Default port is now 1984 everywhere

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YShymaPrXmc3KYRUg2HMSs
This commit is contained in:
ariandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-16 11:18:47 -04:00
1 parent dbe8a8d4e0
commit bdccace271
9 files changed
+35 -35

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@@ -18,15 +18,15 @@ export SKYG_AUTH__DB_PATH=/tmp/slinuxm-demo/db.sqlite
BIN=target/release/slinuxm
TOKEN=$($BIN token create demo) # printed once, never stored in plaintext
$BIN serve & # http://127.0.0.1:9109, loopback only
$BIN serve & # http://127.0.0.1:1984, loopback only
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9109/healthz # public
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:9109/api/v1/systemd/units?state=failed'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:9109/api/v1/journal?priority=err&lines=20'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://127.0.0.1:9109/api/v1/docker/ps # 503 if Docker is not running
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:1984/healthz # public
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:1984/api/v1/systemd/units?state=failed'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:1984/api/v1/journal?priority=err&lines=20'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://127.0.0.1:1984/api/v1/docker/ps # 503 if Docker is not running
```
Point an MCP client at `http://127.0.0.1:9109/mcp` with the same bearer header (see [MCP](#mcp)). Stop the server with `kill %1`.
Point an MCP client at `http://127.0.0.1:1984/mcp` with the same bearer header (see [MCP](#mcp)). Stop the server with `kill %1`.
The service listens on loopback by default. To reach it from another machine set `server.bind`, keep auth on, and use [TLS](#tls). For a permanent install as a systemd service, see [Install](#install) and [Tokens](#tokens).
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Notes:
## REST
Base: `http://127.0.0.1:9109`. Errors are `{"error":{"code","message"}}`.
Base: `http://127.0.0.1:1984`. Errors are `{"error":{"code","message"}}`.
| Route | Notes |
|---|---|
@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ Base: `http://127.0.0.1:9109`. Errors are `{"error":{"code","message"}}`.
```sh
TOKEN=slinuxm_...
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:9109/api/v1/systemd/units?state=failed'
curl -N -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:9109/api/v1/journal/follow?priority=err'
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:1984/api/v1/systemd/units?state=failed'
curl -N -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 'http://127.0.0.1:1984/api/v1/journal/follow?priority=err'
```
## MCP
Endpoint: `http://127.0.0.1:9109/mcp` (Streamable HTTP). Eight tools (`list_systemd_units`, `get_systemd_unit`, `list_systemd_timers`, `get_journal_logs`, `tail_journal`, `list_containers`, `get_container`, `get_container_logs`), two prompts (`diagnose_unit`, `container_health_report`) two resources (`systemd://units/failed`, `docker://containers`) and two resource templates (`systemd://unit/{name}`, `docker://container/{name}`, same JSON as `get_systemd_unit` and `get_container`; percent-encode unusual characters in the name). Log content is untrusted data and is labelled as such in tool results.
Endpoint: `http://127.0.0.1:1984/mcp` (Streamable HTTP). Eight tools (`list_systemd_units`, `get_systemd_unit`, `list_systemd_timers`, `get_journal_logs`, `tail_journal`, `list_containers`, `get_container`, `get_container_logs`), two prompts (`diagnose_unit`, `container_health_report`) two resources (`systemd://units/failed`, `docker://containers`) and two resource templates (`systemd://unit/{name}`, `docker://container/{name}`, same JSON as `get_systemd_unit` and `get_container`; percent-encode unusual characters in the name). Log content is untrusted data and is labelled as such in tool results.
Generic client config (header-capable clients):
@@ -110,21 +110,21 @@ Generic client config (header-capable clients):
{
"mcpServers": {
"linux-tracker": {
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:9109/mcp",
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:1984/mcp",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer slinuxm_..." }
}
}
}
```
Claude Code: `claude mcp add --transport http linux-tracker http://127.0.0.1:9109/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"`.
