P3 review follow-ups: bounded shutdown, unit hardening, host guard, more tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YShymaPrXmc3KYRUg2HMSs
This commit is contained in:
ariandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-15 19:27:49 -04:00
1 parent acedb9522e
commit 533659dfc1
8 files changed
+355 -14

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@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ sudo -u skyg slinuxm token revoke my-laptop --config /etc/skyg-linux-tracker.tom
Revocation takes effect immediately; no restart is needed.
Notes:
- `auth.db_path` must stay under the unit's `StateDirectory` (`/var/lib/skyg-linux-tracker`). The unit uses `ProtectSystem=strict`, so any other location needs a matching `ReadWritePaths=`.
- `token create` needs the state directory to exist, so start the service once first (systemd creates it with the right owner), then run the CLI as `skyg`.
## REST
Base: `http://127.0.0.1:9109`. Errors are `{"error":{"code","message"}}`.
@@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9109/mcp \
### Origin and Host checks
`/mcp` validates `Origin` and `Host` to defend against DNS rebinding from browsers. Loopback names, `server.bind` and the configured port are accepted by default. Requests without an `Origin` header (non-browser clients) pass this check, so the bearer token remains the real gate. If you bind to `0.0.0.0` or serve behind a name, add the names clients use to `server.allowed_hosts` (for example `["monitor.lan:9109"]`) and any browser origins to `server.allowed_origins`. Terminate TLS in a reverse proxy if the host is reachable beyond a trusted network; the server itself speaks plain HTTP.
`/mcp` validates `Origin` and `Host` to defend against DNS rebinding from browsers. Loopback names, `server.bind` and the configured port are accepted by default. Requests without an `Origin` header (non-browser clients) pass this check, so the bearer token remains the real gate. If you bind to `0.0.0.0` or serve behind a name, add the names clients use to `server.allowed_hosts` (for example `["monitor.lan:9109"]`) and any browser origins to `server.allowed_origins`. With `auth.enabled = false` (loopback only), REST requests are checked against a Host allowlist (loopback names, `server.bind` and `server.allowed_hosts`) and get `403` otherwise, to blunt DNS rebinding. There is no Origin check on REST and no token in that mode, so keep auth enabled on any multi-user host. Terminate TLS in a reverse proxy if the host is reachable beyond a trusted network; the server itself speaks plain HTTP.
## Docker access
@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ Reading the Docker socket directly requires group `docker`, which is root-equiva
docker_socket = "/run/docker-proxy/docker.sock"
```
If the socket is missing or unreadable, Docker routes return `503` and everything else keeps working.
A stock install does not add the `docker` group, so out of the box the Docker routes return `503` until you either grant access or configure a proxy. If the socket is missing or unreadable, Docker routes return `503` and everything else keeps working.
## OpenTelemetry
+1 -1
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@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Design: [`plan.md`](plan.md) · Review fixes: [`plan/review.md`](plan/review.md)
- [x] **I1** `main.rs` wiring: protected router (`/api/v1` + `/mcp` + auth) merged with the public `/healthz`, `TraceLayer`, SIGTERM/SIGINT leading to cancel, drain and OTel flush
- [x] **I2** Automated negative tests (Verification #6)
- [x] **I3** `systemd/skyg-linux-tracker.service` running `slinuxm serve`: `StateDirectory=`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `NoNewPrivileges`, `SupplementaryGroups=systemd-journal`, docker group commented (DEC-6)
- [x] **I3** `systemd/skyg-linux-tracker.service` running `slinuxm serve`: `StateDirectory=`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `NoNewPrivileges`, `SupplementaryGroups=systemd-journal`, docker group commented (DEC-6) (verified only by systemd-analyze security --offline = 1.5 OK and a `systemd-run --user` run with the same sandbox properties; not installed as a system unit on a clean host)
- [x] **I4** README: install, config reference, token workflow, MCP client setup, hardened docker option
- [x] **I5** Release build: `ldd` shows only libc + libsystemd and its deps. Record binary size.
- [ ] **I6** Full manual Verification #1–#6 from `plan.md` passes on a real host
+2 -1
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Status | Backlog |
| Status | Review |
| Owner | — |
| Phase | 3 (single track) |
| Depends on | WS-E, WS-F, WS-G (and transitively A–D) |
@@ -59,3 +59,4 @@ Tick these in [`TODO.md`](../../TODO.md).
