C: record review round 1 responses and handoff for WS-D

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ari committed 2026-10-19 22:35:51 -04:00
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@@ -45,7 +45,19 @@ Behaviour tests with the fake transport for every error mapping row in D9; 405 o
- 2026-10-19: Split from the single phase plan 2026-10-19. The proxy logic is placed in `src/peers/proxy.rs` (not `api/peers.rs`) so REST and MCP share one implementation, as the original plan required.
- 2026-10-19 (A0): contract stubs landed (`src/peers/{types,error,transport,testing,registry,proxy,health}.rs`, `src/api/peers.rs` stub, `AppState.peers`, `Config.peers`, `tests/peers_config.rs`). `PeerRegistry::get` forwards through `PeerTransport` and `proxy.rs` already adds `x-slinuxm-hop` and traceparent; path/query allowlists, the hop-header rejection and the `x-slinuxm-peer` response header are still yours. `api::peers::routes()` is empty and merged only when `state.peers.is_some()`, so fill it without touching `api/mod.rs`.
- 2026-10-19 (C1): `GET /api/v1/peers` and `/peers/{peer}` landed in `src/api/peers.rs` (sorted snapshot, one object for the single-peer route, `peer <name>: unknown peer` 404), with behaviour tests for shape, sorting, unknown/invalid names, the empty registry, route absence when peers are disabled and local routes staying available. `docs/api.md` gained the route table row and the status section.
- 2026-10-19 (C2): the allowlist proxy is the body of `PeerRegistry::get` in `src/peers/proxy.rs`; `src/api/peers.rs` is a thin adapter that parses the raw (still percent-encoded) path, the raw query and the trace/accept headers, then renders `PeerResponse`. Allowed routes: `systemd/units`, `systemd/units/{name}`, `systemd/timers`, `journal`, `journal/follow`, `docker/ps`, `docker/containers/{name}`, `docker/containers/{name}/logs`; an `/api/v1` prefix from the caller is stripped. `..`, encoded slashes/backslashes, NUL/CRLF, a second encoding layer, empty segments and over-long paths/queries are rejected before any transport call. Query keys are per route, single-valued and character-checked; anything else is `peer <name>: unsupported query parameter`. The caller's `Authorization`/`Cookie` are never copied (the request is rebuilt, the transport attaches the peer token), `x-slinuxm-hop: 1` is added and any inbound hop header is `400 peer <name>: chained requests are not allowed`. Buffered bodies over `peers.max_response_bytes` are `503 oversize`; streams are cut at the cap, at `limits.max_follow_secs` or on the shared `CancellationToken`. SSE is selected by `Accept` or `journal/follow` / docker `follow=1`. A peer `Content-Type` that is not a valid header value becomes `500 malformed response` instead of smuggling a second header.
- 2026-10-19 (C2): the allowlist proxy is the body of `PeerRegistry::get` in `src/peers/proxy.rs`; `src/api/peers.rs` is a thin adapter that parses the raw (still percent-encoded) path, the raw query and the trace/accept headers, then renders `PeerResponse`. Allowed routes: `systemd/units`, `systemd/units/{name}`, `systemd/timers`, `journal`, `journal/follow`, `docker/ps`, `docker/containers/{name}`, `docker/containers/{name}/logs`; an `/api/v1` prefix from the caller is stripped. `..`, encoded slashes, NUL/CRLF, a second encoding layer, empty segments and over-long paths/queries are rejected before any transport call; a backslash is only legal inside a unit name (see the review entry). Query keys are per route, single-valued and character-checked; anything else is `peer <name>: unsupported query parameter`. The caller's `Authorization`/`Cookie` are never copied (the request is rebuilt, the transport attaches the peer token), `x-slinuxm-hop: 1` is added and any inbound hop header is `400 peer <name>: chained requests are not allowed`. Buffered bodies over `peers.max_response_bytes` are `503 oversize`; streams are cut at the cap, at `limits.max_follow_secs` or on the shared `CancellationToken`. SSE is selected by `Accept` or `journal/follow` / docker `follow=1`. A peer `Content-Type` that is not a valid header value becomes `500 malformed response` instead of smuggling a second header.
- 2026-10-19 (C3): `x-slinuxm-peer: <name>` is attached to every outcome of the pass-through route, including the consolidator's own `400`/`404`/`500`/`503` for that peer (a `405` is produced by the router fallback in `api/mod.rs`, which WS-C does not own, and carries no peer header; WS-T does not require one there).
- 2026-10-19 (C4): mapping stays in `peer_error_to_app` (WS-A file, unchanged); REST adds no `peer` field to the error body, so the note in this file is closed as "not done, optional". A behaviour test drives every D9 row through the fake transport and asserts status, code, message, the peer name in the body, the peer header, and that no row is `401`, leaks a token-file path or a URL.