Claude Code: `claude mcp add --transport http linux-tracker http://127.0.0.1:1984/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"`.
Inspector: `npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector`, transport Streamable HTTP, add the bearer header.
Raw handshake with curl:
```sh
curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9109/mcp \
curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1984/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"curl","version":"0"}}}'
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9109/mcp \
### Origin and Host checks
`/mcp` validates `Origin` and `Host` to defend against DNS rebinding from browsers. Loopback names, `server.bind` and the configured port are accepted by default. Requests without an `Origin` header (non-browser clients) pass this check, so the bearer token remains the real gate. If you bind to `0.0.0.0` or serve behind a name, add the names clients use to `server.allowed_hosts` (for example `["monitor.lan:9109"]`) and any browser origins to `server.allowed_origins`. With `auth.enabled = false` (loopback only), REST requests are checked against a Host allowlist (loopback names, `server.bind` and `server.allowed_hosts`) and get `403` otherwise, to blunt DNS rebinding. There is no Origin check on REST and no token in that mode, so keep auth enabled on any multi-user host. If the host is reachable beyond a trusted network, enable native TLS (see the TLS section) or terminate TLS in a reverse proxy.
`/mcp` validates `Origin` and `Host` to defend against DNS rebinding from browsers. Loopback names, `server.bind` and the configured port are accepted by default. Requests without an `Origin` header (non-browser clients) pass this check, so the bearer token remains the real gate. If you bind to `0.0.0.0` or serve behind a name, add the names clients use to `server.allowed_hosts` (for example `["monitor.lan:1984"]`) and any browser origins to `server.allowed_origins`. With `auth.enabled = false` (loopback only), REST requests are checked against a Host allowlist (loopback names, `server.bind` and `server.allowed_hosts`) and get `403` otherwise, to blunt DNS rebinding. There is no Origin check on REST and no token in that mode, so keep auth enabled on any multi-user host. If the host is reachable beyond a trusted network, enable native TLS (see the TLS section) or terminate TLS in a reverse proxy.
## TLS
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Self-signed example:
openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 -nodes -days 365 \
-keyout key.pem -out cert.pem -subj '/CN=monitor.lan' \
-addext 'subjectAltName=DNS:monitor.lan,DNS:localhost,IP:127.0.0.1'
curl --cacert cert.pem -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://localhost:9109/api/v1/systemd/units
curl --cacert cert.pem -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://localhost:1984/api/v1/systemd/units
```
Rotation: replace the files and send `SIGHUP` (`kill -HUP $(pidof slinuxm)`, or `systemctl kill -s HUP <unit>`). New connections get the new certificate; established ones are not dropped. The certificate and key are read as two separate files, so rotation tooling must send SIGHUP only after BOTH are in place; if the pair is unreadable or mismatched (for example the cert was replaced but the key not yet), the old certificate stays, an error is logged, and you send SIGHUP again once the files are consistent. Any intermediate certificates must be in the `cert_file` chain. Both the TLS and the plain listener are HTTP/1.1 only, share one accept loop, cap concurrent connections at 1024 and close connections that send no request header within 30 seconds. SIGHUP is harmless when TLS is disabled (it is logged and ignored). For ACME, point `cert_file` and `key_file` at the client's output (for example certbot's `live/<name>/fullchain.pem` and `privkey.pem`, or the NixOS `security.acme` directory) and send SIGHUP from the renewal hook. For sops-nix or systemd `LoadCredential`, point at the decrypted or credential path (`/run/credentials/<unit>/...`) so the service user needs no access to the original key file.