- 2026-10-15: Card created.
- 2026-10-15: Implemented on `p3/integration`. I1-I5 done; I6 partial. Router assembly lives in `src/server.rs` (`build_router`, `serve_listener`) so tests and `main` share it. Shutdown: signal -> cancel token -> graceful serve ends -> await exporter handles -> `guard.shutdown().await` -> close pool. `token` subcommand does not init telemetry. Unit uses a static `User=skyg` (not DynamicUser) so `sudo -u skyg slinuxm token ...` hits the same DB. I2: 8 tests in `tests/integration.rs` (raw HTTP client, no new deps). Release binary 19 MB; `ldd`: libsystemd, libgcc_s, libm, libc only.
- I6 live results (release binary, loopback, real token via CLI, real systemd/journal/docker on this host): #1 build/tests pass; #2 serve + token create pass; #3 REST incl. `curl -N` journal SSE pass (docker log follow SSE not exercised live); #4 MCP initialize, tools/list, prompts/list, resources/list, 5 tool calls, no-token 401, bad Origin 403 pass via curl (MCP Inspector not run; not all 8 tools called); #5 OTel NOT RUN (otelcol-contrib not on PATH, devenv shell not started via `devenv up`); #6 pass via tests (401, auth-off+0.0.0.0 refuses, SIGTERM with open SSE exits 0 in <1s); missing-docker-socket 503 covered by WS-E fake test, not live. Unit file not installed on a clean host (only `systemd-analyze verify`, which cannot fully run here).
- 2026-10-15: Review follow-ups applied. Shutdown drain and exporter awaits are bounded (10s each) and the unit uses TimeoutStopSec=30; new test: SIGTERM with an open MCP session and an in-flight 60s `tail_journal` exits 0. Unit: SystemCallFilter, ProtectProc=invisible, ProcSubset=pid, RestrictSUIDSGID, UMask=0077; docker.service is `After=` only. Hardening was run via `systemd-run --user` with the same sandbox properties (REST systemd/journal/docker and SIGTERM all worked); not run as a system unit with User=skyg/StateDirectory. Host allowlist guard on `/api/v1` when auth is disabled (test). `server.port = 0` rejected (test). Integration tests extended (13 tests): unmatched paths (401 with auth on, route existence not disclosed), POST 401/405, GET/DELETE /mcp without token, revoked token, Basic scheme, good Origin, missing docker socket (503 vs 200). SIGTERM tests use env_clear; the pick-port-then-drop race remains (port 0 is now rejected by config).
+17
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@@ -249,6 +249,11 @@ impl Config {
/// Cross-field validation.
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), ConfigError> {
if self.server.port == 0 {
return Err(ConfigError::Invalid(
"server.port must be greater than zero".into(),
));
}
if !self.auth.enabled && !self.server.bind.is_loopback() {
return Err(ConfigError::Invalid(format!(
"auth.enabled = false is only allowed on a loopback bind address (server.bind = {})",
@@ -291,6 +296,18 @@ mod tests {
Config::load(file.map(Path::new), cli)
}
#[test]
fn port_zero_rejected() {
Jail::expect_with(|_| {
let cli = CliOverrides {
port: Some(0),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(load(None, &cli).is_err());
Ok(())
});
}
#[test]
fn defaults_only() {
Jail::expect_with(|_| {
+32 -3
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@@ -99,6 +99,11 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
}
}
/// Upper bounds for shutdown phases (the OTel flush adds up to 5s per
/// provider, so the unit uses TimeoutStopSec=30).
const DRAIN_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(10);
const EXPORTER_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(10);
async fn serve(config: Config) -> Result<()> {
let guard = telemetry::init(&config).context("initialising telemetry")?;
let db = if config.auth.enabled {
@@ -125,11 +130,35 @@ async fn serve(config: Config) -> Result<()> {
signal_token.cancel();
});
let result = server::serve_listener(listener, app, shutdown.clone()).await;
// `serve_listener` returns once the shutdown token fires and connections
// drain. If the token has not fired it is a server error, so return
// immediately. Bound the drain so a stuck client cannot hang SIGTERM.
