TODO: log deferred security findings as future work

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YShymaPrXmc3KYRUg2HMSs
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ariandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-16 09:29:56 -04:00
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@@ -125,3 +125,11 @@ Design: [`plan.md`](plan.md) · Review fixes: [`plan/review.md`](plan/review.md)
- [ ] **H7** README NixOS section: flake input, token workflow, exposure model, `allowedHosts`
- [ ] **H8** NixOS VM test: healthz, 401, mint token via CLI (`sudo -u`), 200, `/mcp`, revoke, 401, bad Origin 403, plus a TLS case
- [ ] **Gate:** `nix build` and `nix flake check` pass. `ldd` shows no openssl. A fresh NixOS host serves `:1984` and a token can be minted from a login shell.
## Future
Logged from the final security review (2026-10-16). Not scheduled.
- [ ] **F-1** Cap concurrent follow streams. Each journal follow, `tail_journal` call or docker follow pins a `spawn_blocking` thread for up to `limits.max_follow_secs`. Add a global semaphore shared by REST and MCP (suggested 16) returning 429/503 when full. A client that stops reading may hold the thread past the deadline (untested); add a write timeout or a hard `tokio::time::timeout` around the producer.
- [ ] **F-2** Bound line and message length. Docker `LineSplitter` and journal `MESSAGE` are buffered without limit before the 256 KiB result cap applies. Truncate per line (suggested 64 KiB, with a visible marker) and cap total bytes collected.
- [ ] **F-3** Unit hardening: `ProtectKernelLogs`, `ProtectHostname`, `RemoveIPC`, `LimitNOFILE`, `TasksMax`, `MemoryMax`, narrower `RestrictAddressFamilies`, `PrivateUsers` (check journal group access). Test under the hardened unit on a clean host before enabling. Document how the service user gets read access to the TLS key.