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
[server]
bind = "127.0.0.1" # listen address; non-loopback requires auth.enabled = true; SKYG_SERVER__BIND
port = 9109 # listen port; SKYG_SERVER__PORT
port = 1984 # listen port; SKYG_SERVER__PORT
allowed_hosts = [] # extra Host header values accepted on /mcp, added to loopback names and bind; SKYG_SERVER__ALLOWED_HOSTS
allowed_origins = [] # extra Origin values accepted on /mcp, must include scheme, e.g. "https://app.example.com"; SKYG_SERVER__ALLOWED_ORIGINS
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ The key structural decision: **`sources/` is the only place that talks to D-Bus/
```toml
[server]
bind = "127.0.0.1" # set 0.0.0.0 only with auth enabled
port = 9109
port = 1984
[auth]
enabled = true # hard-required when bind != localhost
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ Solo, do it sequentially: 0 → A → B → C → D → E → F → G → 3. Wit
1. `cargo build` inside `devenv shell`; unit tests for config precedence and DTO mapping.
2. Run locally: `cargo run -- serve --bind 127.0.0.1`; create a token via `cargo run -- token create`.
3. REST: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer …" localhost:9109/api/v1/systemd/units?state=failed`, SSE follow endpoints via `curl -N`.
4. MCP: point a client at `http://localhost:9109/mcp` (e.g. `npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector`) — verify tool list, call each tool, check auth rejection without the header.
3. REST: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer …" localhost:1984/api/v1/systemd/units?state=failed`, SSE follow endpoints via `curl -N`.
4. MCP: point a client at `http://localhost:1984/mcp` (e.g. `npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector`) — verify tool list, call each tool, check auth rejection without the header.
5. OTel: run `otelcol` with a debug exporter, enable `[otel]`, confirm unit/container gauges appear on the poll interval and journal/docker log records flow with correct severity/attributes.
6. Negative tests: no token → 401; `auth.enabled=false` + `bind=0.0.0.0` → startup refuses; docker socket absent → clean error on docker endpoints, rest of API unaffected.
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@@ -108,11 +108,11 @@ The MCP spec requires Origin validation on Streamable HTTP servers. If the pinne
---
## DEC-9 — Port 1984 in the NixOS module, loopback by default
## DEC-9 — Port 1984 by default, loopback by default
**Status:** Decided 2026-10-16
The module defaults `port = 1984` and `bind = "127.0.0.1"`. The binary's own default is unchanged. Exposing the service to the LAN is an install-time choice made in the host's own config, never a default: the operator sets `bind`, `openFirewall` (or an interface-scoped rule) and `allowedHosts` for that deployment. Config validation already refuses auth-off on a non-loopback bind, and a non-loopback bind without TLS logs a warning (see DEC-12).
The binary and the NixOS module both default to `port = 1984` and `bind = "127.0.0.1"` (the binary default was 9109 until 2026-10-16, when the user made 1984 the default everywhere). Exposing the service to the LAN is an install-time choice made in the host's own config, never a default: the operator sets `bind`, `openFirewall` (or an interface-scoped rule) and `allowedHosts` for that deployment. Config validation already refuses auth-off on a non-loopback bind, and a non-loopback bind without TLS logs a warning (see DEC-12).
**Decision:** Accepted by the user. The default is loopback. Installs change the relevant settings.
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Tick these in [`TODO.md`](../../TODO.md).
## Done when
- F9 passes.
- With P3 wiring, Verification #4 passes. MCP Inspector at `http://localhost:9109/mcp` with a bearer header lists 8 tools, 2 prompts and 2 resources, and every tool returns data. Without the header the client receives 401.
- With P3 wiring, Verification #4 passes. MCP Inspector at `http://localhost:1984/mcp` with a bearer header lists 8 tools, 2 prompts and 2 resources, and every tool returns data. Without the header the client receives 401.
## Notes
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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Tick these in [`TODO.md`](../../TODO.md).
- **H2** `flake.nix` exporting `packages.<system>.default` and `nixosModules.default`, plus `checks` wired to H8.