let serving = server::serve_listener(listener, app, shutdown.clone());
tokio::pin!(serving);
let result = tokio::select! {
r = &mut serving => r,
_ = shutdown.cancelled() => {
match tokio::time::timeout(DRAIN_TIMEOUT, &mut serving).await {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(_) => {
tracing::warn!("graceful drain timed out; closing remaining connections");
Ok(())
}
}
}
};
// Reached on signal or server error: stop everything, then flush OTel.
shutdown.cancel();
for h in exporters {
let _ = h.await;
let join_all = async {
for h in exporters {
let _ = h.await;
}
};
if tokio::time::timeout(EXPORTER_TIMEOUT, join_all)
.await
.is_err()
{
tracing::warn!("exporter tasks did not stop in time");
}
guard.shutdown().await;
if let Some(pool) = pool {
+84 -1
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@@ -7,13 +7,33 @@ use axum::Router;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tower_http::trace::TraceLayer;
use std::sync::Arc;
use axum::extract::{Request, State};
use axum::http::{header, StatusCode};
use axum::middleware::Next;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use axum::Json;
use crate::config::Config;
use crate::state::AppState;
use crate::{api, auth, mcp};
/// `/healthz` public; `/api/v1/*` and `/mcp` behind the auth layer.
pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
// With auth off there is no bearer gate, so guard REST against DNS
// rebinding with a Host allowlist (MCP has its own check).
let rest = api::router(state.clone());
let rest = if state.config.auth.enabled {
rest
} else {
rest.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
allowed_hosts(&state.config),
host_guard,
))
};
let protected = Router::new()
.nest("/api/v1", api::router(state.clone()))
.nest("/api/v1", rest)
.nest_service("/mcp", mcp::service(state.clone()))
.layer(auth::layer(state));
Router::new()
@@ -35,3 +55,66 @@ pub async fn serve_listener(
.await
.context("server error")
}
fn allowed_hosts(c: &Config) -> Arc<Vec<String>> {
let mut v: Vec<String> = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"]
.into_iter()
.map(String::from)
.collect();
if !c.server.bind.is_unspecified() {
v.push(c.server.bind.to_string());
}
v.extend(
c.server
.allowed_hosts
.iter()
.map(|h| host_only(h).to_owned()),
);
Arc::new(v)
}
/// Strip an optional port and IPv6 brackets: `[::1]:9109` -> `::1`.
fn host_only(h: &str) -> &str {
let h = h.trim();
if let Some(rest) = h.strip_prefix('[') {
return rest.split(']').next().unwrap_or(rest);
}
match h.rsplit_once(':') {
Some((host, port)) if !host.contains(':') && port.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()) => {
host
}
_ => h,
}
}
async fn host_guard(State(allowed): State<Arc<Vec<String>>>, req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let host = req
.headers()
.get(header::HOST)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(host_only);
match host {
Some(h) if !allowed.iter().any(|a| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(h)) => (
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
Json(serde_json::json!({"error": {
"code": "forbidden_host",
"message": "Host header not allowed; add it to server.allowed_hosts",
}})),
)
.into_response(),
_ => next.run(req).await,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::host_only;
#[test]
fn host_parsing() {
assert_eq!(host_only("localhost:9109"), "localhost");
assert_eq!(host_only("[::1]:9109"), "::1");
assert_eq!(host_only("::1"), "::1");
assert_eq!(host_only("10.0.0.5"), "10.0.0.5");
}
}
+7 -2
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@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
[Unit]
Description=skyg-linux-tracker: read-only systemd, journal and Docker monitor (REST, MCP, OTel)
After=network.target docker.service
Wants=docker.service
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/slinuxm serve --config /etc/skyg-linux-tracker.toml
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
TimeoutStopSec=15
TimeoutStopSec=30
# Dedicated user, created beforehand: useradd --system --no-create-home \
# --shell /usr/sbin/nologin skyg
@@ -44,6 +43,12 @@ RestrictRealtime=yes
LockPersonality=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
SystemCallArchitectures=native
