by_a_token` asserts a *limit*, on
purpose: a token scoped to `frames` can still read `hhstream://sessions`,
and that is written down rather than left for someone to discover.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KchcvnbfhhZhUHy83YL3Ya
2026-10-11 20:45:53 +00:00
2026-10-09 11:32:42 -04:00
2026-09-28 05:01:41 +00:00
2026-09-28 05:01:41 +00:00

hyprland-headless-stream-plugin

A Nix flake that runs a headless Hyprland session and publishes its frames on a persistent Unix socket, so any process that can open a socket can see the screen without owning a display.

Two parts:

  • NixOS module — services.hyprland-headless-stream: starts Hyprland with no physical monitor, and a small frame server beside it.
  • Package — hhstream — the frame server (publishes frames) and its client (reads them). Pure Python standard library.
{
  inputs.hhstream.url = "git+https://<host>/git/<owner>/hyprland-headless-stream-plugin.git";

  # in your host config
  imports = [ inputs.hhstream.nixosModules.default ];
  services.hyprland-headless-stream = {
    enable = true;
    # Optional: the default is one 1280x720@30 rule with an empty name, which
    # is Hyprland's wildcard and applies to whatever outputs the GPU has.
    outputs = [ { width = 1920; height = 1080; refresh = 60; } ];
  };
}

Then any consumer:

hhstream-client --socket /run/hypr-stream/stream.sock --count 1 --out frame.png

The socket is a plain file descriptor: the server serves every client that connects, and keeps running when one disconnects.

Driving it from an agent: the MCP server

hhstream-mcp is the hhstream CLI behind a Model Context Protocol surface, so an agent can look at this desktop, put an application on it, and aim its one pointer and keyboard at that application without writing command lines. The interface is frozen in docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md.

It is split the way the protocol splits things:

  • Resources are the state — eight of them, read by URI, and reading one changes nothing. hhstream://status is whether the desktop is up, hhstream://sessions is what is running, hhstream://sessions/<id>/logs is an application's own output, hhstream://pointer is who holds the input lease, hhstream://screen is a frame of the screen.
  • Tools are the acts — twenty-one, one per CLI verb that does something. session_start puts an application on the screen, pointer_acquire takes the input lease, keyboard_type types, session_kill ends a session.

A host decides what state to put in front of its model; the model decides what to do. That is the whole of the split, and it is why shot is still a tool (capturing is an act at a moment) while hhstream://screen exists beside it.

It is a thin wrapper and nothing more: every tool and every resource builds the argv list the CLI's own parser takes, runs the CLI's own handler, and maps what came back. The idle clock, the pointer lease, the allowlist and the exit-code table all stay where they were.

Install it with the module — off by default, because it is the surface through which a language model starts processes on this machine:

services.hyprland-headless-stream = {
  enable = true;
  sessions.enable = true;   # the session, pointer and keyboard tools need the broker
  mcp.enable = true;        # puts `hhstream-mcp` on the system PATH
};

Then register it with a client. The transport is stdio — one process per client, spawned by the client, no port and no daemon — so the whole configuration is a command and an environment:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "hhstream": {
      "command": "hhstream-mcp",
      "env": {
        "HHSTREAM_SOCKET": "/run/hhstream/control.sock",
        "HHSTREAM_FRAME_SOCKET": "/run/hypr-stream/stream.sock"
      }
    }
  }
}

Both variables are the CLI's own and both are shown at their defaults, so they can be left out unless this machine moved a socket. The account the client runs as needs what the CLI needs: membership of the compositor's group (hhstream) to read the frame socket, and of the broker's to reach the control socket. The server cannot recover that for itself the way the CLI does — see docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md §5 — so if shot reports it cannot read the socket, the answer is "command": "sg", "args": ["hhstream", "-c", "hhstream-mcp"] or an account in the group.

hhstream-mcp --list-tools and --list-resources print the two tables and exit, which is the quickest way to check an install.

If twenty-one tools is more than a client has room for, --toolsets narrows what is offered to whichever families are wanted — frames, sessions, pointer, keyboard:

{ "command": "hhstream-mcp", "args": ["--toolsets", "frames,pointer,keyboard"] }

Resources are deliberately not narrowed by it: they are the host's context, not the model's tool budget. Nothing else about the server is configurable — it holds no state and caches no lease, and the pointer lease is an explicit argument on every gesture tool for exactly that reason.

Document What it is
docs/CONTRACT.md the wire protocol and the module surface — the interface other people build against
docs/CONTRACT-sessions.md the broker, the containers and the input lease
docs/CONTRACT-mcp.md the MCP surface: the resource URIs, the tool names, their arguments and the error mapping
docs/ARCHITECTURE.md how the pieces fit: compositor, capture, server, client
README.dev.md how to build, test and hack on it
examples/README.md the demo that films the screen: agent-eyes-demo.py

Status: work in progress — the module and the test suite are being built.

S
Description
No description provided
Readme
2.8 MiB
0 Stars 1 Watchers 0 Forks
Languages
Python 81.7%
Nix 18.1%
Shell 0.2%