- **H3** `nix/module.nix` options under `services.skyg-linux-tracker`:
- `enable`, `package`
- `port` (default **1984**; the app default is unchanged, DEC-9)
- `port` (default **1984**, same as the binary default)
- `bind` (default `"127.0.0.1"`; LAN exposure is set per install)
- `tls.enable`, `tls.certFile`, `tls.keyFile` (passed via systemd `LoadCredential`, DEC-12)
- `openFirewall` (default `false`)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Tick these in [`TODO.md`](../../TODO.md).
## Notes
- Port 1984 is set in the module only, so the non-Nix path is unchanged.
- Port 1984 is also the binary default, so the module just passes it through.
- Tokens are printed once and never stored (DEC-11). Declarative/hash-imported tokens and activation-time `bootstrapTokens` are out of scope for v1 are not offered.
- The module must not put secrets in the generated TOML. Anything sensitive goes through `environmentFile`.
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@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ impl Default for ServerConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
bind: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST),
port: 9109,
port: 1984,
allowed_hosts: Vec::new(),
allowed_origins: Vec::new(),
tls: TlsConfig::default(),
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ mod tests {
Jail::expect_with(|_| {
let c = load(None, &CliOverrides::default()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(c, Config::default());
assert_eq!(c.server.port, 9109);
assert_eq!(c.server.port, 1984);
assert!(c.auth.enabled);
assert_eq!(c.limits.max_lines, 1000);
assert_eq!(c.limits.max_follow_secs, 60);
@@ -484,6 +484,6 @@ mod tests {
.insert("authorization".into(), "secret".into());
let s = c.to_toml_redacted().unwrap();
assert!(!s.contains("secret"));
assert!(s.contains("port = 9109"));
assert!(s.contains("port = 1984"));
}
}
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@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ mod tests {
cfg.server.allowed_origins = vec!["https://mon.example.com".into()];
let st = fake_state(cfg);
assert!(allowed_hosts(&st).contains(&"mon.example.com".to_string()));
assert!(allowed_origins(&st).contains(&"http://localhost:9109".to_string()));
assert!(allowed_origins(&st).contains(&"http://localhost:1984".to_string()));
assert!(allowed_origins(&st).contains(&"https://mon.example.com".to_string()));
let _svc = service(st);
}
@@ -846,8 +846,8 @@ mod tests {
cfg.server.tls.enabled = true;
let st = fake_state(cfg);
let o = allowed_origins(&st);
assert!(o.contains(&"https://localhost:9109".to_string()));
assert!(o.contains(&"https://127.0.0.1:9109".to_string()));
assert!(o.contains(&"https://localhost:1984".to_string()));
assert!(o.contains(&"https://127.0.0.1:1984".to_string()));
assert!(!o.iter().any(|x| x.starts_with("http://")));
}
@@ -883,14 +883,14 @@ mod tests {
b.body(Body::from(body)).unwrap()
};
let r = svc
.call(mk("localhost:9109", Some("http://evil.example")))
.call(mk("localhost:1984", Some("http://evil.example")))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
let r = svc.call(mk("evil.example", None)).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
let r = svc
.call(mk("localhost:9109", Some("http://localhost:9109")))
.call(mk("localhost:1984", Some("http://localhost:1984")))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+3 -3
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@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ fn allowed_hosts(c: &Config) -> Arc<Vec<String>> {
Arc::new(v)
}
/// Strip an optional port and IPv6 brackets: `[::1]:9109` -> `::1`.
/// Strip an optional port and IPv6 brackets: `[::1]:1984` -> `::1`.
fn host_only(h: &str) -> &str {
let h = h.trim();
if let Some(rest) = h.strip_prefix('[') {
@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn host_parsing() {
assert_eq!(host_only("localhost:9109"), "localhost");
assert_eq!(host_only("[::1]:9109"), "::1");
assert_eq!(host_only("localhost:1984"), "localhost");
assert_eq!(host_only("[::1]:1984"), "::1");
assert_eq!(host_only("::1"), "::1");
assert_eq!(host_only("10.0.0.5"), "10.0.0.5");
}