SystemCallFilter=@system-service
SystemCallFilter=~@privileged @resources
ProtectProc=invisible
ProcSubset=pid
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
UMask=0077
CapabilityBoundingSet=
AmbientCapabilities=
+205 -4
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
struct Harness {
state_db: Option<sqlx::SqlitePool>,
port: u16,
token: String,
shutdown: CancellationToken,
@@ -38,9 +39,11 @@ async fn start(auth: bool) -> Harness {
state.db = Some(pool);
}
let shutdown = state.shutdown.clone();
let state_db = state.db.clone();
let app = server::build_router(state);
let join = tokio::spawn(server::serve_listener(listener, app, shutdown.clone()));
Harness {
state_db,
port,
token,
shutdown,
@@ -59,8 +62,10 @@ async fn http(
wait: Duration,
) -> (u16, String, String) {
let mut s = TcpStream::connect(("127.0.0.1", port)).await.unwrap();
let mut req =
format!("{method} {path} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 127.0.0.1:{port}\r\nConnection: close\r\n");
let mut req = format!("{method} {path} HTTP/1.1\r\nConnection: close\r\n");
if !headers.iter().any(|(k, _)| k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("host")) {
req.push_str(&format!("Host: 127.0.0.1:{port}\r\n"));
}
for (k, v) in headers {
req.push_str(&format!("{k}: {v}\r\n"));
}
@@ -128,7 +133,10 @@ async fn auth_and_healthz() {
);
let (st, _, body) = get(&h, "/api/v1/systemd/units", true).await;
assert_eq!(st, 200);
assert!(body.contains("ssh") || body.contains(".service"), "{body}");
assert!(
body.contains("\"name\":") && body.contains("active_state"),
"{body}"
);
// /mcp is protected too.
let (st, _, _) = http(
h.port,
@@ -140,9 +148,98 @@ async fn auth_and_healthz() {
)
.await;
assert_eq!(st, 401);
// Unmatched paths are 401 without a token too (the auth layer also wraps
// the fallback, so route existence is not disclosed).
assert_eq!(get(&h, "/foo", false).await.0, 401);
assert_eq!(get(&h, "/api/v1/nope", false).await.0, 401);
assert_eq!(get(&h, "/api/v1/nope", true).await.0, 404);
let auth = format!("Bearer {}", h.token);
// POST to a REST route: 401 without a token, 405 with one.
let (st, _, _) = http(h.port, "POST", "/api/v1/systemd/units", &[], None, SHORT).await;
assert_eq!(st, 401);
let (st, _, _) = http(
h.port,
"POST",
"/api/v1/systemd/units",
&[("Authorization", auth.as_str())],
None,
SHORT,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(st, 405);
// GET and DELETE /mcp without a token.
assert_eq!(get(&h, "/mcp", false).await.0, 401);
assert_eq!(
http(h.port, "DELETE", "/mcp", &[], None, SHORT).await.0,
401
);
// Non-Bearer scheme carrying a valid token string.
let basic = format!("Basic {}", h.token);
let (st, _, _) = http(
h.port,
"GET",
"/api/v1/systemd/units",
&[("Authorization", basic.as_str())],
None,
SHORT,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(st, 401);
h.shutdown.cancel();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoked_token_is_rejected() {
let h = start(true).await;
assert_eq!(get(&h, "/api/v1/systemd/timers", true).await.0, 200);
tokens::revoke(h.state_db.as_ref().unwrap(), "test")
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(get(&h, "/api/v1/systemd/timers", true).await.0, 401);
h.shutdown.cancel();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn host_allowlist_when_auth_disabled() {
let h = start(false).await;
assert_eq!(get(&h, "/api/v1/systemd/timers", false).await.0, 200);
let (st, _, _) = http(
h.port,
"GET",
"/api/v1/systemd/timers",
&[("Host", "evil.example")],
None,
SHORT,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(st, 403);
h.shutdown.cancel();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn docker_unavailable_does_not_affect_systemd() {
use skyg_linux_tracker::sources::docker::BollardDocker;
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
let mut config = Config::default();
config.server.port = port;
config.auth.enabled = false;
config.sources.docker_socket = "/nonexistent/docker.sock".into();
let mut state = fake_state(config);
state.docker = std::sync::Arc::new(BollardDocker::new(&state.config, state.shutdown.clone()));
let shutdown = state.shutdown.clone();
tokio::spawn(server::serve_listener(
listener,
server::build_router(state),
shutdown.clone(),
));