- 2026-10-19 Handoff: C1 to C4 are committed as four task commits on `ws/C` (`9356596`, `a1ea58a`, `cf6b81c`, `c967ad9`). `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test` (154 lib tests) and `cargo tree -i openssl` (empty) pass. WS-D can call `PeerRegistry::get` now: it takes `/api/v1`-prefixed or bare paths, returns `PeerResponse` with the peer's status/content type/body, or an already-mapped `AppError`; SSE callers set `ProxyOpts.accept_sse` and must bound the returned stream with their own shutdown/deadline. WS-F/WS-T: the `x-slinuxm-peer` header, 405, hop-header 400, 503-with-peer-name and query filtering behaviours the VM test asserts are covered by `src/api/behaviour_tests.rs`. Re-check against the real registry once B lands (real transport must map peer statuses to `PeerError` before C sees them; the fake returns statuses verbatim). No Nix VM test was run by this workstream.
- 2026-10-19 Handoff: C1 to C4 are committed as four task commits on `ws/C` (`9356596`, `a1ea58a`, `cf6b81c`, `c967ad9`). `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test` (154 lib tests) and `cargo tree -i openssl` (empty) pass. WS-D can call `PeerRegistry::get` now: it takes `/api/v1`-prefixed or bare paths and returns `PeerResponse` or an already-mapped `AppError`. SSE callers set `ProxyOpts.accept_sse` and then hand the response to `proxy::prepare_response(peer, resp, reg.config().max_response_bytes, deadline, shutdown)` and stream `PreparedResponse.body`: that function (not the REST adapter) owns the 2xx-only status check, the content-type check, the buffered cap and the follow deadline/shutdown bound, so D must not add a second copy. See the review entry below. WS-F/WS-T: the `x-slinuxm-peer` header, 405, hop-header 400, 503-with-peer-name and query filtering behaviours the VM test asserts are covered by `src/api/behaviour_tests.rs`. Re-check against the real registry once B lands (real transport must map peer statuses to `PeerError` before C sees them; the fake returns statuses verbatim). No Nix VM test was run by this workstream.
- 2026-10-19 (review round 1): fixes.
- Blocking: the proxy allowlist no longer keeps a second, stricter copy of unit-name validation. `systemd/units/{name}` decodes the segment and calls `sources::systemd::validate_unit_name`, so escaped units (`foo\x2dbar.mount`, `mnt-data%5Cx2dbackup.mount`) and `-.mount`/`-.slice` work through the proxy as they do locally; `%5c`/`\` is now rejected only where the route is not a unit name (an exact route or a docker container). Each segment is decoded on its own, and the forwarded path is re-encoded from the decoded segment (`\` becomes `%5C`), because the transport builds the URL with `Url::set_path` and a literal backslash would be read as a separator there.
- Size/stream bounds moved out of the REST adapter: `proxy::prepare_response` is the shared step for REST and MCP. It applies the buffered cap, the stream cap, the follow deadline and shutdown, and validates the content type.
- A non-2xx `PeerResponse` is classified instead of relayed (404 -> `NotFound`, 401/403 -> `Rejected`, anything else -> `Http(code)`), so a transport bug cannot pass a redirect or the peer's error body through.
- `x-slinuxm-peer` is attached only when the name parses and the registry knows it; an unknown name is the contract's 404 with no peer header, and the proxy is not called.
- Proxied `text/event-stream` responses now carry `Cache-Control: no-cache` like the local `Sse` routes.
- The unreachable fallbacks are gone: the routes are merged only with a registry, so the handler expects one, and the peer name is taken from `PeerRegistry::status` (one parse and one lookup) instead of being parsed again after a successful proxy.
- Tests: allowlist and forward-form cases for escaped and `-`-root units (unit and behaviour level), non-2xx mapping rows (`404`, `401`, `403`, `500`, `302`), unknown/malformed peer names with no header and no transport call, `no-cache` on a proxied follow, and the double-encoding/control-character rejections (`%252f`, `%255c`, `%00`, `%0a`, `%0d`) in both `bad_paths` and `bad_queries`. Each was checked to fail with the fix reverted (the unit-name, non-2xx status, encoding-rejection and no-cache tests were run against the old code); the unknown-peer header assertion replaces one that asserted the old labelled behaviour.
- Disagreeing with / not doing:
- Disabled peers are still proxied in this tree, but the gating belongs to `PeerRegistry::get` in `src/peers/registry.rs`, which WS-C does not own and WS-B's review already covers (its finding 2). A test here would have to assert behaviour C cannot change, so no C-side test is added; when B refuses disabled peers, the REST route inherits it unchanged because C only resolves the name via the registry.
- The `raw_peer_path` `None` branch is kept: it is an `Option` check on the request URI, not an error-shape fallback, and it is cheap insurance if the route pattern changes.
- `405` on a proxied path is still produced by the router fallback in `api/mod.rs` (not owned by WS-C), so it carries no `x-slinuxm-peer`; the contract's "every proxied response" is satisfied for responses that reach a peer handler, and WS-T does not assert the header on 405.