let (st, _, _) = http(port, "GET", "/api/v1/docker/ps", &[], None, SHORT).await;
assert_eq!(st, 503);
let (st, _, _) = http(port, "GET", "/api/v1/systemd/units", &[], None, SHORT).await;
assert_eq!(st, 200);
shutdown.cancel();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rest_routes() {
let h = start(true).await;
@@ -276,11 +373,24 @@ async fn mcp_bad_origin_is_forbidden() {
h.shutdown.cancel();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mcp_good_origin_is_accepted() {
let h = start(true).await;
let auth = format!("Bearer {}", h.token);
let origin = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}", h.port);
let mut hdrs: Vec<(&str, &str)> = MCP_HEADERS.to_vec();
hdrs.push(("Authorization", auth.as_str()));
hdrs.push(("Origin", origin.as_str()));
let (st, _, _) = http(h.port, "POST", "/mcp", &hdrs, Some(init_body()), SHORT).await;
assert_eq!(st, 200);
h.shutdown.cancel();
}
#[test]
fn nonloopback_without_auth_exits_nonzero() {
let out = std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_slinuxm"))
.args(["serve", "--auth-enabled", "false", "--bind", "0.0.0.0"])
.env_remove("SKYG_CONFIG")
.env_clear()
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success());
@@ -299,6 +409,7 @@ fn sigterm_with_open_sse_client_exits_promptly() {
let mut child = std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_slinuxm"))
.args(["serve", "--auth-enabled", "false", "--bind", "127.0.0.1"])
.args(["--port", &port.to_string()])
.env_clear()
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
@@ -339,3 +450,93 @@ fn sigterm_with_open_sse_client_exits_promptly() {
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
}
}
/// Real binary: an open MCP session with an in-flight `tail_journal` call
/// (60s requested) must not stop SIGTERM from exiting 0 within the bound.
#[test]
fn sigterm_with_inflight_mcp_tail_exits_within_bound() {
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::net::TcpStream as StdStream;
let port = {
let l = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
l.local_addr().unwrap().port()
};
let mut child = std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_slinuxm"))
.args(["serve", "--auth-enabled", "false", "--bind", "127.0.0.1"])
.args(["--port", &port.to_string()])
.env_clear()
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
let post = |body: &str, sid: Option<&str>, read_resp: bool| -> (StdStream, String) {
let mut c = None;
for _ in 0..50 {
if let Ok(s) = StdStream::connect(("127.0.0.1", port)) {
c = Some(s);
break;
}
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100));
}
let mut c = c.expect("server did not start");
c.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(1500)))
.unwrap();
let sid_h = sid
.map(|s| format!("Mcp-Session-Id: {s}\r\n"))
.unwrap_or_default();
write!(
c,
"POST /mcp HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 127.0.0.1:{port}\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nAccept: application/json, text/event-stream\r\n{sid_h}Content-Length: {}\r\n\r\n{body}",
body.len()
)
.unwrap();
let mut out = Vec::new();
if read_resp {
let mut buf = [0u8; 4096];
while let Ok(n) = c.read(&mut buf) {
if n == 0 {
break;
}
out.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
}
} else {
let mut buf = [0u8; 512];
let _ = c.read(&mut buf);
}
(c, String::from_utf8_lossy(&out).to_lowercase())
};
let (_c1, head) = post(init_body(), None, true);
let sid = head
.lines()
.find_map(|l| l.strip_prefix("mcp-session-id: "))
.expect("session id")
.trim()
.to_owned();
let _ = post(
r#"{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized"}"#,
Some(&sid),
true,
);
let _inflight = post(
r#"{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"tail_journal","arguments":{"unit":"nonexistent.service","seconds":60}}}"#,
Some(&sid),
false,
);
let pid = child.id().to_string();
assert!(std::process::Command::new("kill")
.args(["-TERM", &pid])
.status()
.unwrap()
.success());
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
loop {
if let Some(st) = child.try_wait().unwrap() {
assert!(st.success(), "exit status {st}");
break;
}
if start.elapsed() > Duration::from_secs(25) {
let _ = child.kill();
panic!("process did not exit within the shutdown bound");
}
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
}
}